OPUS DEI IN SPAIN: A STUDY OF AN ELITE CATHOLIC ORGANIZATION AND THE RELATION OF ITS TEACHINGS TO CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

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PREFACE

Survey research is ideally undertaken in an open, free society where a sample of respondents may be easily located and where they readily agree to an interview. In an authoritarian society where the memory of a post-civil war suppression of dissident views lingers on, survey research is more difficult to conduct. Yet, it is not an impossible task. This has been the case in conducting research in Spain among members of a Catholic laymen's organization known as Opus Dei.

Opus Dei has aroused a great deal of controversy in Spain during the past two decades. A sizeable number of people have perceived in Opus Dei a plot to take over elite positions in the society. Opus Dei members themselves have repeatedly assured the public that the organization pursues solely spiritual goals.

This study is an attempt to describe Opus Dei and some of its members in an objective manner to determine whether the organization teaches its members a particular political ideology and to delineate some characteristics of some of the Opus Dei political elites.

The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of all who made this study possible. It would not have been complete without the generosity of twenty-six Opus Dei members, elites in several fields, and thirty younger

members who are likely to be included in the ranks of elites within a few years. These people agreed to an interview in which their opinions and beliefs about political matters were solicited. This author has respected their requests for anonymity.

During the writing of the manuscript, Professors Juan J. Linz and Juan Vidal Beneyto offered helpful suggestions. Dr. Robert S. Robins and Dr.James D. Cochrane read the manuscript and gave constructive criticism. Dr. Jean Danielson provided invaluable advice. Throughout the research and writing of the study, as well as in editing, Dr. Paul H. Lewis provided guiding counsel which greatly improved the manuscript. Of course, the author takes full responsibility for the manuscript and for any errors that it contains.

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INTRODUCTION

Rarely in the history of modern Catholic Spain has a Church-related organization generated so much controversy as the Sociedad Sacerdotal de la Santa Cruz y Opus Dei.[1] A laymen's organization founded in 1928, Opus Dei became the object of much speculation and controversy in 1957 when several of its members were appointed to Generalisimo Francisco Franco's ministerial cabinet. By this time, other members had attained high positions in commercial and university circles. Speculation about, and criticism of, Opus Dei's possible temporal goals continued throughout the decade of the 1960's, coinciding with the period of Spain's most rapid economic growth and its largest financial scandal in the contemporary era. Both of these events have been linked, either directly or obliquely, with prominent Opus Dei members.

The immensely successful process of economic development in Spain is generally credited to a major shift in macroeconomic policy in 1959 and the initiation of four-year economic development plans beginning in 1963

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[1]Hereafter referred to by its popular name, Opus Dei, without emphasis.

under the leadership of Laureano López Rodó, then Minister of Social and Economic Development Planning. López Rodó is a long-time member of Opus Dei.[2]

In the private sector of the Spanish economy, a policy of substantial government subsidization and credit was initiated in the early 1960's in order to develop the economic infrastructure and reduce Spain's dependence on importation of light and heavy equipment as well as manufactured consumer goods. A scandal of national proportions developed in 1968-1969 when it became known that a Pamplona-based firm, Matesa, had obtained excessive governmental grants of credit and that the company president had illegally sent $1.8 million out of Spain to a Swiss bank account. Matesa officials, in collusion with high-ranking officials in the ministries dealing with economic affairs and the Industrial Credit Bank, fraudulently collected $175 million in government credit for textile machinery to be manufactured for export. The Minister of Industry was at that time Gregorio Lopez Bravo, another long-time member

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[2]For a discussion of economic development in Spain, see Manuel Funes Robert, Análisis General de la Economía Española (Barcelona: Ediciones Marte, 1968); Charles W. Anderson, The Political Economy of Modern Spain (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1970); Ramon Tamames, Estructura Económica de España, Third edition (Madrid: Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1965). A biographical sketch of López Rodó appears in Chapter Seven of the present study.

of Opus Dei. The juridical proceeding resulting from the Matesa affair reached the Supreme Tribunal where four high-ranking government officials as well as the officers of Matesa were found guilty of fraud. In the new government appointed by Franco on October 29, 1969, Lopez Bravo was removed from the Ministry of Industry and was given the higher-ranking position of Minister of Foreign Affairs.[3]

Before, during, and after the period during the 1960's when Opus Dei was being accused of trying to take over the Spanish government, the economy, and the universities, Opus Dei members themselves declared on many occasions that the laymen's organization to which they belonged espoused only spiritual goals, to the absolute exclusion of temporal goals. The founder and president of Opus Dei, Monsignor José María Escrivá de Balaguer, has often and consistently defined the spiritual goal of Opus Dei as helping its members reach a state of sanctity--of holiness--through consecration of their work or their professional activities in the secular realm. In one of his occasional interviews by the press, Msgr. Escrivá de Balaguer explains how this goal is pursued:

> And it is there precisely [in the secular world] that each member . . . fulfills the purpose of Opus Dei: to try to be holy, making

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[3]See the Madrid newspaper, Nuevo Diario, March 14, 1970, pp. 1-2, for a complete account of the Matesa case.

> his life a daily apostolate, which is divinely effective. That's the important thing. And to nourish this life of holiness and apostolates, they receive from Opus Dei the spiritual help, advice and orientation they need. But only in the strictly spiritual sphere. In everything else--in their work, in their social relationships, etc.--they act as they wish, knowing that this is not neutral ground but material in which they can be sanctified and which itself can be sanctified and become a means of apostolate.[4]

In order to attempt to understand the suspicion aroused by Opus Dei in a country that proclaims Catholicism as the official religion of the State in its constitution,[5] one must begin by recognizing that Catholicism has been involved in a process of self-criticism and renewal since the beginning of the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council in 1962. The Second Council placed new emphasis, among other things, on the value of the laity and the value of secular work. Both of these ideas had been the cornerstones of Opus Dei since its founding. These ideas were also important points of emphasis embodied in the ethos of the centuries-earlier Protestant revolt and reformation, so effectively resisted in Spain. Parenthetically,

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[4]José Mariá Escrivá de Balaguer, Conversations with Mgr. Escrivá de Balaguer (Shannon: Ecclesia Press, 1968), p. 75.

[5]Statute Law of the Spanish People, art. 6 in Fundamental Laws of the State: The Spanish Constitution (Madrid: Spanish Information Service, 1967), p. 32.

it appears to be more than coincidental that the initiation of modern capitalist economic development has been linked causally to the Protestant ethic in the same sense that the economic development boom in Spain in the 1960's is linked to the presence of Opus Dei members in economic policy-making positions.[6]

After the Second Vatican Council adjourned in 1965, it appeared that the Catholic Church, perhaps now more "modernized," was more divided by different currents of opinion. Some of the changes in the liturgy were met by disapproval among the conservative clergy and laity. There was dissatisfaction among some of the clergy, particularly the younger clergy, because the changes initiated by the Council had not been radical enough. Perhaps as a result of the confusion and disagreement, some changes were not put into effect. Among these changes were those regarding a new emphasis on the role of the laity in the Church and on the value of secular life and work.[7]

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[6]For a discussion of the link between economic development and the Protestant ethic, see Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. by Talcott Parsons (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1958).

[7]"Debate en la Iglesia: Los '33' y el Sínodo frente a la Curia," Indice, September, 1972, pp. ii-iii; José María Gonzales Ruiz, "La Izquierda de Cristo," Sábado Gráfico, June 3, 1972, pp. 14-15; José María Gonzalez Ruiz, "El Catolicismo Europeo busca nuevas formas de evangelizacion," Sábado Gráfico, May 27, 1972, pp. 34-36; Alfredo Fierro, "La Iglesia desde abajo," Indice, May 15, 1972, p. 12; Salvador Bernal, "Existe una actitud cristiana ante el Socialismo?," La Actualidad Española,

In the midst of this period of reformation within the Church, it is perhaps not so surprising that Opus Dei should have been an object of controversy among fellow Catholics in Spain. The Spanish Church hierarchy had long been considered extremely conservative. It was perhaps an expectable reaction that in this setting, Opus Dei would be resented and mistrusted because it was a church organization that not only represented the fait accompli of substantial changes in the Church, but that also was producing an efficient, modern type of lay Catholic with an ecumenical spirit.[8]

As these disagreements within the Catholic Church have grown more public, the process of self-criticism and renewal begun by the Second Council has continued. Occasions of open defiance of Church superiors have multiplied. Beginning in the 1970's, local Catholic movements in Europe have developed in the direction of a more populist, fundamentalist type of church.[9]

July 27, 1972, pp. 9-10; Manuel Funes Robert, "Está el demonio dentro de la Iglesia?," Sábado Gráfico, September 23, 1972, pp. 14-17.

[8]José María Gonzales Ruiz, "Confusion y libertad en la Iglesia," Sábado Gráfico, July 29, 1972, pp. 18-19. The same argument is made by Opus Dei member Daniel K. Madden in his article, "Work of God or Octopus for Power?," Columbia (February, 1970), 11-20.

[9]José María Gonzalez Ruiz, "Qué pasa en el Catolicismo Italiano?," Sábado Gráfico, June 17, 1972, pp. 18-19; José María Gonzales Ruiz, "Atencion al Vaticano III!," Sábado Gráfico, August 17, 1974, pp. 18-19.

It is in this new context that criticism and suspicion of Opus Dei seems to have greatly diminished, even disappeared, in Spain. However, another factor appears to be crucially important in the cessation of speculation about Opus Dei's political goals. That factor is that since 1972, the number of Opus Dei members in Franco's cabinet has declined even more rapidly than it rose. This important factor is discussed in Chapter Seven.

The present study is an attempt to describe Opus Dei as an organization and to make some kind of a judgment as to where it might fit in a political scientist's typology of organizations. One of the principal questions in this writer's mind was whether Opus Dei could be considered a political organization in the sense of a pressure group or an "underground" political party in Spain where political parties are prohibited.[10] It was decided that only field and survey research among Spanish Opus Dei members might provide suggestive answers to this and other questions about the Catholic organization that so many Spaniards had accused of working toward political ends.

The study of Opus Dei as presented here has been divided into two main parts, each containing four chapters. Part One, consisting of Chapters One through Four, concerns

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[10]See General Franco's public statements regarding political parties, in Fundamental Laws of the State, pp. 189, 212-213.

the history and description of the organization and activities of Opus Dei. Chapter One contains a survey of the literature dealing with Opus Dei, a statement of the investigatory aims of the present work, and a survey of the literature in political science that relates to the purposes of this study. Chapter Two deals with the historical background in which Opus Dei was founded. Emphasis is placed on the development of two trends or factors which appear to be of importance to the founding of Opus Dei in Spain: (1) the steady growth of popular anti-clericalism and political radicalism in the 19th and early 20th centuries; and (2) beginning with General Primo de Rivera's coup d'etat in 1923, a crisis in the old political order that had been based on an alliance between the Bourbon Crown and the Church. Chapter Three describes the founding and the development of Opus Dei as an organization recognized by the Vatican as the first Secular Institute, a new type of Church-related organization endowed with canonical status. The final chapter in Part One, Chapter Four, describes the structural and administrative organization of Opus Dei. It also contains a discussion of the education centers as well as the apostolic and beneficient activities that are operated or sponsored by Opus Dei.

Part Two of this study deals with the political attitudes and opinions of some prominent Opus Dei members and a case study of some Opus Dei members as political actors. Since opponents of Opus Dei had often accused the organization of covertly pursuing political goals, one of the principal interests of the present study was to determine whether a particular line of political thought, or political ideology, was held in common by Opus Dei members. The finding of a commonly-held set of political beliefs would indicate the possi bility that these beliefs had been taught by the Opus Dei hierarchy and might point the way, by inference, to the existence of political goals espoused by the organization. The absence of a commonly-held set of political beliefs would tend to support the organization's claim that it has no political goals and that its members do not receive any instruction relating to political matters and are free to determine their own political beliefs and acts. Chapters Five and Six contain the results of survey research conducted among Opus Dei members in Spain. Chapter Five presents the political attitudes and beliefs of some prominent Opus Dei members on a number of topical and long-range political questions. Chapter Six examines the responses of a group of younger Opus Dei "pre-elites" to the same questions.

Chapter Seven presents biographical profiles of some of the most well-known Spanish Opus Dei members. It compares and contrasts the political philosophies espoused by these men in their published writings. Chapter Seven also serves as a bridge between the treatment of political beliefs held by Opus Dei members and a treatment, in Chapter Eight, of the way in which these beliefs have been put into effect by some Opus Dei members who have occupied high government positions. Chapter Eight is a case study of the changes brought about by these members in one sector of the Spanish political system, the decision-making apparatus dealing with economic development policy. This case study attempts to demonstrate an example of the indirect, and perhaps unintended, political consequences of Opus Dei's principle of efficiency and excellence in one's professional life as a means to spiritual sanctity.

The final chapter in this study, Chapter Nine, presents this writer's conclusions about the possible ways in which Opus Dei can be considered, by a political scientist, to be a political group or organization. This concluding chapter also presents a discussion of Opus Dei as a factor in the contemporary Spanish political system in terms of both its immediate and long-range consequences for the political system.

CHAPTER I

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE PERTINENT TO A STUDY OF OPUS DEI

This study represents the first attempt to analyze some aspects of Opus Dei in an objective, systematic manner. However, because Opus Dei in Spain has become the object of a good deal of controversy, other works exist which deal, either in their entirety or in part, with the organization. The controversy seems to converge around two opposing viewpoints concerning what Opus Dei is and what its goals are. One viewpoint, generally favorable toward Opus Dei, sees it as a non-political Catholic lay organization which encourages its members to seek Christian perfection in the secular realm. The other viewpoint, generally unfavorable or even antagonistic toward Opus Dei, portrays it as a secret Catholic organization which teaches its members an authoritatian conservative (others argue that it is "liberal democratic") political philosophy and uses them to gain positions of power in accordance with some grand design to control Spain.

The literature that exists on Opus Dei generally falls into the two categories represented by the opposing viewpoints mentioned above. Of those who argue that

Opus Dei is a non-political lay organization in pursuit of spiritual goals, perhaps the most well-known figure is Monsignor José María Excrivá de Balaguer, the founder and president general of Opus Dei. Msgr. Escrivá has granted a number of interviews with members of the world press who questioned him about various aspects of the organizations. These interviews have been published in a volume entitled Conservations with Monsignor Escrivá de Balaguer.[1] In answer to a question from Peter Forbath of Time magazine about whether Opus Dei tries to coordinate members' activities following a particular political or economic line of thought, Escrivá answers:

> No. Opus Dei has nothing whatever to do with politics. It is absolutely foreign to any political, economic, ideological or cultural tendency or group. Let me repeat that its aims are exclusively spiritual and apostolic.....
> .....
> Respect for its members' liberty is an essential condition of Opus Dei's very existence. . . . The Work has never intervened in politics and, with God's help, it never will; but if it were to, I would be its number one enemy.[2]

Another leading spokesman for Opus Dei, and an outstanding canonist, is Dr. Julian Herranz. He has

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[1](Shannon: Ecclesia Press, 1968).

[2]Conversations, pp. 41-42. A note of explanation is in order concerning the use of the phrase "the work." Opus Dei members often refer to their organization as "la Obra" (the work), or "la Obra de Dios" (God's work). This phrase, both in Spanish and in English, is directly translated from the Latin name of the organization, Opus Dei.

authored two articles in Nuestro Tiempo, a monthly journal published by the Opus Dei university in Pamplona. In the earlier article, Dr. Herranz underlined the freedom of Opus Dei members to hold whatever political beliefs they choose, and the personal responsibility of each member for his own, and only his own, political actions. Hence, it is theoretically impossible for any member to speak in behalf of, or engage, Opus Dei in any political matter.[3] In the later article, Dr. Herranz reiterates the non-political nature of Opus Dei and describes some of its corporate ventures for underprivileged young people through which the Opus Dei apostolate is carried out.[4]

Dennis M. Helming, Assistant Director of Schuyler Hall, an Opus Dei student residence at Columbia University, has written a short work in which he explains the nature of Opus Dei, its spiritual character, and the freedom in secular matters enjoyed by its members.[5]

A recent article by Daniel M. Madden suggests that, while unjustified, some of the old suspicions about Opus Dei and its goals in Spain were due to the fact that its

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[3]Julian Herranz, "El Opus Dei y la Políticas," Nuestro Tiempo, 34 (April, 1957), 3-16.

[4]Julian Herranz, "El Opus Dei," Nuestro Tiempo, 87-88 (July-August, 1962), 5-30.

[5]Dennis M. Helming, Christianity for Every Man (Chicago: Scepter Publishers, 1972).

basic concept was revolutionary in the Catholic world when Opus Dei was founded. This basic concept involved the possibility of achieving Christian perfection--sanctity--through a secular profession rather than through the religious orders whose members withdraw from the secular world. Not until the second Vatican council in the 1960's upgraded the role of laymen in the life of the Church did the Opus Dei concept cease to appear revolutionary, especially in Spain where the Church was more conservative than in other European countries. Madden suggests that the years during which the basic concept of Opus Dei was seen as revolutionary made conservative Catholics suspicious of the motive and goals of the organization.[6]

Finally, a recent lengthy work by Jean Jacques Thierry has appeared and it is unabashedly favorable toward Opus Dei and its uniquely spiritual and apostolic goals. These goals and the corporate works utilized as means to the goals are informatively discussed by Thierry.[7]

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[6]Daniel K. Madden, "Work of God or Octopus for Power?," Columbia (February, 1970), 11-20.

[7]Jean Jacques Thierry, L'Opus Dei: Mythe et Realite (Paris: Librarie Hachette, 1973). Other works which fall into the same pro-Opus Dei category include José María Escrivá de Balaguer, La Constitucion Apostólica "Prøvida Mater Ecclesia" y el Opus Dei (Madrid: Rialp Ediciones, 1949); Salvatore Canals, Institutos Seculares y Estado de Perfección (Madrid: Rialp Ediciones, 1954); Julian Herranz, "Sacerdotes del Opus Dei," Nuestros Tiempo (October, 1955), 3-10; Antonio Fontán, Los Católicos en la Universidad actual (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, 1961); Paul Cummings, "Secular Institutes and the Opus Dei," Doctrine and Life (May, 1953-Dublin), 59-65.

The category of literature that is antagonistic toward Opus Dei includes an article by Manuel Ortuño who accused the organization of trying in the mid-1940's, to place as many members as possible in key positions in the Spanish universities, in the National Scientific Research Institute, and in other centers of higher learning. Ortuño also argues that the vows of obedience and poverty taken by members effectively destroy their freedom of action in secular life.[8]

Elena de la Souchère takes a more antagonistic stand and describes Opus Dei as a "shock force," trained to defend the Catholic faith by modern intellectual weapons. Souchère argues that Msgr. Escrivá and his followers, ". . . drilled a small team of technocrats--economists, teachers, engineers--who were admirably prepared to take over and control society."[9]

The three most polemical, most vehemently anti-Opus Dei works to date have come from Ruedo Iberico, the Paris publishing company that has brought out several anti-Franco works. In 1968, Daniel Artigues' book El Opus Dei en España: Su Evolución ideológica y política[10] was

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[8]Manuel Ortuño, "Opus Dei," Cuadernos Americanos, Vol. CXXVI, No. 1 (January-February, 1963), 40-66.

[3]Elena de la Souchère, An Explanation of Spain, trans. by Eleanor Ross Levieux, Vintage Books (New York: Random House, Inc., 1965), 229 ff.

[10](Paris: Ruedo Iberico, 1968).

published as Volume I, treating the organization in the period from 1928-1957, of a two-volume work. The second volume, however, did not materialize. Instead, the original volume was rewritten several years later to cover the period 1928-1962.[11] Artigues relies heavily on secondary journalistic sources for the bulk of his work. His main argument is that Opus Dei sought in the 1960's to establish economic dominion over Spain through the Opus Dei members who held economic ministerial posts in General Franco's cabinets during those years. He also argues that the ideology espoused by several well-known Opus Dei members changed radically from the "anti-demo-liberalism" of the 1940's and 1950's toward economic and political liberalism in the decade of the 1960's. On the basis of this argument, Artigues concludes that the official ideology of Opus Dei changed along the same lines.

The other book from Ruedo Iberico is by Jesus Ynfante,[12] who claims to have secured information from inside the Opus Dei organization. However, it is believed that much of Ynfante's information came from a series of incomplete notes made by a leading Opus Dei figure, notes

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[11]The sub-title of the second edition was more descriptive of the author's position on Opus Dei: El Opus Dei en España, 1928-1962: Su evolución ideológica y politica de los origenes al intento de dominio (Paris: Ruedo Iberico, 1971). Only the second edition will be referred to in footnotes hereafter.

[12]La Prodigiosa Aventura del Opus Dei: Génesis y desarrollo de la Santa Mafia (Paris: Ruedo Iberico, 1970).

that somewhat mysteriously disappeared from Spain. This could explain some of the clearly incorrect points in Ynfante's text, such as the inclusion on the membership list of persons who disavow any connection with Opus Dei. While Ynfante generally makes the same argument as Artiques, he claims that Opus Dei members are taught an authoritarian, clerical philosophy. His book makes an important contribution in that it contains new, apparently valid, information on the interlocking economic connections among certain well-known Opus Dei members.

Thus, from the two opposing viewpoints on Opus Dei in the literature, several avenues of inquiry are suggested for a study of this controversial organization. First, we want to learn whether Opus Dei is a political group with political goals that teaches an ideological, especially authoritarian, line of thought to its members. Second, we need to know how Opus Dei teachings pertaining to the spiritual realm are translated by members into behaviour in their secular lives. Here, we are actually asking if there are consequences of Opus Dei spiritual teachings for the Spanish political system.

But before we proceed farther with the kinds of questions we will be asking about Opus Dei, let us consider why we are asking the questions. In other words, where does a study of Opus Dei fit into the field of

comparative politics? On the basis of the concerns mentioned in the preceding paragraph, this study seems to be related to two bodies of literature: elite studies and developmental theory.

The connection between Opus Dei and elite studies can be established once we have dealt with the definitional problem of the elite concept. This connection is based on the assertion that while Opus Dei appeals to and accepts as members persons of all socio-economic backgrounds, a special effort is made to recruit members from "the intellectuals" of society.[13] In order to accomplish the goal of appealing to intellectuals, much of Opus Dei recruitment takes place in the universities. This leads to a large portion of members in Spain who are either intellectual, economic, or political elites. The term "elites" is used here to refer to those individuals who by virtue of their positions in the academic community, their wealth, or their authoritative positions of political power are distinguishable from the mass public.[14]

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[13]In the Catholic Church's official Annuario Pontificio (Città del Vaticano, 1967), p. 906, the aim of Opus Dei is stated as follows: "To promote for all classes of society, and especially for the intellectuals, the search for Christian perfection in the midst of the world." This writer's translation.

[14]This concept of elites follows in the tradition of Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society, III (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935), pp. 1422-23, who defined the elites of a society as those people who have attained recognizable success (usually measured by wealth or official position) in each branch of human activity. Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class: Elementi di scienza

Since a large portion of Opus Dei members in Spain come from elite strata, we can learn a great deal about Opus Dei by studying some of these individuals. More specifically, by studying the attitudes of these elites toward selected political objects, we can learn whether they share a common political ideology; and if this is so, we shall be one step closer to inference about whether their adherence to a common political ideology was learned within the Opus Dei organizations, as some of the opponents of the organization assert. The finding that Opus Dei elites do not share a common political ideology will support the organization's claim that Opus Dei has no position on any political questions nor does it teach its

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politica (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1939, pp. 50-53, wrote of the ruling class in referring to political elites, or those who perform all political functions and occupy high positions of political power. Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and C. E. Rothwell, The Comparative Study of Elites (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952), define the political elite as ". . . the power holders of a body politic. The power holders include the leadership and the social formation from which leaders typically come, and to which accountability is maintained, during a given period." There is a substantial body of literature that treats elite theories of politics, e.g., Harold Lasswell, Politics-Who Gets What, When, How (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1960, first published in 1936); Raymond Aron, "Social Structure and the Ruling Class," Journal of Sociology, I (1950), 1-16; C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965); Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967); Suzanne Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class (New York: Random House, 1968). For brief introductions to this body of literature, see: T. B. Bottomore, Elites and Society (New York: Basic Books, 1965), and Gerald Parry, Political Elites (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969).

members a political ideology or philosophy. And further, the finding of either a shared political ideology or the absence of a common political ideology will tell us something, again by inference, about whether Opus Dei is a political group with political goals.

This is one of the types of inquiry about elites recommended by Lasswell, Lerner, and Rothwell, in The Comparative Study of Elites. They suggest that in order to draw inferences about the perspectives of elites, we must conduct a direct examination of the utterances of elites. The present study attempts to do this through the utilization of two methods of examining Opus Dei elites' attitudes. The first method involves the soliciting of elites' attitudes towards current political topics or objects. These attitudes are thought to be likely to change in response to important changes on the political scene. This approach has been effectively used by Deutsch and others.[15]

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[15]Marshall R. Singer, The Emerging Elite: A Study of Political Leadership in Ceylon (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1964); Karl W. Deutsch, France, Germany and the Western Alliance (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967); Michael W. Suleiman, "Attitudes of the Arab Elite toward Palestine and Israel," American Political Science Review, LXVIII, No. 2 (June, 1973), 483-489; Wendell Bell, Jamaican Leaders: Political Attitudes in a New Nation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964); Lester G. Seligman, Leadership in a New Nation (New York: Atherton Press, 1964); Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1965); Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971). Lester M. Salamon's article, "Leadership and Modernization: The Emerging Black Political Elite in the American South," Journal of Politics, 35, No. 3 (August, 1973), 615-646,

The second approach involves the study of "elite political culture," or the more intensely philosophical beliefs and values that guide and inform elites' positions on matters of greater and more lasting importance, e.g., how the political system should be structured. An appealing use of this approach has been made by Robert D. Putnam.[16] In addition to combining these two approaches to the study of elites, the present work applies these approaches not only to Opus Dei elites, but also to a group of Opus Dei "pre-elites," or younger members who share many social and educational characteristics with the visible Opus Dei elites.

Opus Dei must be considered a secret organization, in that its membership lists and constitution are not

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combining socio-economic data with attitudinal data from two groups of Southern elites, reinforces the newly-emerging notion that "social backgrounds are unreliable predictors of attitudes, let alone of behavior," 635. Our interest in the present study, however, is not in explaining the absence of a shared political ideology, or set of political attitudes, among Opus Dei elites by looking at social background. The focus of this study lies, rather, in determining whether there is evidence of a shared political ideology among Opus Dei elites which can be adduced to their membership in Opus Dei.

[16] "Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of 'Ideology,'" American Political Science Review, LXV, No. 3 (September, 1971), 651-681. The concept of elite political culture, or ideology, as utilized in the present study of Opus Dei corresponds closely to Joseph LaPalombara's concept of ideology, in his article, "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Interpretation," American Political Science Review, LX, No. 1 (March, 1966), 6. Cf. Willard A. Mullins, "On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science," American Political Science Review, LXVII, No. 2 (June, 1972), 498-510; David E. Apter, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in Ideology and Discontent, edited by David E.

available to the public. This presented some problems in terms of identifying the members for interviews. Most important, it was impossible to select in a random manner the members to be interviewed. Identification was made mainly by searching published and media material for those who openly declared their membership, and by utilizing personal contacts. The search through published and media material led to the identification of fifty highly visible members, prominent in academic, commercial, and/or governmental circles. Of these men, twenty-six agreed to a personal interview.

Thus, while Opus Dei is secret in the terms mentioned above, it must be suggested that it is not impossible to identify some prominent members of Opus Dei, nor to secure interviews with some of them in which their political beliefs were solicited. It may also be suggested that reticence to openly discuss political beliefs may have been due to the nature of the authoritarian regime in which these Opus Dei members live. Secret organizations have sprung up in highly centralized totalitarian and authoritarian societies as well as in open pluralistic societies.[17]

Apter (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 47-76; Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review, 58 (June, 1964).

[17]Studies of secret societies can be found mainly in 19th century literature. See, Lucien de la Hodde, Histoire des Sociétés Secrètes et du Parti Républicain de 1830 à 1848 (Paris: Julien, Lanier et Cie., 1850); Henri Delaage, Doctrine des Sociétés Secrètes (Paris:

We know, as stated at the beginning of this chapter, that spokesmen for Opus Dei claim that one of its main aims is to help its members to seek a life of Christian perfection within the secular world. One of the main means of this search for spiritual perfection is through the Opus Dei doctrine of "sanctification of work."[18] This doctrine means, in practice, that one should develop oneself and make the best of one's abilities in order to become proficient in a profession or trade. This proficiency is then offered, in the manner of a daily

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E. Dentu, 1852); John Wolcott Phelps, Secret Societies: Ancient and Modern (Chicago: E. A. Cook and Co., 1873); Edwin Edgerton Aiken, The Secret Society System (New Haven, Conn.: O. H. Briggs, 1882); Martin V. Lascano, Las sociedades secretas políticas y masónicas en Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires: P. Garcia, El Ateneo, 1927); Manley Palmer Hall, An Encyclopedic Outline of Masonic, Hermetic, Cabbalistic and Rosicrucian Symbolic Philosophy (San Francisco: H. S. Crocker, Inc., 1928); and Hutton Webster, Primitive Secret Societies, 2nd edition (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1932). More contemporary works include, Arkon Daraul, A History of Secret Societies (New York: The Citadel Press, 1961); René Alleau, Les sociétés secrètes: Leurs origines et leur destin (Paris: Denoël, 1963); Eric J. Hobsbawn, Primitive Rebels (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1965); William Joseph Whalen, Handbook of Secret Organizations (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1966); and Norman Ian MacKenzie, Secret Societies (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1967).

[18]One of the best expositions of this doctrine is to be found in Opus Dei member José Luis Ilanes' article, "La sanctification du travail: Problème de notre temps," La Table Ronde, No. 236 (September, 1967), 27-66.

prayer, in praise of God.[19] This doctrine stands in somewhat striking contrast to the traditional Spanish values of Hidalgaría and the ability to live without working.[20]

One of the consequences of this doctrine for the Spanish economic and political systems, we will argue, is that a small group of technologically skilled political elites, Opus Dei members, began in 1957 to put into effect economic and social development plans that have made Spain's economy one of the most robust in Europe and one of the fastest growing in the world.

We argue that the process of economic development in contemporary times requires highly skilled and knowledgeable political elites,[21] and that the Opus Dei

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[19]Msgr. Escrivá wrote in his book of meditational maxims The Way (Chicago: Scepter Publishers, 1965), p. 86, "An hour of study, for a modern apostle, is an hour of prayer."

[20]These values can be found in Spanish literature from Cervantes to Lorca. See Carr, Spain, p. 39 for comments on the "excessive size of the unproductive classes."

[21]Everett E. Hagen, in his work On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, Inc., 1962), p. 28, argues that in societies where economic growth is successful, it has been led by individuals from some distinctive, elite social groups. Robert E. Blackwell, Jr., in "Elite Recruitment and Functional Change: An Analysis of the Soviet Obkom Elite, 1950-1968," Journal of Politics, 34, No. 1 (February, 1972), 124-152, makes the same point in regard to a wider range of types of system changes: "A change in the character of the political elite is one of fundamental importance in the life of a political system. It can reflect a broader political, social, and economic transformation that is occurring in the society, or it can herald the coming of such a development," 124. See also, Robert E. Blackwell, Jr., "The Soviet Political Elite: Alternative Recruitment

political elites had the necessary skills to successfully initiate and lead the process of economic development in Spain. The proficiency of these Opus Dei elites thus appears to be linked directly to the Opus Dei doctrine of the sanctification of work.

We will also argue that economic development in Spain has ushered in some important political changes, especially in the sense of greater meaningful public participation in the political decision-making process, and that the Opus Dei political elites have been largely responsible for these changes in the Spanish political system.

There is abundant literature on the relationship between economic development and political development. It would be useful at this point to review some selections from that literature in order to place in relief the political correlates of economic development in the Western experience. Then, we will be able to relate political changes occurring under the aegis of the Opus Dei economic ministers in Spain to the political aspects of economic development in the Western world.

Social scientists have increasingly turned their attention to analyses of the relationships between the

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Policies at the Obkom Level," Comparative Politics, VI, No. 1 (October, 1973), 99-121.

variously-defined processes of economic and political development. Some authors have posited a causal relationship in which certain political functions are seen as prerequisites to economic development.[22] Other scholars have posited relationships in which economic development precedes political development.[23] Still others have put forward a multivariate view of development which proceeds in phases or stages in which the changing political,

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[22]E.g., Joseph J. Spengler, "Bureaucracy and Economic Development," in Bureaucracy and Political Development, ed. by J. LaPalombara (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 199-232; J. J. Spengler, "Economic Development: Political Preconditions and Political Consequences," Journal of Politics, XXII (August, 1960), 387-416; Edward Wiedner, "Developmental Change and the Social Sciences," in Perspectives in Developmental Change, ed. by A. Gallaher, Jr. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1968), pp. 231-256; Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, The Political Bases of Economic Development: An Exploration in Comparative Political Analysis (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966); V. A. P. Panandiker, "Developmental Administration," in Readings in Comparative Public Administration, ed. by N. Raphaeli (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967), pp. 199-210.

[23]E.g., Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (New York: The Free Press, 1958); Donald McCrone and Charles Cnuddle, "Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model," American Political Science Review, 61 (March, 1967), 72-79; Raymond Tanter, "Toward a Theory of Political Development," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 11 (May, 1967), 145-172; Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, Anchor Books (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1963).

economic, and social systems mutually influence each other at varying rates.[24]

However, we are interested for the purposes of the present study in theoretical works that describe and explain political changes that accompany economic development. Since our focus is not on economic, political, and social development as interrelated processes per se, sometimes referred to as modernization, we shall leave aside the definitional problems of these processes. We shall consider only those political changes which are thought to occur along with, or to follow, certain phases of economic growth arising as a result of increasing industrialization and production.

Daniel Lerner's work dealing with modernization in the Middle East[25] gives us a three-phase developmental

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[24]E.g., Fred W. Riggs, "The Theory of Political Development," in Contemporary Political Analysis, ed. by J. Charles Worth (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 317-349; Gabriel A. Almond, "Political Development: Analytical and Normative Perspectives," Comparative Political Studies, I (January, 1969), 452-453; Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962). Cf., A.F.K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1966), p. 7. Organski does treat the process of political development in terms of stages but he stresses the importance of the "Primary function of national government" which changes as the society advances to each new stage of development.

[25]The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (New York: The Free Press, 1958).

model, the application of which he claims to be global, although historically it has been Western. The first phase comprises the occurrence of urbanization, then, in the second phase, we find the development of literacy. It is in the third phase, "when the elaborate technology of industrial development is fairly well advanced," that the society produces and consumes mass media of communications. It is the interaction between the spread of literacy and the development of mass media that give rise to "those institutions of participation (e.g., voting) which we find in all advanced modern societies."[26]

Thus, Lerner gives us the kind of theoretical statement in which we are interested. His assertion that wider economic participation correlates with wider political participation[27] is the kind of statement that will later allow us to compare the political changes brought about by Opus Dei political elites directing the economic development planning process with those political changes occurring along with economic development in other Western societies.

Lerner's view is shared by Philip M. Hauser[28] who argues that modernization will eventually lead to greater

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[26]Ibid., p. 60.

[27]Ibid., p. 46.

[28]Urbanization in Latin America (Paris: Unesco, 1961).

political participation. Hauser states, "Whatever the political structure, the industrial society seems to demand a more extensive political participation on the part of increasingly large population sectors."[29]

Seymour Martin Lipset argues that political development, viewed as democracy, and its chances for initiation and survival are related to the state of economic development in a society.[30] Lipset holds that "all the various aspects of economic development-industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education--are so closely interrelated as to form one major factor which has the political correlate of democracy."[31]

Wilbert E. Moore and Neil J. Smelser[32] identify several important factors which they consider to be directly

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[29]Ibid., p. 50.

[30]Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, Anchor Books (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1963), Chapter 2. Lipset's definition of democracy, drawn from the work of Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter, is as follows: "Democracy in a complex society may be defined as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office," p. 27.

[31]Ibid., p. 41.

[32]The Impact of Industry, Modernization of Traditional Societies Series (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965).

associated with the process of economic development. Among those factors that are relevant to the present study are: (1) increased political participation, either through legal political action, or, in the event that legal political action is thwarted, then through criminal or rebellious political activity; and (2) a trend toward the expansion of the role of government in regulating and controlling the economy.[33]

Joseph J. Spengler has addressed himself to the question of the political correlates of economic development that occur once the process of economic growth is under way.[34] He argues that, in general, economic development tends eventually to be accompanied by both political and economic decentralization. Spengler uses the term "decentralization" to indicate that greater numbers of persons and groups enter the political and economic decision-making processes. Thus, Spengler's argument is that economic development tends eventually to be accompanied by widespread public participation in the economic decision-making process (the market mechanism) and in the political decision-making process (through interest group pressures and through individuals engaging in voting).[35]

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[33]Ibid., pp. 105-109.

[34]Spengler, "Economic Development," op.cit., 387-416.

[35]Ibid., 415-416.

This same argument is made by A. F. K. Organski, whose thesis is that the process of industrialization which matures in the second stage of political development furnishes the elements of leadership, organization, and higher productivity that are essential to force a decentralization of political decision-making power and to transform oligarchical systems into systems of "mass democracy."[36]

Thus, there appears to be some consensus among these various social scientists with respect to this particular theoretical relationship: economic development tends to be accompanied by greater public participation in the political decision-making process. We shall be interested to show how this political correlate of economic development actually occurred in Spain and to emphasize the role played by Opus Dei political elites in its occurrence.

In order to study these kinds of concerns, a method will be employed which centers on analysis of the Spanish decision-making process that produces economic development policy, a process that has been led by Opus Dei political elites since 1957. This analytical approach requires some explanation and the definition of some concepts which will appear frequently in Chapter Seven.

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[36]Organski, Stages of Political Development, pp. 160-163.

Charles E. Lindblom characterizes the decision-making process which produces public policy as a complex analytical process involving the making of critical choices in order to solve public problems in all types of political systems. Lindblom notes that it operates within the somewhat flexible boundaries set by basic societal values and traditions, political ideology, and the reality of scarce resources. The policy-making decision process also operates in accordance with an accepted, though not rigid, set of "rules" which specify who performs which specialized task. This is because it is more efficient and less costly to have rules so that specialization and expertise can develop and so that time is not wasted in deciding who has the final responsibility of choosing between alternatives each time a decision is required. Yet, these constraints leave a great degree of leeway for the authoritative decision-makers to practice innovation in selecting the elements that will enter into the decision-making process and in solving public problems.[37]

This summary discussion of policy-making implies that throughout the process, choices must be made--choices

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[37]Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process, Foundations of Modern Political Science Series (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), pp. 4-42, passim.

relating to the allocation of scarce resources, the objectives sought, the means to secure objectives, and the gathering of information on various different means of securing objectives. The analytical method utilized in Chapter Six aims at dissecting the economic policy decision-making process during the entire Franco regime, in order to show how some of the policy making choices were made. We will be interested in comparing economic policy-making under the Opus Dei political elites with economic policy-making of the earlier period from 1939 to 1957.[38]

In analyzing the economic policy decision-making process as it has existed in Spain during the Franco regime, we shall consider the making of public economic policy as a matter of adapting and/or expanding the problem-solving capabilities, or equipment, of the state in order to achieve public purposes. From this perspective, the institutions of government, the legal system, and the state's capacity to tax and spend are seen as examples of the equipment provided by a society to its political decision-makers for the solution of public problems. Within this perspective, we shall focus on two fundamental tasks or acts of choice which must be performed by political

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[38]This two-fold division of the history of Spain's political economy under the Franco regime is employed by many authors who treat this subject. See, Manuel Funes Roberts, Analisis General de la Economia Expañola (Barcelona: Ediciones Marte, 1968), pp. 93-124, 344; Guy Hermet, "Les Espagnols devant leur Regime," Revue Française de Science Politique, XX, No. 1 (February, 1970), 15.

decision-makers in the process of producing public economic policy. The first task is that of procedural instrumentation, which means the structuring of an environment of choice by bringing together mechanisms and techniques that generate information on different possible courses of action in the solution of public problems. The second task is that of policy instrumentation, which involves the actual selection by decision-makers of the most appropriate course of action to achieve public purposes.[39]

Although there is some overlap between these two acts of choice and between the instruments involved in each, the criterion for making the analytical distinction between procedural and policy instruments is a functional one. If an instrument serves as a guide to decision-making by providing information about either potential policies or consequences of policies already in effect, it is a procedural instrument, e.g., committee hearings, surveys,

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[39]This approach is based on a similar method developed by Charles W. Anderson in his work, The Political Economy of Modern Spain (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), pp. 9-21, 206. Anderson uses his method of analysis to evaluate the policy-making process in Spain in terms of its efficiency and effectiveness and to compare the Spanish process with its counterparts in other Western European countries. Thus, while Anderson's work aims at answering questions which are quite different from those posed in the present study, his analytical method lends itself in a particularly apt manner to the concerns of this study. Cf. Herbert March and James Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958), pp. 190-191.

some types of statistical analysis, and in some cases, elections. If an instrument performs the function of carrying out a public purpose by affecting social or economic processes, it is a policy instrument, e.g., devaluation of the currency, wage and price controls, land reform.

In our analysis of procedural instrumentation during both economic periods, we shall be asking two types of questions: (1) What techniques or mechanisms (procedural instruments) were employed to structure an environment of choice for the decision-makers? Were these procedural instruments characteristic of centralized or decentralized decision-making systems? (2) What types of inputs were handled by these procedural instruments? Was there evidence of failure in the registering of inputs by procedural instruments? Were the inputs varied enough in composition to indicate a multiplicity of organized (and conflicting) interests in the society? Was there a greater load of inputs in the early period of economic policy-making or later, under the Opus Dei political elites?

We shall focus briefly on policy instrumentation in order to compare the types of policies that were effected during the two periods of the Franco regime.

To recapitulate, then, the present study of Opus Dei has two main theoretical concerns. Primarily, this is a study of an elite religious group. We are interested in ascertaining whether Opus Dei members of similar elite socio-economic backgrounds, but of two different age

groups, share adherence to a single political ideology. This inquiry will provide the answer to a current debate over whether Opus Dei teaches its members a political ideology. This inquiry, along with other descriptive data, will tell us something about whether Opus Dei is a political group with political goals.

Secondly, we are concerned with the ways in which the economic policy-making process changed under the aegis of Opus Dei political elites. This inquiry will allow us to draw inferences about the way in which the Opus Dei doctrine of "sanctification of work" is actuated, as well as something about the ways in which economic development has affected the Spanish political system in one aspect, i.e., the economic policy-making process. As has been stated, we expect to show that the Spanish experience parallels the general Western experience in terms of greater public participation in political decision-making and that this factor was due particularly to the efforts of Opus Dei political elites.

Joseph LaPalombara has identified as one of the greatest problems confronting comparative politics today, ". . . the enormous imbalance in the amount of sub-systemic or partial-systemic information available for the United States, on the one hand, and the rest of the

world, on the other."[40] LaPalombara argues that these gaps in our knowledge must be filled by attention to segments of other political systems, ". . . whether these segments be institutional or behavioral in nature, whether their choice does or does not clearly relate to the validation or illumination of general systemic theories."[41] The present study of Opus Dei as an elite group and an organization within the contemporary Spanish political system aims at providing an original, first-attempt institutional/behavioral analysis of this phenomenon; it aims at filling in another, however small, portion of the information gap.

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[40]Joseph LaPalombara, "Macrotheories and Micro-applications in Comparative Politics," Comparative Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (October, 1968), 62.

[41]Ibid., p. 3.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF OPUS DEI

No history of any organization can be written without first placing the nascent group within a socio-political setting, for it must be within the larger framework that we find the clues to the needs that the organization first sought to fill. The socio-political fabric that preceded the founding of Opus Dei in 1928 extends throughout the greater part of the nineteenth century when the first notions of liberalism, Marxist socialism, and Bakhuninist anarchism arrived to challenge the Spanish Catholic Church and its historic position as the official church of the state. The nineteenth century saw such vastly divergent experiments in forms of government as absolutist monarchy, military dictatorship, a republic, and fledgling attempts towards constitutional monarchy, all interspersed with almost chronic civil war. One historian, Salvador de Madariaga, characterizes this period of Spanish history as a conflict between absolutism and liberalism which evolved into a conflict between clericalism and militarism, and ended in a "tacit but

efficient treaty of peace between the two," with the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty in 1874.[1]

Out of this contextual background, two factors or trends can be discerned which had important consequences for the Spanish Catholic Church and its position in the society. Firstly, throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, there was steady growth of popular anti-clericalism and political radicalism. The early liberal movement eventually succeeded in dispossessing the Church of some of its considerable holdings in land and business ventures. During the latter part of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Spanish versions of socialism, anarchism, and anarcho-syndicalism began to take hold and erode the mass base of the Church. When the laboring classes, organized by these revolutionary political movements, began to employ their collective weapons--the strike and acts of violence--the Church and the bourgeoisie felt their blows.[2]

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[1]Salvador de Madariaga, Spain: A Modern History (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1958), pp. 156-157.

[2]See Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Spanish Civil War (Cambridge: University Press, 1964, 1943), pp. 37-56, for a discussion of liberalism and its relation to the Church. Cf. Raymond Carr, Spain: 1808-1939 (Oxford: University Press, 1966), pp. 93-105, for a discussion of liberalism at the beginning of the 19th century. See Brenan, Spanish Labyrinth, pp. 131-202, for a discussion of anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism.

Secondly, by 1923, the old political order of the Bourbon restoration was facing a crisis. This political order had been based on a tacit alliance between the Crown and the Church in a parliamentary framework that aimed to bring about a constitutional monarchy without political interference from the military, which had been so common in the 19th century. This system survived amid social turmoil and violence until General Primo de Rivera's coup d'état, carried out to "restore order" in 1923 with the tacit support of King Alfonso XIII. Unable to solve Spain's basic problems, Primo de Rivera withdrew from the political scene in 1928, three years before Alfonso relinquished the throne and the Second Republic was declared in existence by newly-elected republican and socialist local government officials. Popular anti-clerical, anti-monarchical sentiment had triumphed.[3]

It was in this setting of unstable old alliances and uncertain new bonds that a young scholar priest, Father José María Escrivá de Balaguer, founded Opus Dei. It is the argument of this chapter that these two factors--(1) steady growth of anti-clericalism and political radicalism, and (2) a crisis in the political system established by the Bourbon restoration led directly to the founding

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[3]For a discussion of the Bourbon restoration and the 20th century crisis in the political order, see Carr, Spain, pp. 348-397; 473-563.

of Opus Dei. Let us look more closely at these two trends and the ways in which they affected the Spanish Catholic Church.

The beginnings of popular anti-clericalism and political radicalism can be traced to the early nineteenth century when liberalism first manifested itself in the Spanish political system. It was during the War of Independence against Napoleon's occupying forces in northern Spain that a newly elected Cortes, or parliament, met in Cádiz and drew up the Constitution of 1812 which embodied Spanish liberalism as a political creed. Although the constitution was abrogated on several occasions by King Ferdinand VII, and was eventually replaced by a more moderate instrument, the Constitution of 1812 served as the model of classic liberalism in Latin Europe of that era.[4]

Spanish liberalism was based on the principle of popular sovereignty and the Constitution of 1812 contained the first formal enunciation of the principle in Spain.[5]

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[4]Ibid., pp. 81-96. Carr argues that the political theory of Spanish liberalism was derived from the 18th century natural law school and Montesquieu, from the 18th century attempts towards constitutionalism under General Godoy, from the translated works of Bentham introduced into Spain in 1802, and from medieval ideas of representative government in the kingdoms of Aragon, Castille, and Leon. Cf. Jaime Vincens Vives, Approaches to the History of Spain, trans. and ed. by Jean Connelly Ullman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 124.

[5]Fernando Diaz-Plaja, La Historia de España en sus documentos: el siglo XIX (Madrid: Institute de Estudios Politicos, 1954), p. 107.

Early liberals appeared to be willing to preserve the special legal relationship between the Church and the State. The constitution included a provision declaring the Roman Catholic Church to be the official church and prohibiting the practice of any other religion. However, liberal political thought placed great emphasis on the creation of a modern capitalist economy, the basis of which was seen to be the establishment of unequivocal, individual property rights. Thus, the constitutional instrument contained provisions for curtailing the economic power of the Church, particularly through expropriation of some of the Church's vast properties. In line with establishing individual property rights, the constitution also provided for the enclosure and sale of common lands which were the basis of the peasant sector's agricultural activities. And finally, the constitution shifted political power largely away from the monarch and into the elected Cortes.[6]

These political aims of the liberals meant that the Church, in its desire to protect its property and

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[6]Carr, Spain, pp. 94-101, 115-117; Diaz-Plaja, Historia de España, pp. 107-109; Martin Hume, Modern Spain (London: T. Fisher Unwin Ltd., 1899), pp. 175-178; J. L. M. Curry, Constitutional Government in Spain (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1899), pp. 7-11; Joseph A. Brandt, Toward the New Spain (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933), pp. 15-18; Joseph McCabe, Spain in Revolt: 1814-1931 (London: John Lane the Bodley Head, Ltd., 1931), pp. 11-12; Conde Victor Du-Hamel, Historia Constitucional de la Monarquia Española, II (Madrid: Mellado, 1848), pp. 180-181.

privileges, came to be the natural ally of Ferdinand VII, who wanted to return to an earlier form of absolutist monarchy and needed the support of the Church. This alliance flourished for a time while Ferdinand disregarded the liberal constitution.[7]

Ferdinand's reign had begun in 1814 with the support of the military hierarchy in return for the monarch's agreement to respect the Constitution of 1812. Yet, when Ferdinand continued to resist the constitution, the military led the liberal revolt of 1820 against both the King and the Church. A breach in the Crown-Church alliance occurred when, in 1830, Ferdinand began naming moderate liberals to government posts and when he published the Pragmatic Sanction which would make his daughter, Isabel, the royal heir, thus excluding his brother, Carlos, from the succession. Carlos and his followers, drawn largely from the north of Spain, were arch-Catholics who wanted to restore the Inquisition, exile all liberal leaders, dissolve the army with its liberal officers and replace it with a royalist army, and reinstitute absolutist rule.

This meant that the liberals and the military supported Isabel and the Queen Regent Maria Christina,

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[7]Antonio Ramos Oliveira, Politics, Economics and Men of Modern Spain: 1808-1946, transl. by Teener Hall (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1946), pp. 29-31; Carr, Spain, pp. 117-119.

while the Church supported Carlos and his followers during the first of three Carlist wars that occurred during the nineteenth century. Thus, the Crown-Church alliance was replaced by a Crown-military alliance.[8]

From about 1835 on, there was a gradual division of the Liberal party into two groups which became the Moderate party and the Progressive party. Raymond Carr suggests that these two groups, under various names, were to ". . . divide power and patronage within the constitutional monarch until its fall . . . ," when the Second Republic came into existence in 1931.[9] The Moderates were a rather homogeneous group comprised of non-Carlist aristocrats, large landowners, career civil servants, military officers, and professionals of the "enlightened" upper middle class. They argued that political power must be based on wealth and that sovereignty should not reside in the people, but rather in the people's representatives and in the Crown.[10]

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[8]For an excellent treatment of the military's intervention in domestic politics through the use of pronunciamentos, or declarations, and the more classic coupe d'etat, see Stanley G. Payne, Politics and the Military in Modern Spain (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 14 ff. Cf. Carr, Spain, pp. 127-129. For a treatment of Carlism as a political movement in its early stages, see Carr, Spain, pp. 150-209. Some scholars even imply that the Church supported Carlism as a political movement in order to gain more direct access to political power; see Ramos Oliveira, Politics, Economics, p. 32.

[9]Carr, Spain, p. 158.

[10]Ibid., pp. 158-166; Antoni Jutglar, Ideologias y Clases en la España contemporanea, I (Madrid: Editorial Cuadernos para el Dialogo, S.A., 1968), pp. 108-109.

The Progressiveswere a much more heterogeneous group in which could be found, ". . . generals and sergeants, needy journalists and wholesale merchants, respectable lawyers, and bullfighters," as well as sections of the underemployed middle classes that aspired to governmental posts.[11] The Progressives were more radical Europeanizers than the Moderates. Their attack on the Church extended to the secular clergy, instead of only the Church's possessions. The Progressives maintained their belief that sovereignty residing in the people was the foundation of constitutional law. They also put forward more modest criteria of property ownership for enfranchisement than did the Moderates.[12]

The Progressives were decidedly more prone to splintering off into factions. By mid-century, they had a left-wing aligned with the urban working-class Democratic party and a right-wing group that argued for government led by a stable, high-ranking military officer. These divisions within the Progressive party meant that its ability to form governments would become seriously limited, thus facilitating the long hegemony of the Moderates.[13]

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[11]Carr, Spain, pp. 166-167; Jutglar, in Ideologias, p. 116 ff., adds that the Progressives also had adherents among the intellectuals and a portion of the industrial working class.

[12]Carr, Spain, pp. 162-163; Jutglar, Ideologias, pp. 115-116.

[13]Carr, Spain, pp. 229-232; Jutglar, Ideologias,

It was the Moderates who, in 1851, fully restored the Crown-Church alliance by concluding a Concordat with the Vatican. In the Concordat, the state recognized as its duty to pay wages to the secular clergy, in return for which the Vatican recognized the validity of past state expropriations. The Concordat, in effect, took from the Church the burden of supporting the secular clergy and freed her to acquire property in the future. The Concordat also allowed the existence of the Regular Orders of St. Vincent de Paul, St. Phillip Neri, and one other Order from among those approved by the Vatican. This phrase was interpreted by the Spanish bishops to mean "one other" order in each diocese, a move that infuriated anti-clerical Progressives and Democrats who wanted to see education taken from the hands of the teaching Orders.[14]

Historian Jaime Vicens Vives argues that aristocratic and bourgeois liberalism in the nineteenth century was only moderately secular and favored a Church subject to state controls. He characterizes its main objective as the elimination of the religious orders and the acquisition of their property. However, these conservative

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pp. 118-119. Cf. Jose M. Sanchez, Reform and Reaction: The Politico-Religious Background of the Spanish Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), p. 25.

[14]Carr, Spain, pp. 234-235; Ramos Oliveira, Politics, Economics, p. 51; Richard A. H. Robinson, The Origins of Franco's Spain: The Right, the Republic, and Revolution: 1931-1936 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970), pp. 1-7.

Liberals intended that the State would defend and protect the Church, as evidenced in the language of both the Constitution of 1845 and the Concordat of 1851. In contrast, by the late 1860's, the more radical groups of the liberal persuasion, the Democratic, Republican and Federalist parties, were all openly anti-clerical and had begun propagating for the first time in Spain an atheistic point of view. By 1868, anti-religious propaganda was beginning to make considerable inroads into Spanish Catholicism.[15] It was in 1868 that a liberal revolution, led by the military and supported by Progressives and Democrats, forced the constitutionally-irresponsible Isabel II into exile.[16]

It was also in 1868 that the first emissary of the International Working Men's Association arrived in Spain: Fanelli, of the Bakhuninist persuasion, was later followed by LaFargue, Marx's son-in-law. Socialist leaders in Spain rapidly made working-class converts to their revolutionary,

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[15]Vicens Vives, Approaches to the History, p. 144.

[16]Ibid., pp. 134-135. Ramos Oliveira, Politics, Economics, pp. 89-91, argues that the fall of the monarchy was caused by the liberals' realization that Isabel was being "ruled by a theocracy" of arch-Catholics in the Court and that she was unable or unwilling to maintain the independence of civil institutions. Carr, Spain, pp. 290-293, argues that the revolution was brought on by Isabel's failure to allow the Progressives any part in a government and by the growing desire for governmental reform in the country.

atheistic doctrines. In 1872, as a result of the breach between Marx and Bakhunin, the emerging Spanish socialist movement split into the Marxist, or authoritario, branch centered in Madrid and Asturias, and the apolitical anarchist followers of Bakhunin, whose strength lay in industrial Barcelona and in Andalucia where the enclosure and sale of common lands had impoverished marginal rural workers. These socialist groups represented the beginning of large-scale organization of the working class in Spain. The anarchists organized labor in loosely confederated local federations and trade unions, claiming 45,633 members by early 1873. The Marxists founded their political organization in 1879, the Partido Democratico Socialista Obrero, with its own newspaper, El Socialista, and in 1882, a trade union, the Union General de Trabajadores (UGT). Growth of the Socialist party and the UGT proceeded more slowly. By 1904, the UGT membership stood at 43,665.[17]

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[17]Madariaga, Spain, pp. 144-152; Ramos Oliveira, Politics, Economics, pp. 146-148; Carr, Spain, pp. 439-450; Brenan, Spanish Labyrinth, pp. 137-145. Carr argues that the Socialist party, under Pablo Iglesias, had no true peasant program and its authoritarian party discipline administered by paid professional party staff members failed to appeal to the fiercely individualistic agrarian working classes which found anarchism more acceptable; see Carr, Spain, pp. 448-449. Brenan argues that the anarchists' organizing principles were much more suited to Spanish conditions. Anarchist leaders were never paid and as they traveled about organizing new groups, they lived on the hospitality of the more prosperous workers. Their first objective was to enroll peer workers for mutual protection against employers, and to organize small strikes which would

After the failure of the short-lived Spanish Federal Republic in 1873, the Bourbon monarchy was restored, thus beginning the reign of Alfonso XII, son of Isabel II. The architect of the restored monarchy was Canovas del Castillo, a leader of the Conservative-Liberal party. He admired the British system and disapproved of military intervention in domestic politics. He also disapproved of the concept of a sole Spanish Church protected by the state. The Constitution of 1876 reaffirmed most of the provisions of the Concordat of 1851, but included modifications: freedom of worship in private was extended to non-Catholics. With the aid of Sagasta, a leader of the Liberal Party, Canovas devised a system of pacific rotation in office for their respective parties. Parliamentary majorities were "made" from the Ministry of the Interior by patronage and the manipulation of votes on the local level through political bosses, or caciques. Canovas' system lasted until 1923, although it began to break down around the beginning of the twentieth century. Canovas himself was assassinated by an anarchist in 1895

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boost local membership. Then gradually, the leaders would inculcate their anarchist creed with its hatred of the Church, its ideas of violent overthrow of the state and of setting up collectivist communities, and its stress on education and self-development, all of which appealed to the severely deprived working classes; see Brenan, Spanish Labyrinth, pp. 145-146.

after he had taken steps aimed at preventing the violence and terrorist acts performed by anarchist groups.[18]

It appears that near the turn of the century, there began to develop a Catholic revival in reaction against bombings in Barcelona, the peasant rebellion in the southern town of Jerez, and generalized labor strikes, all of which were due to anarchist action or inspiration, according to Salvador de Madariaga. But it also appears that the Catholic Church did not present a united front against her enemies. One group of Catholics, the integristas, led by Aparisi Guijarre and Candido Nocedal, advocated a return to Catholic unity under a king who would both rule and govern. They also wanted a measure of decentralization that would give local control back to the provinces and municipalities. This was a view of government that dated from the sixteenth century. The Carlists were also willing to defend the Church, but their position was embarrassing to the Church because of their disloyalty to Alfonso XIII who came to the throne in 1902. Thus, the integristas and the Carlists represented much of the fighting strength of Catholicism. Yet the integristas spent most of their energies combating those of the Catholic Right who joined forces with Canovas' Moderate (or Conservative Liberal) party. One of these

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[18]Robinson, Origins, pp. 19-20; Curry, Constitutional Government, pp. 90-95.

Catholic rightest groups was Pidal's Catholic Union Party, led intellectually by Marcelino Mendenez y Pelayo, whose works were later to be much admired by high-ranking members of the Falange, the political movement that Franco fused together with the Carlist Requetés to become the National Movement, the sole political organization allowed during the Franco regime.[19]

Perhaps one of the most important factors in the religious revival was the re-catholicization of upper-class society, with the aristocracy in the lead. Carr characterizes the revival as an evangelical process which came to be carried to the masses by way of Catholic charitable organizations. The charitable organizations, funded handsomely by the Spanish upper classes, supported movements led by priests who attempted to utilize social goals to win the working classes and the youth back to the Church. The largest of these movements was Father Vincent's Catholic Circles, which aimed for membership among the working classes and eventually linked up with the International

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[19]Madariaga, Spain, p. 152; Carr, Spain, pp. 351-355, 465; Vicens Vives, Approaches to the History, pp. 144-145; Sanchez, Reform and Reaction, pp. 57-58. Carr argues that Menendez y Pelayo sowed the first seeds of "intellectual nationalism" by his exaltation of second-rate Spanish intellectuals to the stature of European geniuses, a tactic later practiced by José Antonio Primo de Rivera's Falange party; see Carr, Spain, p. 355. Also, see Florentino Perez-Embid, "Menendez Pelayo desde la Actualidad," Nuestro Tiempo, 56 (November, 1961), 539-554. For a treatment of the Guijarre-Nocedal right-wing group, see J. N. Schumacher, "Integrism," Catholic Historical Review, XLVII (1962), 340-364.

Catholic Labor Movement. Another of these Catholic evangelical movements with social aims was the cult of St. Theresa of Avila, a teaching Order striving to build up a "falange" against laicism and indifference among young people, especially girls. From a modest beginning in 1881, the Order was teaching some 16,000 girls in 1925. Other movements of the same genre include those of Father Poveda at Guadíx and Father Manjon in Granada. Father Gafo and the Dominican Father Gerard established a Catholic organization for industrial workers in the first decade of the twentieth century. Despite these varied attempts to bring the working class back to the Church, their overall success was limited. When a national confederation of Catholic workers' unions (CNSCO) was finally established in 1919, it consisted of 60,000 members, compared with a membership of 200,000 for the Socialist UGT and 600,000 for the Anarcho-Syndicalist CNT.[20]

These efforts were not without vehement opponents among the ranks of Republicans, Socialists, and Anarchists. These groups also opposed Alfonso XIII, whose reign was characterized by his predilection for parties of the political right and for positive, declaratory military

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[20]Carr, Spain, pp. 465-466; Madariaga, Spain, pp. 154-155; Robinson, Origins, p. 25. Robinson notes that in Castile and Leon, social Catholicism did meet with success. Although not officially connected with the Church, the small holders' syndicates of the area joined together in a confederation, the CNCA, and by 1920, claimed to have 600,000 members. Among the aims of the CNCA was opposition to socialism, caciquismo, and liberalism.

support of his governments. The Crown-Church-Military alliance was entrenched in power. This situation led eventually to an open clash which erupted in Barcelona. So great was the violence aimed at Catholic religious orders and the destruction of at least forty churches that one week in July, 1909, came to be known as the "semana trágica."[21]

A portion of the Anarchists, influenced by Georges Sorel, perceived a need to organize their actions. They founded the Confederacion Nacional del Trabajo (CNT) in 1910. This new anarcho-syndicalist labor union aimed at organizing the world for the producers by the producers. The CNT counted some 600,000 members by 1919 and was instrumental in leading the workers in a drive toward a cataclysmic and definitive social revolution. Their revolution was not successful but they did succeed in creating such chaotic conditions in the society that Alfonso XIII turned the government over to General Miguel Primo de Rivera in 1923.[22]

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[21]Carr, Spain, pp. 483-485; E. Allison Peers, Spain, the Church and the Orders (London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, Ltd., 1945), p. 205; Sanchez, Reform and Reaction, p. 55; Vicens Vives, Approaches to the History, p. 145; Brenan, Spanish Labyrinth, p. 172.

[22]Carr, Spain, p. 446; Ramos Oliveira, Politics, Economics, pp. 148-149; Vicens Vives, Approaches, pp. 145-149; Madariaga, Spain, pp. 153-154. Franz Borkenau in his work World Communism: A History of the Communist International (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1939), p. 402, argues that Communism in Spain was practically non-existent during this period. He states that the

The Church's official, i.e., papal, answer to its opposition was a laymen's organization called Catholic Action. Founded in Spain in 1912, it was an organization through which the Catholic laity participated in the work of the Church under the clergy's direction. It became the political arm through which the Church's rights and interests were protected. In 1921, Monsignor Federico Tedeschini, the new papal nuncio in Madrid, took charge of Catholic Action and enlarged its goals to include social action aimed at caring for the poor. Although the organization was not able to weld together the divisions among Spanish Catholics, it grew and provided a defensive structure for the Church's interests, and by 1931, many of its leaders occupied positions of political influence.[23]

The military dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera began in 1923 and ended in 1930. It was during this regime that Opus Dei was founded. With the consent of the king, General Primo de Rivera proclaimed his de facto coup d'etat as an interim government which would restore domestic peace, dismantle the corrupt institutions (especially those connected with Canovas' old system of caciquismo), and throw out the professional politicians

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Spanish labor movement in the early twentieth century was thoroughly revolutionary, but that the revolutionary attitude in Spain found its embodiment in Anarcho-Syndicalism, not in Marxism.

[23]Sanchez, Reform and Reaction, pp. 60-62.

whom the dictator felt had destroyed Spain.[24] The dictatorship came in on a wave of popular approval. The dictator's support came from the king, as mentioned above, but also from the Army, the Church, the wealthy and middle classes, and even a portion of the working classes. These segments of the society waited in vain for Primo de Rivera to call a Constituent Cortes to begin elaborating a new constitution. Meanwhile, he governed by decrees which he issued in abundance and rescinded at will.[25]

Ramos Oliveira argues that the assets of the dictatorship outweighed the liabilities and that Primo de Rivera's chief merit lay in having destroyed the oligarchy and dismantled the election-making system engineered by Canovas del Castillo. An important accomplishment of Primo de Rivera's regime was the establishment of better relations between the government and organized labor. He established compulsory wage arbitration boards (comités paritarios) which benefited the working classes, and he called on Largo Caballero, secretary of the Socialist Union General de Trabajo, to collaborate in the regime. It appears that Primo de Rivera thought that collaboration with the Socialists was the best means to lure the working

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[24]Carr, Spain, p. 564.

[25]Brenan, Spanish Labyrinth, pp. 78-83.

classes away from the revolutionary Anarcho-Syndicalists who had by then begun to propagate the concept of Catalan separatism and Catalan nationalism.[26]

However, Primo de Rivera's collaboration with the Socialists cost him support from the Church and from the Catholic trade unions who felt that they were underrepresented on the comités paritarios. The dictator's vigorous suppression of manifestations of Catalan nationalism cut into his budding support from the Catalan working classes.[27] In 1926, Primo de Rivera promulgated a decree to the effect that his government was above any legal restraints. He censored the press and tried to suppress his growing opposition made up, initially, of the politicians, then the intellectuals, who were joined soon by university students. Student revolts began in 1927 and by April, 1928, had spread to every state university except the one in Zaragoza. Primo de Rivera's army put down the revolt. The dictator imprisoned students, suspended university courses, and placed the University of Madrid under the direction of selected Royal Commissioners.[28]

In 1928, it was evident that the old political order was facing a crisis. The military began to withdraw

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[26]Brenan, Labyrinth, pp. 80-81; Ramos Oliveira, Politics, Economics, pp. 197-200; Carr, Spain, pp. 570-571.

[27]Carr, Spain, pp. 567-573, passim.

[28]Carr, Spain, pp. 582-583; Ramos Oliveira, Politics, Economics, p. 206.

support from Primo de Rivera because of his interference in army promotions and his attempts to reform the artillery corps. The Church distrusted the dictator, and the King, seeing Primo de Rivera's support from the political right being withdrawn, became interested in the question of the succession of the regime.[29] On October 2, 1928, in the midst of this crisis, Father Escrivá and his handful of followers founded Opus Dei in Madrid.

In order to complete our discussion of the trends of increasing anti-clericalism and popular radicalism and of crisis in the political order, which formed the background in which Opus Dei was founded, it will be helpful to look past the founding date in 1928 towards the culmination of the trends in the Second Republic.

When Primo de Rivera lost the remainder of his support, particularly the high military officers' support, Alfonso XIII was successful in bringing the dictator's regime to an end in 1930. The king attempted to salvage the monarchy by calling elections on April 12, 1931. Election results gave the Republican-Socialist bloc a victory, especially in urban areas. Alfonso left Spain for self-imposed exile, and on April 15, 1931, the Second Republic of Spain was declared in existence.[30]

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[29]Carr, Spain, pp. 585-587.

[30]Ibid., pp. 590-594; Robinson, Origins, pp. 30, 36-38.

Let us pause for a moment and consider the spectrum of ideologies represented on the eve of the Second Republic by groups in the political arena.

On the political center left, there were the separate Basque and Catalan regionalist parties. These groups were mainly interested in seeing the establishment of a federal republic which would allow their regions the autonomy that historically, i.e., in the Middle Ages, had existed in those linguistically--and in the case of the Basques, ethnically--non-Spanish regions.[31]

Also on the political left, there were the Republicans, divided into two groups. Right-wing Republicans were organized in the Radical party under the leadership of Lerroux. The Radical party was in favor of the Republic, but it was not strongly anti-clerical and it was conservative on questions of social reform and the needs of the working classes. The Left Republican group, under Azaña, was composed of new lower-middle class elements that were against the traditional oligarchies. They were anti-clerical and wholeheartedly democratic.[32]

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[31]Brenan, Spanish Labyrinth, pp. 211-212, 278-280; for a treatment of Catalan separatism, see Chapter II. Carr, Spain, p. 557, treats the founding of the Basque party, the P. N. V.

[32]Carr, Spain, p. 592; Brenan, Spanish Labyrinth, pp. 232-234; Elena de la Souchère, An Explanation of Spain, trans. by Eleanor Ross Levieux, Vintage Books (New York: Random House, Inc., 1964), p. 135.

On the far left were the Socialists, who were also divided. The Moderate Socialists, led by Prieto, advocated gradual social reform through the parliamentary process, while radical Socialists, under Largo Caballero, urged a more thorough sweeping away of capitalist society.[33] The Socialist labor union, the UGT, had over one million members in 1932. Also on the far left, but unwilling to cooperate with any political groups were the Anarcho-Syndicalists, who advocated the immediate overthrow of the state. In 1932, their labor union, the CNT, had approximately one million members.[34]

On the political right, there was a loose coalition of center Catholic groups called the Confederacion Española de Derechas Autonomas (CEDA), led by Gil Robles. Initially, they gave tacit support to the Republic, but they were against social revolution and eventually, took a more clerical stance.[35]

Farther to the right was a bloc of nationalist groups, led by Calvo Sotelo. They were influenced by Italian fascism. They wanted to restore the monarchy and preserve traditional, paternalistic, Catholic society,

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[33]For a treatment of the Socialists, see Brenan, Spanish Labyrinth, pp. 215-228.

[34]Souchère, Explanation, pp. 125-127; Carr, Spain, p. 604.

[35]See Robinson, Origins, pp. 113-116, for a discussion of the CEDA.

after a period of authoritarian rule which would rid the state of its opponents. Within this bloc also were Alfonsist monarchist groups, such as the Unión Monárquica Nacional and the Juventud Monárquica Independiente, which illustrate the tendency of almost all right-wing parties to splinter in that era.[36]

A small party on the right was the Falange, led by José Antonio Primo de Rivera, son of the ex-dictator. The Falangists were influenced by the revolutionary aspects of fascism, but they wanted to destroy the old political order: they were anti-clerical and anti-monarchical. The Falangists wanted to create a system of authoritarian government in which service to the nation would be the ultimate duty and value.[37]

And finally, on the extreme right were the Carlists. Although Carlists had joined forces with a Basque separatist party, the P.N.V., Carlism as a political creed still existed. Carlists remained ready to propose the Carlist heir as successor to the Spanish throne and to reinstitute a Catholic, authoritarian monarchy.[38]

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[36]Ibid., pp. 34-35.

[37]For an excellent treatment of the Falange, see Stanley G. Payne, Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism (Stanford: University Press, 1961).

[38]Robinson, Origins, pp. 143-144; Brenan, Spanish Labyrinth, pp. 212-213.

During the first two years of the Second Republic, the Republican-Socialist coalition government, headed by Manuel Azaña, presided over the enactment in the Cortes of a new constitution. In terms of the principles it embodied, the constitution portended great changes in the political system. It allowed for expropriation of all kinds of private property. It vested final decision-making power in a single chamber representative Cortes. It enfranchised women and lowered the minimum voting age to twenty-three. It granted home rule to Catalonia in a separate statute of autonomy. Yet, it was the constitution's treatment of the Church that was to polarize public opinion and lead to organization among right-wing political parties in defense of the Church. The right-wing groups were outraged at an outburst of church and convent-burning carried out by small left-wing groups in 1931. Article 26 of the constitution separated church and state, thus making the Catholic Church an association like all other religious associations, subject to the law of the land. Clerical salaries were no longer to be paid by the state. Provisions were included that allowed for the dissolution of the Jesuits and the confiscation of their property. The continued existence of other Catholic religious Orders was made contingent on their good behavior. Finally, the constitution prohibited the religious Orders from

operating schools and removed religious symbols from public schools.[39]

The strength of anti-Catholic feeling in the Cortes can be more directly seen in the May 17, 1933, passage of the Law of Religious Confession and Congregations, which was adopted by a vote of 278 to 50. This law made the state the owner of all ecclesiastical property, although the Church was to be allowed to continue using its buildings. The law forbade all religious Orders and Congregations from engaging, either directly or indirectly, in commerce, industry, agriculture, or education. Thus, the activities of the Catholic Church and its religious Orders were severely curtailed and brought under the control of the state.[40]

Carr argues that without the Republican constitution's treatment of the Church and the Law of Religious Confessions and Congregations, the parties of the political right may not have been able to gather sufficient popular strength to defeat the Republican-Socialist coalition in the elections of 1933.[41]

We have attempted to show in the historical development of popular anti-clericalism and political radicalism,

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[39]Carr, Spain, pp. 603-610.

[40]Ignacio Fernández de Castro, De las Cortes de Cádiz al Plan de Desarrollo: 1808-1966 (Paris: Ruedo Iberico, 1968), pp. 161, 174-176.

[41]Carr, Spain, pp. 614-615.

as well as in the slow disintegration of the Crown-Church alliance of the old political order, the development of factors which meant the erosion of the mass base of the Catholic Church and the erosion of state protection of the Church. Thus, the Church was being attacked from below at the same time as it was losing its special relationship to the state. It was in this scene of political and spiritual malaise that Opus Dei was founded.

CHAPTER III

THE FOUNDING AND EVOLUTION OF OPUS DEI

José María Escrivá de Balaguer y Albas, the founder of Opus Dei, was born on January 9, 1902, in Barbastro, a small town in the northern Spanish province of Huesca. His family operated a modest grocery store in the village until they moved, some years later, to Logroño where Escrivá completed his secondary studies before entering San Carlos Seminary in Zaragoza. During the time that he was studying for the priesthood, he earned a degree in Law at the University of Zaragoza. Ordained in 1925, Father Escrivá was assigned to several rural parishes in the area for a short time.[1] During that year, he began writing a book of personal spiritual experiences and maxims which was to be amplified and published in 1939 under the title Camino (The Way). This book would become the "daily Bible" of Opus Dei members. Although not intended exclusively for Opus Dei members, Camino, in the

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[1]Artigues, Opus Dei, pp. 17-18; Ynfante, Prodigiosa Aventura, pp. 4, 6-7.

words of its author, embodies "something of the spirit of Opus Dei."[2]

In 1926, Father Escrivá was sent to Madrid where he carried out the duties of a diocesan priest in a suburban parish. Because of the death of his father, he also taught classes in several university preparatory schools in order to help support his mother, brother, and sister.[3]

Actually very little has been written about the founding of Opus Dei. Pérez-Embid, the official biographer of Escrivá, states that the concept or idea for an organization of Catholic laymen seeking spiritual perfection through the exercise of secular professions was conceived by the young priest while he was celebrating mass on October 2, 1928, the date which is cited for the foundation of Opus Dei. Pérez-Embid points out that the founding of Opus Dei was carried out according to the procedures required by the Church.[4]

Salvador Canals' definitive work on the development of secular institutes, of which Opus Dei was the first to be recognized by the Vatican in 1947, indicates that when

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[2]José María Escrivá de Balaguer, Camino, 23rd edition (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, S. A., 1965), pp. 12-14; this writer's translation.

[3]Florentino Perez-Embid, "Monseñor José María Escrivá de Balaguar y Albas: Fundador del Opus Dei, Primer Institute Secular," in Forjadores del Mundo Contemporaneo, IV (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1965), p. 3. Perez-Embid is an Opus Dei member.

[4]Ibid., p. 3.

these Catholic lay organizations began to multiply in Europe in the decades of the 1920's and 30's, the procedures for their official recognition by the Church were not specified by canon law because the organizations were of a new type which did not conform to any of the Church's juridical definitions of existing organizations. The problem of classification and recognition by the Church of these newly-formed organizations lay in the fact that they combined aspects both of Religious Orders, e.g., internal discipline, members' aspirations to a state of spiritual perfection, and constitutions governing the organizations' activities, and of Secular Associations, e.g., the continuation of secular professions by members, renewable private vows made by members, and the absence of religious habits or other externally identifying garments. In the uncertainty that surrounded the canonical status of these new organizations, the procedure generally followed in their foundation was simply the attainment of approval by the bishops of the dioceses in which the organizations desired to carry out their activities. Thus, these organizations were initially recognized as Secular Associations, either of Pious Union or Sodality types, which were juridically local (diocesan) in character and came under the jurisdiction of diocesan bishops. Canals, an authority in canon law, points out that this procedure of local approval was much shorter and less complicated than the obtention of the nihil obstat, or approval by

the Holy See, required of all Religious Orders. Hence, Canals argues, this explains the fact that these new Secular Associations were able to expand their membership so rapidly.[5]

It appears that although Father Escrivá received verbal approval from the Bishop of Madrid for the foundation of Opus Dei, he did not immediately seek its approval in scriptis as a Secular Association. Perez-Embid states that in order to avoid confusion, Father Escrivá preferred to wait until the canonical status of the new type of Catholic organization was clarified.[6]

The university milieu in Madrid in which Escrivá lived and worked in 1928 provided the first members of Opus Dei. Professor Antonio Fontan, an Opus Dei member, writes that from its foundation until after the civil war in 1939, few people in Spain had heard of Opus Dei except those who were in direct contact with its apostolic and teaching activities. During those early years, it appears that the efforts of Father Escrivá were concentrated on the spiritual and professional education of young university students. According to Fontan, "the program that Mgr. Escrivá de Balaguer presented to his

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[5]Canals, Institutos Seculares, pp. 65-68, 74-75.

[6]Perez-Embid, in Forjadores, pp. 5-6.

children and disciples was simple and clear: a spiritual life as children of God, and work."[7]

Monsignor Escrivá himself has appeared on several occasions to be rather hesitant to talk in specific terms about the early period of Opus Dei's development. During an interview in 1967 conducted by Peter Forbath of Time magazine, Escrivá responded to a question about the foundation and evolution of Opus Dei: "The Work was born small and has grown up normally, little by little, like a living organism, like everything that develops in history."[8] When asked to describe the major milestones in the development of Opus Dei, Escrivá replied, in part:

> The work was born very small, It was only a young priest's desire to do what God asked of him. . . . Early in 1935 we were ready to begin working in France, as a matter of fact in Paris. But then the Spanish Civil War broke out, and afterwards, the Second World War, and we had to put off the expansion of the Work. But since expansion was necessary, the delay was minimal. In 1940, our work in Portugal began. After a few preliminary trips in previous years, practically coinciding with the end of the hostilities,

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[7]Antonio Fontán, Los Catolicos en la Universidad Española Actual (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, S.A., 1961), pp. 55-56.

[8]Conversaciones con Mons. Escrivá de Balaguer (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, S. A., 1969), p. 59, this writer's translation. A note of explanation concerning the word "work" is in order. Among members and people who cooperate in the educational enterprises operated by the organization, Opus Dei is often referred to as "la Obra," which is translated as "the Work" in its literal sense; the figurative translation would be "the Organization." However, to avoid excessive redundance, the literal translation is preferred by this writer.

> our work began in England, Italy, France, the United States, and Mexico. Afterwards, the rhythm of growth and expansion became more rapid. From 1949-1950, we began in Germany, Ireland, Holland, Switzerland, Argentina, Canada, Venezuela, and other European and South American countries. Simultaneously, we began in other continents: North Africa, Japan, Kenya and the other East African counties, Australia, Philippines, and Nigeria.[9]

In the same interview, Escrivá stated the central objective or mission of the organization in much the same language that he consistently employs when asked this question: "Opus Dei proposes to promote among all persons of all classes of society the desire for Christian perfection in the midst of the world. That is to say, Opus Dei tries to help people who live in the world--the common man, the man on the street--to live a fully Christian life, without modifying his normal mode of life, or his ordinary work, or his hopes or dreams."[10]

Although information about the early history of Opus Dei in Spain is sparse, it is known that an identical but separate organization was founded for women in 1930, in the environment of the University of Madrid. The women's organization, parallel to that earlier founded for men, was to be completely separate, joined to the

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[9]Conversaciones, pp. 73-74; this writer's translation.

[10]Ibid., pp. 55-56. Other similar statements of the objective of Opus Dei made by Father Escrivá in interviews with the press may be found in Conversaciones, pp. 31, 77-78, 111-112.

men's organization only at the administrative apex in the person of Father Escrivá. Most of the first female Opus Dei members eventually left the organization. By 1932, the male members of Opus Dei numbered thirteen, among whom figured three young men who were to become university professors of some renown: Juan Jimenez Vargas, Federico Suarez Verdeguer, and Angel Santos Ruiz.[11]

In Father Escrivá's book of spiritual experiences and maxims, one finds a passage that is often referred to by members as a description of the early years of Opus Dei: "The plants were hidden under the snow. And the farmer, the owner of the land, remarked with satisfaction: 'Now they are growing from within.'"[12] The early years of Opus Dei's existence are considered to be a period of gestation, or "growing from within."

In order to understand the apparent absence of notable organizing activities during the early years of Opus Dei's existence, perhaps one must remember that the Spanish Second Republic was proclaimed after the municipal elections of 1931 which installed an overwhelming majority of Socialist and Republican officials. One

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[11]Ynfante, Prodigiosa Aventura, p. 14; Fontán, Los Catolicos, pp. 63-64, corroborates the information about early Opus Dei members who became professors.

[12]Camino, p. 96. Antonio Fontán refers to this maxim in its connection to the early years of Opus Dei in Los Catolicos, p. 56.

must also bear in mind that the Socialist and Republican creeds were, in part, anti-clerical. Some of the anti-clerical thrust was expressed by small groups of incendiaries who burned churches and schools operated by various religious Orders in Madrid and throughout Andalucia during the first week of May, 1931. In the same year, Article 26 of the newly-adopted constitution abrogated the Concordat of 1851 by separating Church and State and by placing religious Orders under the jurisdiction of a special law which prohibited them from engaging in industry, commerce, and educational activities.[13]

The Society of Jesus, for example, was dissolved by the Spanish government in 1932 in an attempt to bring education under the sole control of the state at a time when the Jesuits were operating thirty university preparatory schools, as well as numerous social centers, working men's clubs, and beneficent societies.[14] There is evidence

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[13]Peers, Spain, Church, pp. 131-134, 138-139.

[14]Ibid., p. 112. See further, pp. 114-122, where Peers points out that the Order called the "Escolapios" had schools educating some 30,000 children at that time, including a commercial school at Sarria, the first of its kind in Spain. The Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools, an organization of laymen, operated 133 schools by 1930, two-thirds of which were gratuitously educating children whose families were unable to pay tuition. As in the cases of other religious organizations of the same type, the Institute's schools were funded by wealthy local people, e.g., Pedro Domecq, the wine merchant, supported the Brothers' school in Jerez. The Society of Saint Francois de Sales operated fifty schools by 1931, almost all of which offered free education at

that other teaching Orders would also have been dissolved, but the elections of 1933 returned a majority of center-Right representatives who wanted to protect the Church and who realized that the state was simply neither prepared nor equipped to take over the education of all the children then enrolled in schools operated by the religious Orders.[15]

It is thus perhaps understandable, in light of the prevailing "mood" of the country during the early years of the Republic, that a recently-organized Catholic lay organization such as Opus Dei would proceed somewhat cautiously in seeking new members and in expanding its activities. In other words, it is understandable that in that uncertain era Opus Dei would proceed by "growing from within."

However, in the relative calm restored during the center-Right biennium, Escrivá founded his first student residence in Madrid in 1934. The colegio,[16] located in a

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the elementary level. The Salesian schools, like many other schools and beneficent organizations administered by religious Orders, suffered much physical damage during the anti-clerical outburst in May, 1931.

[15]Peers, Spain, Church, pp. 152-156.

[16]The colegio in Spain is an educational institution for students who are preparing the Bachillerate diploma (the approximate equivalent of a U.S. high school diploma), which is necessary for admission to all schools and departments comprising the Spanish university. Some students continue to board at the colegio after they have gained admission to the university. After the Civil War, Opus Dei began establishing a type of student residence known as the colegio mayor which employs professors and

large apartment near the university, took in students who were preparing to enter the School of Law and the School of Architecture. The residence was named "Dya," the acronym for derecho y arquitectura. It was also during this time that Escrivá began his apostolic work through the instrument of the tertulia, a traditional type of gathering at which members of the circle discussed politics, or literature, or art, etc. Father Escrivá turned the students' attention toward the sanctification of the lay Christian through his profession or work. At the end of the second academic year, Dya moved to larger quarters in a building which was destroyed by anti-clericals during the onset of the civil war in July, 1936.[17]

Fleeing the civil war in the summer of 1936, Escrivá left Republican-occupied Madrid and went to Valencia where his followers had opened a university students' residence only a short time before the outbreak

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tutors to guide students successfully through their first years in the university. The importance of successfully passing this prerequisite first year in, for example, the School of Law or the School of Medicine cannot be over-emphasized because students cannot take any courses on the second year level until they have passed all the courses required during the first year. Thus, university students living in colegios mayores have the benefit of advantages not available to students living in colegios or at home.

[17]Perez-Embid, in Forjadores, p. 4.

of hostilities. From Valencia, he moved on to Barcelona and gathered a small group of his followers. This small band of Opus Dei members crossed the Pyranees mountains on foot, going through Andorra and into France.[18]

By the end of 1937, Escrivá and his followers had made their way to the Atlantic coast of France, then crossed into Spain via San Sebastian which had passed over to the Franco-led Nationalist side of the conflict. After a brief stay there and in Pamplona, they finally settled in Burgos, then the headquarters and provisional capital of the Nationalist forces. Escrivá remained there for the duration of the Civil War, apparently as did many other priests who had fled Socialist and Republican anti-clerical persecution. While in Burgos, Escrivá worked on the final version of Camino and prepared a manuscript which was later to be presented as his doctoral thesis at the School of Law in the University of Madrid.[19]

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[18]Ynfante, Prodigiosa Aventura, pp. 18-19. An interesting aside, related to this writer by a friend of Opus Dei in Madrid, is found in the story of Escrivá's journey into France. When Escrivá and his followers were in the Rialp Mountains, he found a rose sculpted in weed protruding from the snow and interpreted this to mean that the period of "growing from within" was near. It is also interesting that the large publishing firm, Rialp, S. A., which publishes almost all of the works of distinguished Opue Dei intellectuals, uses a rose as its logo on the first page of its books.

[19]Ynfante, Prodigiosa Aventura, p. 19; Escrivá, Camino, p. 12.

Immediately after the war, Escrivá opened another students' residence in Madrid, called the Moncloa. It quickly gained the status of colegio mayor for male university students.[20] Also immediately after the civil war in 1939, José María Albareda, an Opus Dei member since 1937, was appointed Secretary General of the newly-formed Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC) by its president and Minister of Education, José Ibáñez Martin, a sympathizer of Opus Dei.[21] It was through the CSIC, which was the center for all government-financed scientific research, and the vacant tenured professorships (cátedras) gained by Opus Dei members by successfully competing in state examinations, that young Opus Dei intellectuals, ". . . well-prepared professionally [and] guided by Josemaría Escrivá with a firm and lucid orientation, decisively intervened in the organization of several scientific research foundations, . . . " This was Opus Dei's first public appearance in the higher echelons of Spanish academic life.[22]

In the decade of the 1940's, nuclei of Opus Dei members developed in Seville and in Barcelona. They

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[20]Ynfante, Prodigiosa Aventura, p. 37.

[21]Ibid., p. 41.

[22]Perez-Embid, in Forjadores, p. 5.

were small groups, but their members were later to occupy positions of influence in university, government, and business circles. For example, the "key" member in Seville is thought to have been Vicente Rodriguez Casado who, at the age of 24, earned a tenured professorship, or cátedra, in Modern History at the University of Seville. One year later, in 1943, he founded the School of Hispanic Studies which came under the patronage of the CSIC in 1950. Rodriguez Casado was later appointed Director General in the Ministry of Information and since 1963, Director of the Social Institute of the Navy. His cátedra was transferred to the University of Madrid so that he could continue his academic profession. Four of his students, also members of Opus Dei, went on to earn their own cátedras in 1949. Florentino Pérez-Embid, the biographer of Father Escrivá, was one of their number.[23] In Barcelona, the initial nucleus of Opus Dei members included Fernando Valls Taberner, academician and financier who died in 1942; Alfonso Balcells Gorina, professor and later rector of the University of Salamanca; and Laureano López Rodó, who served as an espionage agent for the Nationalists during the Civil War, obtained a cátedra in law and later became Minister of Development Planning.[24]

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[23]Ynfante, Prodigiosa Aventura, pp. 52-53.

[24]Ibid., pp. 54-55; "Spain: The Awakening Land," Time (January 21, 1966), 34C.

In 1945, the Catholic press in Spain began to take notice of Opus Dei. One of the earliest articles refers to the fact that Opus Dei was relatively unknown by the general public until three young engineers, Opus Dei members, were ordained in the priesthood in 1944. According to the article, Opus Dei was seen as an apostolic organization comprised mainly of university students whose aim consisted in living their secular professional lives with a "Christian conscience."[25]

A priest, Justo Perez de Urbel, also writing in 1945, comments that it was around 1940 when he began to be aware that "a new religious and cultural force" was emerging in Spain, a force that because of its youthful aspect and its innovations aroused some misunderstanding and even jealousy. Perez de Urbel recounts an interview with a young Opus Dei priest in which the latter reiterates that Opus Dei is not a Religious Order, but rather an organization of secular Christians seeking to achieve spiritual perfection through the exercise of secular profession. This was the "innovation" of Opus Dei, since the seeking of a state of spiritual perfection had previously been reserved to members of Religious Orders who withdrew from the world.[26]

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[25]Angel Sagarminaga and Pedro Casciare, "Opus Dei," Catolicismo (January, 1945), 20, 27.

[26]Justo Perez de Urbel, "Opus Dei o el secreto que no es secreto," Signo (June 9, 1945), 5, 7.

Father Silvestre Sancho, Rector of the University of Saint Thomas in Manila, also commented on the misconceptions surrounding the aim of Opus Dei in the mid-1940's. He wrote, "it is mistakenly believed by some people that Opus Dei has as its aim to achieve university cátedras, although some of its members--a few--do hold tenured professorships. Sancho states that each Opus Dei member has complete liberty, ". . . within Catholic moral limits," to form his own opinions and to decide on his own professional and political activities.[27]

In 1946, the Church hierarchy in Rome began elaborating a constitution to establish canonical status for the new type of Catholic secular organizations that lay between the status reserved for Religious Orders and that applied to local laymen's groups. In the same year, Escrivá moved his personal residence to Rome in order to petition for official recognition of Opus Dei and to submit his organization's constitution for study and approval by the Vatican. On February 2, 1947, Pope Pius XII promulgated the Apostolic Constitution, Provida Mater Ecclesia which regulated the establishment and operation of "secular institutes," as the new type of

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[27]Silvestre Sancho, "La Obra de Dios," Ecclesia (June 23, 1945), 17; this writer's translation.

secular organization came to be called. These organizations were allowed, under the terms of Provida Mater Ecclesia, to retain their membership lists and constitutions in privacy from the public, if they wished. On February 27, 1947, the Pontiff conferred provisional approval on Opus Dei, making it the Primum Institutum, or the first secular institute recognized by the Holy See. In April of that same year, the Pope conferred on Father Escrivá the honorary title of "Domestic Prelate of His Holiness." On June 19, 1950, Opus Dei received final papal approval as Primum Inter Instituta, with its international headquarters in Rome.[28] Thus, Opus Dei's rise to success within the Catholic Church had taken approximately two decades.

During the time that Opus Dei was seeking official status as a secular institute, its members in Spain kept expanding their organization-building activities. In 1952, Ismael Sanchez Bella, a priest and member of Opus Dei, founded the Estudio General de Navarra, a college in Pamplona. Land and money were donated by the local and provincial governments for construction, and the college became a university in 1958. In 1960, the

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[28]Canals, Institutos Seculares, pp. 80-82; Artigues, Opus Dei, pp. 42-43, 73; Welles, Spain, p. 157; Alvardo del Portillo, "El estado actual de los Institutes Seculares," Nuestro Tiempo (May, 1958), 528; Gabriel Reidy, Secular Institutes, Vol. 87 of Twentieth Century Encyclopedia of Catholicism (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1962), pp. 80, 91-92.

Vatican recognized the University of Navarre as an official university of the Church, with Monsignor Escrivá as its Grand Chancellor. In 1962, the Spanish government granted official recognition to the degrees issued by the University. This meant that the state accepted as valid the examinations conducted by professors at the University of Navarre. Since professors at the university are hired on a contractual basis by officials of the university, the state no longer had any voice in the conduct of the Opus Dei university.[29] At present, the university is comprised of Schools of Law, Medicine, Philosophy and Letters, Pharmacy, Science, Architecture, Canon Law, Theology, Journalism, Education, Library Science, Languages, Literature and Spanish Culture, and Social Work. It is the only university in Spain that offers, in addition to degrees in the traditional Spanish disciplines, a Bachelor of Arts degree and a program of study structured along lines similar to the American university system. The University of Navarre also includes a School of Engineering located in San Sebastian and a School of Business offering Masters' and Doctoral programs in Barcelona.[30]

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[29]Ynfante, Prodigiosa Aventura, pp. 77, 80-82; Welles, Spain, pp. 160-161.

[30]This information was taken from a brochure describing courses and admission procedures at the University of Navarre: Normas de Incorporación de Alumnos Espanoles: 1972-73 (Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 1972).

In addition to the University of Navarre, by 1961, Opus Dei was directing in Spain twenty colegios mayores, four university-level technical schools with more than 1500 students enrolled, and numerous lower level technical training schools for underprivileged boys as well as various "domestic science" schools for girls employed as domestic servants.[31]

In the decade of the 1950's, Opus Dei members began attracting attention as middle and upper-level government officials. Beginning in 1956 and 1957, some of these members, especially those with background specialization in economics, attained the highest political posts available. The names of those who became ministers in Franco's various cabinets include: Alberto Ullastres Calvo (at present, Ambassador to the European Common Market), Laureano López Rodó, Mariano Navarro Rubio, Gregorio Lopez Bravo, Luis Carrero Blanco (assassinated in December, 1973), Faustino Garcia Moncó, and Gonzalo Fernandez de la Mora.[32] A major change in Franco's cabinet occurred on October 29, 1969. Some authors and critics argued that every minister in the cabinet was either a militant, full-fledged member of

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[31]Fentan, Los Catolicos, p. 59; Ynfante, Prodigiosa Aventura, p. 70.

[32]Ynfante, Prodigiosa Aventura, p. 202; Welles, Spain, pp. 161-162. A complete list of the Opus Dei Ministers appears in Chapter seven of the present work.

Opus Dei, or a sympathizer or "cooperador" of the organization.[33] [Professor] Paul H. Lewis points out in a recent article that ". . . Opus Dei has come to provide an increasing number of the young modernizing technocrats in Franco's government."[34] And Stanley G. Payne argues that only half of the nineteen member cabinet were in 1969 in some way associated with Opus Dei.[35] It appears that the more conservative estimates of the presence of Opus Dei members in Franco's cabinet were correct. However, the number of Opus Dei members in the cabinet has fallen in the cabinet changes in 1972 and 1974. This will be discussed further in Chapter Seven.

Now that we have an overview of the founding and development of Opus Dei in Spain, let us turn our focus to the structure of the organization itself.

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[33]Ynfante, Prodigiosa Aventura, p. 202.

[34]"The Spanish Ministerial Elite, 1938-1969," Comparative Politics (October, 1972), 100.

[35]"In the Twilight of the Franco Era," Foreign Affairs, 49, No. 2 (January, 1971), 344-347.

CHAPTER IV

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF OPUS DEI

In this chapter, we shall study the structure of Opus Dei, beginning with general organizational features and ending with a discussion of the specialized segments and individual membership. On several occasions, Father Escrivá has referred to Opus Dei as an "organización desorganizada."[1] When one looks at the number of residence-centers and schools of all types operated by Opus Dei as well as the numerous religious and social corporate enterprises managed by the Institute, it is difficult to see how the characterization "disorganized organization" applies to Opus Dei in Spain.

In terms of the type of overall organizational structure applicable to Opus Dei, Manuel Ortuño, one of the earliest scholars who attempted a description of the organization, wrote in 1963:

> The internal organization of the Opus, according to the little that is known about it, is very simple: A General Council, located in Rome, whose President is Father Escrivá; Regional Councils, by country or group of countries

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[1]Conversaciones, pp. 45-47; 78-79, 118. This point will be discussed later at length.

> headed by a Regional Commissioner; and at the base, the local centers. The line (of organization) is absolutely hierarchical and responsibility is transmitted from top to bottom, through these officials who are named by the President.[2]

In the same vein, Daniel Artigues states that Opus Dei is characterized by "centralization and a rigorous hierarchy." Artigues also notes that, as in the case of all Secular Institutes, Opus Dei has a Cardinal Protector, a position of liasion between the Vatican and the Institute which was occupied first by Cardinal Tedeschini, then by Cardinal Tardini, and finally by Cardinal Ciriaci, until his death in 1967.[3] No successor has been named to this position.

Jesus Ynfante's description of the organization of Opus Dei agrees mainly with those published by Ortuño and Artigues, except that Ynfante offers more details. He states that at the head of the entire organization is the president and a Consejo General, or General Council, made up in 1968 of the following: Secretary General (Alvaro del Portillo, charter member), Procurador General (Pedro Casciaro, charter member), four councilmen (José Luis Muzquíz, Ferdinando Valenciano Polack, J. Cox Hunneus, and G. Rossman), Prefect

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[2]Manuel Ortuño, "Opus Dei," Cuadernos Americanos, XXV, Vol. CXXVI, No. 1 (Jan.-Feb., 1963, Mexico), 53.

[3]Artigues, Opus Dei, pp. 75-76.

of Studies (J. Molteni), and Administrator General (Joaquin Alonso).[4]

Ynfante also comments on regional and local organization. According to his work, there is a missus, or liason official between the General Council and the Regional Councils, a counterpart to the papal nuncio in the Church's regular hierarchy. Spain and Portugal together comprise a region with Father Amadeo de Fuenmayor as the missus to the Regional Council. The Regional Commissioner, or chief official in the Spanish/Portuguese Regional Council is Florencio Sanchez Bella who has two brothers, one of whom has served as the Minister of Information and Tourism in Spain, and the other, also a priest, is Vice Rector of the University of Navarra. Below the Regional Council is a newly-created administrative level, the regional delegations, which corresponds to four geographical areas of Spain: north, central, south, and the Levante, a region centered in Valencia. And finally, there are local Councils in every city in

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[4]Ynfante, Opus Dei, pp. 123, 125. It is interesting to note that Ynfante cites the 1968 edition of the Annuario Pontificio as the source of the names of high Opus Dei officials, yet the Italian edition for that year does not include the name of any officials of any of the Secular Institutes. The 1967 Italian edition of the Annuario Pontificio (Cittá del Vaticano, 1967), p. 906, does include the names of the high officials of Opus Dei; Daniel Cummings is listed as the Procurador General, J. Molteni as Administrator General.

which Opus Dei has members and activities. Below the level of the President General, the female branch of Opus Dei has separate organizational levels similar to those described for the main, male branch.[5]

As has been stated, Father Escrivá has occasionally referred to the structure of Opus Dei as a "disorganized organization." In an interview in May, 1966, he was asked to elucidate that phrase and to briefly sketch the structural framework of Opus Dei on the world level. He answered, in part,

> In Rome, the General Council has its home, independent for each section, of men or of women (Annuario Pontificio, 1966, p. 885, and 1226); in each country there is an analogous organ, presided over by the Councilman of the Opus Dei in that nation. Don't think of a powerful organization, extended like capillaries over the entire countryside. Rather, imagine a disorganized organization, because the job of the directors of Opus Dei is directed principally toward making sure that the spirit of the Gospel comes to all members--the spirit of charity, of living together peacefully, of understanding, absolutely foreign to fanaticism--by means of a solid and appropriate theological and apostolic formation . . .
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> Also, the direction of the Work is always collegial. We detest tyranny, especially in this exclusively spiritual government of Opus Dei. We love pluralism: the opposite can only lead to the failure of effectiveness. . . .[6]

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[5]Ynfante, Prodigiosa Aventura, pp. 122-123.

[6]Conversaciones, pp. 78-79, emphasis in the original; this writer's translation.

In another interview later in 1966, Father Escrivá again set forth the organizational structure, adding that the direction of Opus Dei's activities in each country was entrusted (encomendada) to a commission largely composed of lay members, presided over by the Commissioner of Opus Dei in the country. In speaking about the "central government" of Opus Dei, Father Escrivá states, "I do not govern alone. Decisions are taken in the General Council of Opus Dei, which is located in Rome and is at present composed of persons of fourteen countries. . . . In the female branch, there exists an analogous system. Members of twelve nationalities make up their Central Council."[7]

In 1967, when he was asked to explain in greater detail what he meant by "disorganized organization," Father Escrivá replied in part,

> I mean that we give primary and fundamental importance to the apostolic spontaneity of the person, to his free and responsibilities initiative, guided by the action of the Holy Spirit; and not to organizational structures, mandates, tactics, and plans imposed from the vertex, the seat of government.
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> .....
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> Each member, with apostolic spontaneity, working with complete personal liberty and autonomously forming his own conscience in the face of concrete decisions that he will have to make, strives toward Christian perfection and giving Christian testimony in his own environment, sanctifying his own professional,

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[7]Conversaciones, pp. 99-100.

> intellectual, or manual work. Naturally, when each one autonomously makes these decisions in his secular life, in the temporal realities in which he lives and moves, frequently different options, criteria, and actions, are encountered; in a word, this blessed disorganization is encountered, this just and necessary pluralism, which is an essential characteristic of the real spirit of Opus Dei, and which has always seemed to me the only proper and ordered way to conceive of the apostolate of the laity.
>
> I will say more: this disorganized organization even appears in the corporate apostolic undertakings of Opus Dei, . . . in different countries. These activities and initiatives of the Association are always of directly apostolic character, i.e., educational, social, or beneficient activities. But, as our spirit is precisely to stimulate initiative coming out from the base, . . . , the central government of the Work leaves to the regional governments--which enjoy practically total autonomy--the responsibility of deciding, promoting, and organizing those specific apostolic activities that they judge most appropriate; from a university center or students' residence to a dispensary or a dairy farm school for rural inhabitants. As a logical result, we have a multicolor, varied mosaic of activities: an organizedly disorganized mosaic.[8]

And finally, in an interview in 1968, Father Escrivá added some more information on the subject of the organization of Opus Dei: "the majority of the members--about all--live according to their own arrangements, where they would live if they were not of the Opus Dei: in their own homes, with their families, where their work

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[8]Ibid., pp. 45-47; emphasis in the original. As a note of explanation, the somewhat awkward translation of "un mosaico organizadamente desorganizado," in the last sentence of the quoted passage was preferred to a smoother, more figurative translation because it maintains Father Escrivá's insistence that Opus Dei has a disorganized organization.

takes them." He went on to explain that some members do decide to live together, making Christian homes in order to direct an apostolic undertaking or to give spiritual assistance to others.[9]

Ynfante describes a typical home made up of Opus Dei members who decide to live together. According to him, each home has a director who is always a priest and who is in charge of the spiritual life of the residents. Then there is a subdirector who handles all practical matters with the help of a secretary. Ynfante suggests that the designation of members to positions of responsibility, from that of subdirector up to the Regional Commissioner, is personally done by Father Escrivá, or in his name by Alvaro del Portillo, the Secretary General.[10]

Ynfante purports to have obtained, by unstated means, a copy of the secret Constitution of Opus Dei, i.e., the constitution that received papal approval in 1950, when Opus Dei was granted definitive approval as a Secular Institute.[11] Ynfante claims that he had this

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[9]Conversaciones, pp. 118-119.

[10]Ynfante, Prodigiosa Aventura, p. 123.

[11]The reader is reminded that all Secular Institutes may have constitutions and membership lists that are unavailable to the general public. See Chapter III, p. 12, supra.

document translated from Latin to Spanish and it appears as the fourth appendix in La Prodigiosa Aventura del Opus Dei. However, as Ynfante's translators suggest, some liberties have been taken for the sake of clarity in the translation.[12] To this must be added the caveat that it was necessary to translate the document again from Spanish to English. Nonetheless, it gives us a fully delineated organizational structure of Opus Dei, as well as the duties and privileges pertaining to those occupying positions at the different structural levels. These latter features will be discussed further in reference to the specialized segments of Opus Dei. As for the question of general organizational lines, one finds in Part Three, Chapter 1, no. 293, the provision for local, regional, and general governing bodies. The general government has jurisdiction over the entire Institute and all its activities; the regional government has jurisdiction over the "members and the activity" of Opus Dei in a given region; the local government, over the various local centers. One also finds in clause no. 297 of the same chapter, the negative provision that "no one can be promoted to a governing post, not even

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[12]Ibid., p. 396.

local, without the express consent of the President General."[13]

According to the document published by Ynfante, the President General occupies his post for life after his election (except in the case of Father Escrivá who was not elected) by the members of the General Congress, who are themselves named for life by the President General and the General Council. The President General's powers are extensive, extending to dominion ("potestad") over individual members, "in accordance with the Constitution," i.e., in spiritual matters. An interesting clause referring to the main activities of the President General reads ". . . it will be the principal concern of the Father (President General) to watch over the promotion, above all, of the education, religious as well as scientific, given to members; to maintain the centers for studies well furnished and supplied; to prevent the promotion of members to the Sacred Orders (of the priesthood) before satisfying all canonical requirements; to provide for all and each one of the members of the Institute the means necessary for them to exercise their professional and apostolic activities." The President General is attended by a Spiritual Guardian and a Health

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[13]Ibid., p. 431.

Guardian, and is aided in an information-gathering task by a Visitor, all appointed by the President himself. The Visitor's duties are ". . . to inform himself, above all, of the spiritual life of the members, of their general education, their professional standing, their adherence to the spirit of the Institute, their apostolic activity. He also investigates economic relations and all those matters which, in whatever way, concern the Institute. The Visitor listens to every one of the members, asks for news of any event; he advises them, he counsels them; where it is required,he reprehends, corrects, praises, and encourages them to greater undertakings."[14]

Provision has been made for a Vice President, to be appointed by the President or by the General Council in the event that the President is incapacitated.[15] To date, this position has remained vacant. The General Council, to "aid the President in the direction and governance of the Institute," is composed of the Vice President (if one has been named), the Secretary General, the Procurador General, the Central Secretary Priest (who aids the President in governing the female branch

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[14]Ynfante, Prodigiosa Aventura, pp. 431, 434-435.

[15]Ibid., p. 435.

of the Institute), three Vice-Secretaries (who manage the apostolic works carried out under the patronage of St. Michael, St. Gabriel, and St. Raphael), at least one missus for each region, the Prefect of Studies (who manages the education centers) and the Administrator General.

The General Council has a deliberative vote in the following matters: the interpretation and application of the Constitution; the creation and modification of regional circumscriptions; the promotion of members to the ranks of Inscritos (full-fledged members) and Electores (members of the General Congress); in dispensing with required qualifications for promotion to the various membership categories; and in the transferral of assets belonging to the Institute from one region to another, or one center to another, when such a transfer is proposed by the President General.[16] Thus, although the President is allowed a wide range of discretionary powers, it appears that "colegial" decision-making is provided for in a number of types of cases even according to Ynfante's document which he uses to support his criticism of Opus Dei.

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[16]Ynfante, Prodigiosa Aventura, pp. 435-438.

Ynfante's comments relating to the regional organization of Opus Dei,[17] discussed earlier in this chapter, were taken directly from the document he calls the Constitution. According to this document, the governing body of the region (in this case, Spain and Portugal) is the Commission or Regional Council, headed by the Regional Commissioner or Councilman (Florencio Sánchez Bella), and comprised of a Defensor who investigates prospective members, the missi who also sit in the General Council, a Regional Secretary Priest who represents the female branch of Opus Dei, a Secretary, three committee members who direct the apostolic works under the patronage of St. Michael, St. Gabriel, and St. Raphael, a Delegate in charge of studies, and a Regional Administrator. A close reading of this chapter pertaining to regional organization reveals provisions for information linkages between the regional bodies and the central governing body in Rome and between the regional governing body and the local governing bodies within the region. One also finds that provisions are made for some initiative and responsibility in decision-making. In particular, the Regional Commissioner with the deliberative vote of the Regional Council is charged with the responsibility and/or

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[17]Ibid., pp. 440-443.

power to: admit to "Oblation" or "Fidelity"[18] those Numerary[19] members who are qualified for definitive incorporation into the Institute; promote new apostolic undertakings; create and dissolve Centers where these apostolic works are carried out; impose sanctions on members within their regional jurisdiction and remove from membership those Supernumerary[20] members who should no longer remain in Opus Dei; give to Supernumeraries the right to live in a corporate family house of the Institute for a maximum period of six months; and transfer goods or assets from one Center to another within the region.[21]

The constitutional document also allows for Subregional Commissions of two types: those responsible to the Regional Commissioner and those responsible directly to the President General. The constitutional

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[18]Oblation is a canonically-recognized status that is applied to laymen who become priests after they have become members of Opus Dei; Fidelity is a canonically-recognized status that is applied to lay members of Opus Dei who promise to remain in the Institute for the remainder of their lives.

[19]One of the membership categories, relating to unmarried members, to be discussed further.

[20]One of the membership categories, relating to married members, to be discussed further.

[21]Ynfante, Prodigiosa Aventura, pp. 441-442.

instrument also provides for Delegations of two types within the region: those responsible to the President General and those responsible to the Regional Commissioner.[22] The subregional bodies represent interesting examples of "extra-hierarchical" bodies which, potentially at least, could be used for both gathering information and transmission upward and downward and for implementation of directives from the President General to specific local bodies or individual members.

In reference to local organization and its administration, the document presents detailed, but not always clear, information. In Chapter III, one finds provisions for local residences and Centers. The concept of the Center is that of "persons rather than territory," with the possibility of persons living in different cities belonging to the same Center. Provisions are made for autonomous Centers as well as Centers dependent upon, or responsible to, autonomous Centers. The autonomous Center is administered by a Director, named by the Regional Commissioner with approval of the Defensor and advice of the Regional Council; by a subdirector; and by a secretary who handles the local financial affairs of the center, including bookkeeping and payments for fixed expenses

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[22]Ibid., p. 443.

such as food and clothing for members and equipment and expenses relating to each member's practice of his profession. The dependent Center is also administered by a Director, named in the same way as the Director of an autonomous Center. He can also be aided by other officers who have de facto rather than canonically-recognized juridical status.[23] Special Centers for Oblatos and Supernumeraries may be set up with the local administration staffed by Numerary members and by a priest of the Opus Dei as Spiritual Director. At the very bottom of the organizational framework, one finds the structure of the Group, composed of a small number of members, preferably of the same or similar professions or belonging to the "same social class." In each Group, there are First and Second Celadores[24] proposed for those positions by the local Center and named by the Regional Commissioner on advice of the Regional Council. The same Celadores may be named for different Groups. In terms of their duties, Celadores are required to: "painstakingly imbue in the members a sense of the spiritual life of their Group," ask about absent members, visit those who are sick to let them know about the matters discussed in the meetings, and give the members news of

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[23]One of the membership categories, relating to unmarried members, to be discussed further.

[24]The literal meanings of celador are: one who shows zeal in; one who keeps an eye on.

their fellows in the group. It is important to note that every member of Opus Dei belongs to a Group. It appears from the constitutional document that the concern for Group apostolic activity is primal over the concern to place members in Groups of the same professional or social categories, thus where there exists no Group in which a member would be incorporated by virtue of his Opus Dei membership category, that member may join any existing Group in his area. The constitution is quite clear that it does not permit an "acephalous or wandering" member.[25]

Since the Constitution of Opus Dei is not public, the possibility does not exist of comparing the text published by Ynfante with the official document. In addition one finds that Opus Dei members themselves do not react uniformly to Ynfante's version of the Opus Dei Constitution as it relates to the structural characteristics of the organization and the activities associated with various bodies and officials within the organization. One way of overcoming, at least partially, these difficulties is to turn to the official Church's position on Secular Institutes in general. Gabriel Reidy, O. F. M., has written a Church-approved work on Secular Institutes in which he explains that these Secular Institutes may

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[25]Ynfante, Prodigiosa Aventura, pp. 443-445.

be legally established through the action of the diocesan bishop, thus becoming an Institute approved by diocesan right. Or, as in the case of Opus Dei, it may additionally obtain pontifical approval, in the form of a decretum laudis from the Congregation of Religious, and ultimately, definitive approval of its Constitution. He states, "whether of diocesan or pontifical approval, the members remain subject to the Ordinary who established the Institute, but he may make no changes in the Constitutions, nor inquire into the temporal administration or internal government and discipline save in certain matters already laid down."[26]

In the matter of internal government, Reidy explains that the Institutes are encouraged to govern themselves on a hierarchical pattern in the manner of the religious Orders and Congregations. He states that "many of the Institutes do imitate the governmental patterns of religious orders, both the highly centralized ones and the more loosely confederated ones. They are free to copy and adapt to their own requirements any of the well-nigh innumerable formulas available, or to invent new ones for themselves. . . ."[27]

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[26]Gabriel Reidy, O.F.M., Secular Institutes, Vol. 87 of The Twentieth Century Encyclopedia of Catholicism (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1962), p. 83. This work carries the nihil obstat of the Church.

[27]Reidy, Secular Institutes, p. 84.

Thus, it is at least possible that the version of the Opus Dei Constitution published by Ynfante is substantially correct in its description of the internal organization as generally hierarchical, but with some measure of initiative and decision-making reserved to the national (Regional Council) and the regional (Center) levels. See Figure 4.1 for an organizational structure chart.

Now, we may turn to the corporate enterprises operated by Opus Dei in Spain. These enterprises have overtly educational and/or social aims in coexistence with spiritual aims. Let us begin with those entities that are involved in informal education leading to state-recognized degrees or diplomas, and then proceed to those entities that function along more purely social, beneficient apostolic lines.

As we saw in Chapter III, the University of Navarra was founded in Pamplona by Opus Dei in 1952. Antonio Fontan reports that in 1961, it was composed of five schools (Facultades) and four institutes and university-level technical schools; the University then had an enrollment of some 1500 students.[28] In an interview in

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[28]Fontan, Los Católicos en la Universidad, p. 59. A note of explanation is perhaps in order in regard to the use of the Spanish word "facultad," translated here as "school"; it is applied to the classical division of the university, i.e., School of Medicine, School of Law, School of Philosophy and Letters, etc.



Figure 4.1. Central Government of Opus Dei

1968, Father Escrivá described the University of Navarra as having grown to include eighteen schools, institutes, and university-level technical schools, with a total enrollment of more than six thousand students.[29]

Judging from the admissions bulletin published by the University for the academic year 1972-73, it has continued to enlarge its scope of activity. It now has a branch in San Sebastián where Industrial Engineering and Physical Sciences are taught. This branch also includes a secretarial school. Another branch, the Instituto de Estudios Superiores de la Empresa (IESE), formally founded in Barcelona in 1965, is a modern, well-equipped business administration school at the graduate level, offering a Master's program in Business Economics and Management, and since the academic year 1970-71, a Doctoral program in Business and Management Sciences. IESE also organizes international management training programs for senior business executive managers. The school is a member of the European Foundation for Management Development and attracts students from thirty-two countries. There are forty-two full-time professors, twenty-three part-time faculty members, and eleven full-time research assistants. IESE's alumni association counts among its members over one thousand high-level business managers.[30]

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[29]Conversaciones, p. 138.

[30]Normas de Incorporación de Alumnos Españoles: 1972-73 (Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 1972),

The main campus of the University of Navarra in Pamplona presently offers the equivalent of American Baccalaureate degrees in twenty-four fields, the Master's degree in Liberal Arts in four fields of specialization, and the Doctorate in fifteen fields.[31]

Within the total university system in Spain, Opus Dei operates a number of colegios mayores.[32] There are seven colegios mayores within the University of Navarra. At the state-operated University of Madrid, Opus Dei operates the Colegio Mayor de la Moncloa for male students and the Colegio Mayor Alcor for female students. Other colegios mayores operated by Opus Dei include Monterols in Barcelona, El Albaicín in Granada, La Estila in Santiago de Compostela, Miraflores in Zaragoza, and two

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p. 6; Programa Master en Economía y Dirección de Empresas: 1972-73 (Barcelona: IESE, Universidad de Navarra, 1972), pp. 9-16; An International Program in Business and Management Sciences: 1973 (Barcelona: IESE, Universidad de Navarra, 1972), pp. 9-17; Programas de Perfeccionamiento: 1972-73 (Barcelona: IESE, Universidad de Navarra, 1972); Memoria Informativa de Programas (Barcelona: IESE, Universidad de Navarra, 1972), p. 3.

[31]Normas de Incorporación, pp. 17-23, 27. It is difficult to compare these degrees with those granted by U.S. universities, except in the case of the Master's degree in Liberal Arts which was patterned after the same degree program in U. S. universities. In some cases, e.g., Medicine and Law, the Spanish degree is not equivalent to the U.S. Baccalaureat, but comparable to the M.D. and J.D. degrees, even though further study is necessary in Spain to obtain the Doctorate in these fields.

[32]See Chapter III, n. 16, for an explanation of colegios mayores.

colegios mayores, Guadaira and La Alcazaba, in Seville. These Opus Dei colegios mayores thus represent only a small percentage of the total 166 colegios mayores existing in Spain in 1972.[33]

During an interview with the directrice (an Opus Dei member) of the Colegio Mayor Alcor in Madrid, this writer learned that only approximately 2% of the residents of Alcor are themselves Opus Dei members. The Alcor has four administrative personnel members, two of whom are professors. All four are Opus Dei members. The activities of this colegio mayor are aimed primarily toward aiding the residents to successfully terminate their university studies by means of methods that are comparable in kind to those utilized by non-Opus Dei colegios mayores, e.g., tutoring, seminars and colloquia led by professors, a well-equipped library, audio-visual equipment (and in the case of Alcor, a magnificent theatre), and the provision of ample, well-appointed study areas within the modern physical plant. Complementing the primary emphasis on scholarship is an emphasis on a pleasant, family-like environment. The residents are expected to participate in the daily hour-long tertulia, or directed discussion of themes and problems associated with modern life. Weekly

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[33]The information about the colegios mayores operated by Opus Dei was obtained from the office of Public Relations of Opus Dei in Madrid and the office that manages educational centers for the female branch in Madrid. For an up-to-date article on the total number and activities

tertulias are held in which only religious themes are discussed; mass is said daily.

When asked the bases for admittance to residency in Alcor, the directrice stated that three criteria are used in making these decisions: (1) high grades in pre-university level schools; (2) personality and character traits which would "allow the student to fit in here in our family ambiente"; (3) the degree of necessity that a prospective student has to be admitted to Alcor. It was not clear exactly what was meant by the third criterion. Further probing only established, as an example of the criterion, that some consideration of preference is given to prospective residents whose families do not live in Madrid. In that case, Alcor can perform the function of some kind of surrogate parental guidance, presumably rather than forcing these students into less closely-supervised situations existing in other colegios mayores. At any rate, the directrice made it clear that the first two criteria are given considerably more weight than the third. She also made it clear that no attempts are made by the administrative personnel of Alcor to recruit new members for Opus Dei from among the residents. The cost for food and lodging at Alcor is approximately $200 per month which makes it among the relatively more expensive

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of colegios mayores in Spain, see the newspaper report, "En España Hay 166 Colegios Mayores Universitarios," Los Domingos de ABC (September 17, 1972), 30-31.

colegios mayores in Spain, although certainly not the most expensive, as are the Casa de Brazil and various other non-Opus Dei colegios mayores.[34]

Colegios mayores operated by Opus Dei in Spain are greatly outnumbered by university residences operated by the organization. However, data referring to the precise number is difficult to obtain since, in Spain, the residencia universitaria undertakes no teaching functions but merely provides a place where students can secure meals and lodging, whether in a building used only for that purpose, or more commonly, in a large apartment operated as a university residence by the owner. However, Julian Herranz, a leading spokesman for Opus Dei, indicated in 1962 that the Institute operated some two hundred university residences throughout the world and that of this number, a "large part" are located in Spain.[35]

On the level of the equivalent of high school studies, Opus Dei operates colegios in Madrid, Barcelona, and Bilbao. They are among the more efficient and expensive private colegios in Spain. Opus Dei also operates elementary level schools in Madrid and Barcelona where

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[34]Interview with the directrice of the Colegio Mayor Alcor in Madrid, on September 19, 1972.

[35]Julián Herranz, "El Opus Dei," Nuestro Tiempo, Nos. 87-88 (July-August, 1962), p. 10.

efforts are made to continue the education of the teachers in the use of the most modern and effective pedagogical methods.[36]

In addition to the private colegios and elementary schools which charge tuition fees, Opus Dei operates a number of the same types of schools for low-income workers' children in Madrid, Barcelona, Sevilla and several other cities. These schools do not charge tuition fees to their students. Students terminate their studies in these Opus Dei schools with state-recognized certificates and diplomas. Students are also given religious instruction.[37]

In the realm of corporate apostolic enterprises of a more purely "social" nature, with less emphasis on studies leading to the university, Opus Dei operates a

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[36]Ibid., p. 10; Ynfante, Prodigiosa Aventura, p. 70. This writer talked with a teacher at an Opus Dei operated elementary school in Madrid; she offered information regarding the continuing training of all teachers employed in the school; both she and her husband are in the process of becoming members of Opus Dei.

[37]The most well-known of these schools is "Tajamar" in Madrid, which in addition to studies, offers sports equipment and facilities. See Herranz, "Opus Dei," p. 11; "Qué es el Opus Dei?", La Actualidad Española, no. 462 (10 November 1960), p. 6; "El Opus Dei," SP, no. 270 (November 15, 1965), p. 20. Another example of this type of school is the Technical Agrarian Institute of Gerona, near Barcelona, where classes in agriculture and animal husbandry are given to 137 male students each year, Opus Dei: Press Cuttings on Some Apostolic Works (no publishing information), p. 46.

number of free medical clinics, sports clubs, technical training centers for unskilled rural workers who have moved to urban areas, and homemaking centers for unskilled females who seek employment as domestic servants or in the maintenance department of institutions.[38]

An example of the homemaking schools is the successful center in Madrid called "Los Tilos," operated by the women's branch of Opus Dei. Opened in 1967, Los Tilos is actually the name of a chalet located in the northeastern section of Madrid, a pleasant residential area that is rapidly increasing in size and population. At Los Tilos, girls come for several hours in the afternoon for classes in cooking, sewing, infant care, hygiene, domestic machines usage, general education (etiquette, history, art, and Spanish grammar and literature), and religion. These classes are offered to the students without charge, and are staffed by volunteer teachers, many of whom are themselves Opus Dei members. Another example of this type of homemaking school is "Pineda" in Barcelona, although it is also a professional secretarial school granting a state-recognized certificate of studies. Pineda has been in operation longer than Los Tilos and offers, in addition to regular classes, short courses

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[38]Herranz, "Opus Dei," p. 11; "Qué es el Opus Dei?", p. 6; "El Opus Dei," SP, p. 20.

in sales techniques for those interested in employment in retail sales; foreign languages; homemaking for the prospective bride; and sewing for the mothers of alumnae. There are plans for organizing a guitar club, pedagogical seminars for teachers, and a sports club. The directrices of Los Tilos and Pineda, in private interviews, explained that although the classes in religion are not obligatory, almost all students attend these lectures given by Opus Dei priests on matters of Church doctrine. In addition to the "formal" classes, these homemaking centers organize social activities such as Sunday afternoon gatherings and weekend trips for students.[39]

It is interesting to note that the impact of the homemaking centers of Opus Dei is beginning to be felt far beyond the homes and institutions in which their alumnae are employed. On September 25 and 26, 1972, the Second Annual National Meeting of Centers of Professional Formation for Home Assistants was held at Los Tilos. It was attended by approximately 150 teachers and students from the twenty homemaking centers located thoughout Spain.

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[39]José María Peman, "Los Tilos," ABC (Madrid, November 20, 1967); Josefina Figueras, "Pineda: Una Escuela para la Mujer que Trabaja," AMA (November 1, 1966), pp. 29-30; Interview at Pineda in June, 1972; Interview at Los Tilos, September, 1972.

Those attending the meeting heard addresses by government officials.[40] It also received press coverage. They also set up three commissions to treat the following themes: Family and Home in contemporary society, planning for expansion and development of homemaking centers into Centers of Domestic Sciences, and juridical recognition of the profession. The commission treating the latter subject issued a very strong, concluding statement that urged legal recognition for domestic workers through their inclusion under the Law of Work Contracts. This move would immensely benefit domestic workers by establishing for them and by making them eligible for social security benefits, minimum work standards and compensation.[41]

In order to keep these educational and social corporate undertakings of Opus Dei in some kind of

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[40]José Aguilar Peris, Director General of Professional Education, Ministry of Education; Luis Buceta Facorro, Subdirector General of Special and Continuing Education, Ministry of Education; Rafael Martinez Emperador, National Institute of Planning.

[41]This writer was an invited observer at the national meeting which was not open to the general public but, as stated above, was attended by the press, including the national television news team. For press coverage of the meeting, see, Pilar Urbano, "En Los Tilos: II Reunion Nacional de Centros de Formacion Professional para Auxiliares de Hogar," Telva, No. 217 (Oct. 1, 1972), pp. 61-62.

relative perspective, it should be noted that Opus Dei as well as other Secular Institutes have established these apostolic enterprises all over the world. Opus Dei itself operates in some seventy countries.

Although the division of Opus Dei into branches on the international level and the organization of individual members into Centers and Groups on the local level have already been discussed, one final related theme deserves scrutiny. Ynfante and others have described Opus Dei as having three main branches (priestly, male, and female) composed of different categories of members. Both Ynfante and Antigues argue that the "Numerary" members of each branch are the "elites" within that branch. They also make the argument that the priestly branch itself is more "elite" than the other two. According to these authors, only unmarried persons with graduate university degrees are admitted to membership in the Numerary category while unmarried persons without university degrees are admitted to the second-ranking category of membership called "Oblate." Married members supposedly rank third in a category called "Supernumerary," analogously shared in the priestly branch by those regular priests who are already ordained before becoming members of Opus Dei. Ynfante, in a somewhat contradictory fashion, describes a fourth-level category of membership made up of "cooperators" who are not actually members and

do not even have to be Catholics, but who aid in the apostolic work carried out by Opus Dei.[42]

Father Escrivá has answered questions in reference to these charges in several interviews with the press. He states, for example, that Opus Dei is structured in two completely independent branches or sections, one for males, the other for females. Some diocesan priests become members of Opus Dei, the male branch, ". . . since the Obra helps them to attain Christian perfection through the sanctification of their regular work, which precisely is sacerdotal, or priestly, ministry in the service of their Bishop, the diocese, and the whole Church." In other words, membership in Opus Dei does not in any way change the character of the profession of these diocesan, regular priests. In addition, there are in Opus Dei other secular priests who become priests after they have been members of the Institute for some time. These are men with civil professions which, in some cases, they continue to practice after they are ordained as Opus Dei priests. However, their primary duties are involved in the "apostolic goals of Opus Dei." This small number of priests, less than two percent of the total membership according to Father Escrivá, undertake

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[42]Ynfante, Prodigiosa aventura, pp. 126-128; Artigues, Opus Dei, pp. 76-81.

special studies leading to a doctorate in any of the ecclesiastical disciplines. They administer the sacraments and attend the spiritual needs of fellow Opus Dei members as well as other Catholics in the diocese where each priest lives. Father Escrivá explains that becoming a priest within Opus Dei is not meant to imply any kind of a step upward since all members of the Institute ". . . are and feel themselves to be equal." Touching on this same point on another occasion, Father Escrivá explained that in Opus Dei, there exist no categories of members that imply a ranking or hierarchical ordering of individual members with some being "more holy" or somehow higher-level members than others. The classification of members into different groups, according to Father Escrivá, only reflects their civil and professional states.[43]

In this chapter, an attempt has been made to describe the structural organization of Opus Dei, from the central administrative structure in Rome down to the local administrative structure in Spain. The educational and corporate apostolic enterprises were discussed, finally bringing the description down to the level of

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[43] Conversaciones, pp. 87, 103, 119, 131-133.

individual members and the bases for classifying them into the two branches and into further types of members.

Perhaps a final note should be inserted at this point in reference to the total membership of Opus Dei. It would be a simple matter if it were not for the fact that Opus Dei does not officially make public these figures, a practice that is not uncommon among Secular Institutes.[44] Various sources have estimated the membership in different terms. In 1957, Time magazine estimated the total membership, plus "cooperators," to be 94,000.[45] In 1964, the New York Times estimated the global membership to be around 50,000, an estimate which was supported by the Spanish magazine, SP.[46] Although Opus Dei does not officially make public any statistical data relating to membership, there exists one reference to this question in a pamphlet in a series called Mundo Cristiano Folletos. The series is directed by Jesus Urteaga, a highly visible Opus Dei member and author whose book El Valor divino de lo humano[47] is required reading by new Opus Dei members.

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[44]Reidy, Secular Institutes, pp. 104-105.

[45]Time (March, 1957).

[46]New York Times (1964?); "Opus Dei," SP, No. 270 (November 15, 1965), p. 20.

[47]Jesus Urteaga, El Valor Divino de lo humano (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, S.A., 1948).

In one pamphlet of the series, Urteaga poses a number of questions about Opus Dei to Father Escrivá. The answers to these questions come from various public statements that Father Escrivá has made, so that in a sense the questions were suggested by their "answers" already embodied in published interviews. The interesting, and perhaps enlightening, point is that Urteaga frames one of the questions in the following words: "In any case, doesn't the administration of so many centers of Opus Dei for 50,000 members require a strong organization?"[48] Father Escrivá's "answer" refers to the structural organization of Opus Dei, but the membership figure suggested by Urteaga can probably be accepted as valid. He is, after all, a member who has served in high offices within Opus Dei and thus would possess information about the total number of members. Of course, one is still left wondering what percentage of this membership is Spanish. Judging only from the extention of educational and corporate apostolic enterprises in Spain as compared with those in the rest of the world, it seems plausible to estimate that a preponderance of the global Opus Dei membership is Spanish.

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[48]Jesus Urteaga, "24 Preguntas a Mons, Escrivá de Balaguer," Mundo Cristiano Folletos, No. 123 (April, 1971), pp. 21-22; emphasis added.

Now that some notions of Opus Dei's history and organization have been presented, let us look more closely at Spanish members and their opinions on a variety of subjects.

CHAPTER V

A SURVEY OF ELITE OPUS DEI MEMBERS' POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS

Of central concern in analyzing the political dimensions of a group is determining its members' views on short-term and long-term political questions. In this chapter and the next, we shall be looking at the political opinions and beliefs held by some individual Opus Dei members in the various membership categories. By focusing on the political opinions and beliefs of members, we shall learn whether there is agreement or disagreement among their attitudes towards specific political questions. This data will provide the description of an important dimension of Opus Dei as a group within the Spanish political system in its broadest sense.

The connections between attitudes and behavior have been widely and variously studied.[1] There is also

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[1]Much work using experimental methods has shown that people are more likely to exhibit, and to be satisfied by, mutually agreeing attitudinal and behavioral responses to related objects than by responses displaying nonagreement or inconsistency. Cf., N. Jordan, "Behavioral Forces that are a Function of Attitudes and of Cognitive Organization," Journal of Human Relations, 6 (1953), 273-287; Samuel A. Stouffer, "Experimental Comparison of a Statistical and a Case History Technique of Attitude Research," American Sociological Society Proceedings, XXV (1931), 154-157; N. Kogan and R. Tagiuri, "Interpersonal Preference and Cognitive Organization," Journal

a body of literature which stresses the interactive relationship between environment and psychological predispositions or attitudes as the causal nexus of behavior.[2] The basic thesis embodied in these works is that attitudes and behavior are causally interrelated. For the present purposes, we shall accept that thesis as valid. We shall look at the attitudes of various categories of Opus Dei members toward specific political questions or objects, on the assumption that their attitudes are causally related to their political behavior.

If we find disagreement among the members' political attitudes toward the same political objects, this will tell us something about the lack of cohesion in Opus Dei when it is viewed as a political group. Obverse

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of Abnormal Social Psychology, 56 (1958), 113-116; for more recent studies, see Carl I. Hovland and Milton J. Rosenberg, eds., Attitude Organization and Change: An Analysis of Consistency among Attitude Components (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1960).

[2]See James Davies, Human Nature in Politics (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1963); Richard S. Lazarus, Personality and Adjustment (Englewood Cliffs, N.Y.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963); Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference and Conceptualization (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1969). For studies dealing with the relationships among environment, attitudes, and voting behavior, see Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard R. Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet's work, The People's Choice (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1944); Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964). For a review of the various views on the ways in which early learning of political attitudes affect adult belief systems, see Donald D. Searing, Joel J. Schwartz, and Allen E. Lind, "The Structuring Principle: Political Socialization and Belief

findings, however, will not justify the conclusion that Opus Dei is a cohesive political group actuating political goals. The incidence of great agreement among members' attitudes toward specific political objects may have its genesis in environmental factors only tangentially connected with the fact of membership in Opus Dei. In other words, we will not have proved that these shared attitudes were "learned" within the Opus Dei teaching apparatus.

A method has been devised to help us overcome this difficulty in analyzing agreement among members' attitudes toward political objects. The twenty-six Opus Dei members whose attitudes are measured in this chapter are elite, highly visible men who are active in governmental, academic, and industrial spheres. This group has been divided into three subgroups according to membership status within Opus Dei so that we have samples of Numerary members, of Supernumerary members, and of Co-operators who, while they are not members in a strict sense, are affiliated with the Opus Dei organization. The reasoning behind this classification by membership status is that if shared political attitudes are learned within the Opus Dei teaching process, then we would expect to find the greatest amount of sharing or agreement of attitudes among those members who spend the

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Systems," American Political Science Review, LXVII, No. 2 (June, 1973), 415-432.

greatest amount of time being taught by the Opus Dei organization. Numerary members undergo a probationary period of some seven years or more during which time their ties to the organization's official teaching and counseling personnel are very close, involving regular twice-weekly sessions and numerous other occasions for contact. While Supernumeraries also go through a probationary period, it is not so long as that required of Numeraries and since the Supernumerary is a married person, he does not spend as much of his probation time, on a weekly basis, with the Opus Dei organization's teaching and counseling figures. In other words, the Supernumerary's contact with and exposure to the Opus Dei teaching situation is not as great as that of the Numerary.

In similar fashion, the Co-operator attends less frequent instruction sessions, discussions, and lectures than the Numerary and the Supernumerary. Since the Co-operator is only affiliated with Opus Dei, he has no probationary period, as such, and he does not experience the close counseling relationship that exists between an Opus Dei priest and the Numerary or the Supernumerary member.

Thus, by this classification according to membership status, we will be able to observe the degree of agreement or disagreement among the members' attitudes within each membership category. If political attitudes

are in fact learned by members from Opus Dei teaching and counseling, we would expect to find greater agreement among the attitudes of Numeraries toward specific political objects; lesser agreement among the attitudes of Supernumeraries toward the same political objects, and the least amount of agreement among Co-operators' attitudes toward these political objects.

A word of explanation is in order concerning the political themes selected to serve as objects of Opus Dei members' attitudes. It was felt that the objects should try to tap various kinds of attitudes in order to test the existence of agreement among attitudes on different levels; or to put it another way, to test for consistency among attitudes sets held by each member.

One group of political objects was chosen because of their timeliness. The themes represented by these objects are somewhat controversial and are frequently discussed in the press. These themes include: (1) the possibilities for development of political parties and/or political associations; (2) the future of the monarchy and Juan Carlos as King of Spain; and (3) the question of government-controlled corporate syndicates and/or free labor unions; and (4) necessary governmental reforms and changes.[3]

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[3]There are a number of studies which deal solely with political elites' attitudes and opinions on current themes in domestic and foreign political affairs. For examples of this approach, see Deutsch, et al., France,

Two additional political objects, the best form of government for Spain and current problems in Spain, were chosen because they would involve the respondent's choosing from an unspecified number of possible types of government and kinds of problems and would, thus, seem to tap attitudes closely related to the respondents' more fundamental philosophical or ideological beliefs.[4]

This list of political objects was believed to be sufficiently broad and varied as to allow for measurement of agreement and consistency among attitudes in two different dimensions.

A note of methodological concern must be raised in regard to the selection of members whose attitudes are surveyed in this chapter as well as in Chapter VI. Since no membership lists of Opus Dei are available, it was impossible to select in a random manner the members to be interviewed. Thus, it was first necessary to ascertain who, in fact, the members were. This was done in two ways: (1) by searching in published and media material for those members who openly declared their

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Germany, and the Western Alliance; Seligman, Leadership in a New Nation; Bell, Jamaican Leaders; and Lloyd A. Freo, Six Allies and a Neutral (New York: The Free Press, 1959).

[4]Robert D. Putnam uses "current problems" as a political object is his study of ideological modes of thinking among political elites, "Studying Elite Political Cultures," op. cit., 631, 661.

membership, a search which led mainly to elite, highly visible members, and (2) by utilizing personal contacts in the universities and in the commercial sector to procure introductions to elite and younger, "pre-elite" Opus Dei members, who in turn produced further introductions.[5]

These methods have obvious disadvantages in that it is extremely difficult to arrange interviews with the most elite, highly visible Opus Dei members, especially cabinet ministers and other high-level government officials. In the group of pre-elites, it is also a disadvantage that one must rely on introductions in the form of ever-widening sets of concentric circles since there exists the danger that one is leading or predisposing the analysis toward high agreement among the political

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[5]This does not differ too greatly from the method used by Floyd Hunter in his classic work on the structure of power in an urban community, Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1953), pp. 11 ff., 262271. Although Hunter's interest in studying power relationships among community elites is quite different from our own interests, his work and methodology are cited because they embody the assumption that influential, powerful people are recognized in the community by the positions they hold, an assumption which we share in relation to elite Opus Dei members. In other words, if the measurement of agreement among attitudes held by Opus Dei members is to mean anything in terms of behavior and the possibility of influencing the political decision-making process, the members whose attitudes are measured must possess the capabilities to influence that decision-making process. Although we share with Hunter, and those who use the stratification approach to the study of community power, the assumption that powerful people can be recognized by the positions they hold, we do not mean to imply that these people are equally, or even relatively constant, active or influential in all "issue areas." This view is shared by those who utilize the

attitudes measured. However, with these caveats in mind, a list of fifty names of elite Opus Dei members was drawn up, based on declared membership through some published medium. These fifty men were highly visible, prominent members, active in either governmental, academic, or business sectors, or some combination of these sectors. A personal letter stating the purposes of the present study was sent to each of the fifty men, along with a request for an interview with this writer. Only twenty-six responded favorably. Sufficient data to produce a complete interview, i.e., attitudes towards all of the political objects, was gathered through personal interviews and published sources for twenty-six members of the original fifty-member list.[6] The twenty-six members, all males, were from Madrid, Barcelona, Pamplona, San Sebastian and Valencia.

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pluralist approach to the study of community power, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).

[6]In addition to the personal interviews that were conducted with the elite Opus Dei members, published interviews and the elites' own written works furnished additional attitudinal data toward the six political objects with which this study is concerned. Those works consulted include Josep Carlos Clemente, Conversaciones sobre el Presente y el Future Politico do España (Barcelona: Editorial Juventud, S. A., 1972); Eduardo Alvarez Puga, José Carlos Clemente, and José Manuel Girones, Los 90 Ministro do France (Barcelona: Dopesa, 1972); José Luis Navas, La Generación del Principe (Madrid: G. del Toro, 1972); Miguel Veyrat, Hablando de España en Vez Alta (Madrid: GRSA, 1971); Rafael Calvo Serer, España ante la Libertad, la Democracia, y el Progreso (Madrid: Guadiana de Publicaciones, S.A., 1968); Rafael Calvo Serer, Franco frente al Rey: El proceso del régimen (Paris: Ruedo Iberico, 1972); Laureano López Rodó,

Let us look now at each of the selected political objects and the attitudinal responses elicited from the elite, highly visible Opus Dei members to those political objects. The first question was stated as follows: "In your opinion, what are the possibilities for the development of political parties and/or political associations in Spain?" A note of explanation is in order concerning political parties and political associations in the Spanish context.

Since the inception of the Franco regime in 1938, political parties have been illegal in the Western sense, i.e., electoral groups operating through formal mechanisms to aggregate and represent interests.[7] Franco's Spain has

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Politica y Desarrollo (Madrid: Aguilar, 1970); Laureano López Rodó, Nuevo Horizonte del Desarrollo (Madrid: Aguilar, 1972); Sergio Vilar, Les Oppositions à Franco, trans. by Elena de la Souchere, J. M. Fossey, and J. J. Olivier (Paris: Editions Deneel, 1970); Jordi Sole-Tura, "Los Tecnocratas en la encrucijada," in España Perspectiva 1972 (Madrid: Guadiana de Publicaciones, S.A., 1972), pp. 179-203; Sebastian Auger, La Empresa Española como problema politica (Barcelona: Editorial Plaza y Janes, 1973).

[7]The portion of Spain's constitution entitled Law on the Principles of the National Movement, Article VIII, omits any reference to the National Movement as a legal channel through which persons may be elected to participate in the "legislative functions" of the political system: "The participation of the people in the legislative and other functions of general interest shall be implemented through the family, the municipality, the Trade Union and other organically representative bodies recognized by law for this purpose. Any political organization whatever outside this representative system shall be deemed illegal." See Fundamental Laws of the State: The Spanish Constitution (Madrid: Spanish Information Service, 1967), p. 23.

often been characterized as a single party regime, or movement regime, since the only political group even resembling a political party that has been permitted to exist has been the National Movement.[8] While the civil war was still in progress in 1937, the National Movement was formed by Franco from a fusion among the fascist Falange with its several factions, the Carlists, other monarchists, and conservatives.[9] Although the militantly totalitarian ideology of the National Movement in its early days has been considerably watered down and de-emphasized since the decade of the sixties, this political organization still retains constitutional recognition of its "unalterable" principles and its unique duty to "inform the political system and, . . . promote political life on the basis of an orderly concurrence of criteria."[10]

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[8]E.g., Juan J. Linz, "From Falange to Movimiento-Organization: The Spanish Single Party and the Franco Regime, 1936-1968," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1970), pp. 128-203.

[9]See Stanley G. Payne, Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1961), Chapter XIV, for a discussion of the founding of the National Movement as the official state political organization.

[10]Fundamental Laws of the State, p. 62.

However, constitutional principles proved to be alterable in Franco's Spain, and in 1966, a new constitutional Organic Law of the States was adopted by the Cortes, or legislature, and was approved by a large majority of the Spanish electorate in a general referendum. This constitutional instrument contained amendments pertaining to already-existing portions of Spain's constitution, including the Constitutive Law of the Cortes. The new language written into the latter document refers somewhat vaguely to the "present need" for elaborating a mechanism for the expression of "the contrast of opinions" within the National Movement and of "extending representation to other . . . associations."[11] At the present time, these political associations have not yet been elaborated, nor have any provisions been made for their organization or elaboration, but the subject still remains a lively point of discussion in the Spanish press.

Thus, it seemed that the political object embodied in the concepts of political parties and associations was sufficiently visible and controversial to serve as an apt object to elicit attitudes from our sample of elite Opus Dei members. Attitudinal responses to this object fell into four categories which make up a broad

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[11] Fundamental Laws of the State, pp. 97-98.

liberal-authoritarian continuum with two intermediate positions.[12] It will be helpful to look at each of the four attitudinal positions before we discuss the response data.

A liberal position was identified. It was expressed by those who thought that "political associations" was simply an officially acceptable term for political parties and that such associations should operate in the Western sense in open electoral competition to aggregate and articulate interests and to serve as channels for elite recruitment. A slightly different moderate liberal position was espoused by those who held generally the same view of political parties and associations as the "liberals," with the exception that moderate liberals took a "go slow" attitude toward the functions of these political groups. For the moderate liberals, these political groups should initially serve only as channels of non-electoral, low-level participation, i.e., as informal channels of interest aggregation and articulation. The moderate liberals were, however, in agreement

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[12]The categories or groupings of attitudinal responses to the political objects are the results of this author's coding of the responses. The coding process was a rather lengthy one in which nuances and small differences among attitudes were not given up easily. The political objects elicited, in some cases, as many as 12 to 15 different types of attitudes, although the differences among some of the attitudes were minimal. The presentation of response data in this chapter as well as in Chapter V represents this author's efforts to find the most natural groupings of different types of attitudes.

that the functions of political parties or associations should eventually be expanded to include the use of formal electoral procedures for articulating interests.

Substantially different from the moderate liberal position is the moderate authoritarian position which does not admit the possibility of political parties and which assigns to political associations the function of channeling non-electoral, low-level political participation. The moderate authoritarians do not admit the possibility of evolution of political associations into formal electoral mechanisms for articulating interests. The pure, or more extreme, authoritarian position of course does not admit the possibility of political parties in the Western sense, nor does it allow to political associations any function other than that of "discussion." Thus, the authoritarian stance admits only the possibility of an informal group somewhat resembling the traditional Spanish cafe tertulia, an informal gathering of friends in a favorite cafe for the purpose of discussing "politics," much in vogue in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

With this background information in mind, now we can look at the attitudinal response data gathered from the sample of twenty-six elite Opus Dei members. The data is presented in Table 5.1.

TABLE 5.1

Elites' Attitudinal Responses to Political Parties and/or Political Associations in Spain

	A Liberal	B Moderate Liberal	C Moderate Authoritarian	D Authoritarian
Numeraries	3	2	1	1
Supernumeraries	2	4	2	3
Co-operators	2	0	4	2
Totals	7	6	7	6

A. Either political parties or associations, in open competition.

B. Either political parties or associations to channel non-electoral participation.

C. Only political associations to channel non-electoral participation.

D. Only political associations to channel discussion.

From this distribution of attitudes, it can be seen that within our sample of elite Opus Dei members, there is almost total disagreement as to the possibilities for development of political parties and/or political associations, as these terms are understood in the Spanish context.

As Table 5.1 shows, seven elite Opus Dei members fell into the liberal position, six into the moderate liberal position, seven into the moderate authoritarian position, and six into the authoritarian position.

Another way of looking at this disagreement is that thirteen Opus Dei members want to have political organizations (parties or associations) providing electoral procedures and performing recruitment functions, either immediately or eventually. The remaining thirteen members would deny any present or future electoral, recruitment function to political associations in the Spanish political system.

Thus, we have total disagreement toward this political object when our sample is taken as a whole. However, the breakdown of attitudinal responses into the three membership categories shows a slightly different pattern of divergence of agreement among attitudes held by those in each category. The Numeraries tend to fall largely into the liberal and moderate liberal positions on the continuum and Co-operators tend to be grouped into the authoritarian and moderate authoritarian positions. However, both Numeraries and Co-operators are represented on the opposite ends of the continuum. The Supernumeraries are more evenly distributed with six members falling in liberal and moderate liberal positions and five members in the authoritarian and moderate authoritarian positions.

On the question of the future of the Spanish monarchy and of Juan Carlos, king-designate, let us look

at the background of the political object. The constitutional document entitled Law of Succession in the Headship of State provides that the present head of state, Francisco Franco, "at any moment, . . . may propose to the Cortes the person whom he thinks should succeed him, either as King or as Regent, ..."[13] In 1969, General Franco named as his successor Prince Juan Carlos de Borbón, grandson of Alfonso XIII, the last reigning Spanish monarch, and son of exiled Don Juan, the pretender to the Spanish throne. It was a choice that angered some of the supporters of Don Juan. It is difficult to estimate just how much real public sentiment of allegiance has developed toward Prince Juan Carlos. The young king-designate has been cast in a largely ceremonial role since being named as Franco's successor and one of the lively topics of debate in the press turns on the question of how active Juan Carlos will be in politics after he ascends to the throne.[14]

With this in mind, let us look at the distribution of attitudes toward this political object in Table 5.2.

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[13]Fundamental Laws of the State, p. 115.

[14]One has only to look at the reign of Prince Juan Carlos' grandfather, Alfonso XIII, to see that Spanish monarchs, even in the 20th century, often took active roles in the formation of governments and in legislative affairs. See Carr, Spain, pp. 390-400.

TABLE 5.2

Elites' Attitudinal Responses to the Question of the Future of Juan Carlos and the Monarchy

	A	B	C	D
Numeraries	2	1	2	2
Super-numeraries	0	5	3	3
Co-operators	0	1	2	5
Totals	2	7	7	10

A. Monarchy not necessary in modern times; people won't accept.

B. Juan Carlos will be above politics; a figurehead.

C. Juan Carlos will decide how active in politics he should be.

D. Traditional Spanish monarchy; Juan Carlos will be active in politics and this is his responsibility.

One does not find such evenly balanced disagreement among attitudes toward the question of the future of Prince Carlos and the Spanish monarchy as toward the question of political parties and political associations. Also, the attitudinal responses to the second political object do not fall into neatly fitting categories along a liberal-authoritarian continuum. The categories, or types of attitudinal responses, require some explanation. For identification purposes, they have been labeled A through D.

Position A is the most liberal, republican response. It was voiced by those members who believe that the monarchy is an outmoded and extravagant institution that will not be supported or even accepted by the citizens of modern Spain once Franco is no longer on the scene. Thus, to those who express this attitude toward the monarchy, it makes no difference who becomes king; the institution itself is headed for failure, as they see it. And, as shown in Table 5.2, there were only two elite Opus Dei members, both Numeraries, who expressed this kind of attitude.

The second liberal category of attitudinal responses, labeled B, is hardly less liberal than the first. The main difference is that in the second liberal position are found those who favor the institution of monarchy in a genuinely constitutional monarchy. They believe that this is the only type of monarchy that will be acceptable to the Spanish people and that Juan Carlos has given evidence that he intends to play the role of a ceremonial, figurehead king, far above the processes and mechanics of political decision-making.

The remaining two categories of attitudinal responses have a more authoritarian flavor in regard to the question of Juan Carlos and the Spanish monarchy. Position C is a moderately authoritarian category of

attitudes held by those members who see the choice of Juan Carlos' activity or absence in politics as one that he will have the power to make. In other words, Juan Carlos as king is seen as potentially not bound by constitutional restraints on some range of his activities involving authoritative decision-making. Those in position C insist that Juan Carlos may or may not become active in political decision-making and that the choice is his to make. They tend to feel that if he becomes active, then the monarchy will be more secure than if he plays a more passive role.

Position C differs from the more purely authoritarian attitudinal response, labeled D, elicited by those Opus Dei members who believe that Spain should and will have a traditional Spanish monarchy and that Prince Juan Carlos, as king, will be active in political decision-making, thus accepting his proper responsibilities.

Looking at attitudinal response categories A and B as the liberal position and at categories C and D as the authoritarian position, one sees in Table 5.2 that the authoritarian position is favored by nearly a 2 to 1 ratio. One also sees that the extreme authoritarian position, category D, represents even by itself a considerable block of opinion.

The distribution of attitudes according to membership category in Opus Dei does not lend support to the often-repeated charge that the organization inculcates the authoritarian viewpoint to its members. The Numeraries and Supernumeraries are rather evenly divided between the liberal and authoritarian positions. It is the Co-operators whose attitudes cluster heavily around the authoritarian position, while only one person in this membership category supported the liberal attitude favorable to a constitutional monarchy. Thus, as in response to the political object of political parties and or associations, those who receive the least amount of training within the Opus Dei teaching organization, i.e., the Co-operators, tend more often to have more authoritarian views than those who spend greater amounts of time learning Opus Dei-taught dogma and precepts.

Before analyzing the results of attitudinal responses to the political object of syndicates and free labor unions, let us take a brief look at the nature of Spanish state trade union syndicates and some of the reasons that they are controversial.

In 1938, official state syndicates were organized according to a "vertical," functional corporate scheme; that is to say, state trade unions were set up

in broad categories, such as industrial, agrarian, and public utility unions.[15]

In order to show how the state trade unions operate, let us take the example of the textile syndicate. To this corporative vertical organization belong owners of textile manufacturing plants, management personnel, technicians, and contract textile workers, both skilled and unskilled. Working conditions and wages and benefits negotiations are carried on within the syndicate between management personnel and representatives elected by the workers, arbitrated by government officials representing, or attached directly to, the syndicate itself.[16]

Only authorized state syndicates are legally permitted to exist. However, since the early 1950's, tacit

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[15]Fundamental Laws of the State, pp. 54-55.

[16]Until the mid-1960's, the whole syndical organization and bureaucracy was located within the ministerial department of the National Movement. After the administrative reorganization in the first half of the 1960's, the syndicate apparatus was given its own separate department headed by a cabinet minister.

From 1957 until 1969, the head of the syndical organization and the head of the National Movement, the latter a ministerial post, were positions occupied by the same man, José Solis Ruiz. From 1969 to the present time, the syndical organization has become more independent of the National Movement; the head of the syndicates is a position of cabinet ministerial rank. See Equipo Mundo, Los 90 Ministros de Franco (Barcelona: Dopesa, 1970), pp. 299-310, 419, 504. For an excellent discussion of the new syndicate law and syndical reorganization, see Carlos Iglesias Selgas, Un Regimen social moderno: Reflexiones sobre la España actual (Bilbao: Mensajero, 1970), pp. 164-188.

recognition ... has been given to a series of Catholic labor brotherhoods, Hermandades Obreras de Acción Catolica (H.O.A.C.). The H.O.A.C. have been permitted to carry out their activities within, and as special organs of, the mass lay Catholic organization called Catholic Action. In the early 1960's, the H.O.A.C. and Catholic Action began to channel labor demands for higher minimum wages and recognition of the right to strike. Both of these demands were met by 1966. The ensuing strikes and inflation due to rising wages have been the source of much controversy in the press, although the more basic question of the right to peaceful assembly and organization has not usually been connected in the media with the question of state syndicates and free labor unions.[17]

Thus, one is confronted in Spain with a series of large state syndicates composed, along functional lines, of employees and employers in the same economic sector. It is often charged by critics of the Franco regime that these syndicates are not supported by the workers.[18] Hence, the question of state syndicates and

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[17]Souchère, Explanation of Spain, pp. 276-287; Payne, Franco's Spain, pp. 124-125; Hugh Thomas, "The Balance of Forces in Spain," Foreign Affairs, 41, no. 1 (October, 1962), 211, states that the Catholic Action periodical Ecclesia published an editorial in favor of the right to strike in 1963.

[18]Souchère, Explanation of Spain, pp. 241-242; Payne, Franco's Spain, p. 113. There are no studies based

free labor unions seemed to be an appropriately visible, controversial political object toward which we could measure the amount of attitudinal agreement among elite Opus Dei members.

As with the questions of political parties/associations and of Juan Carlos and the monarchy, the responses to the question of state syndicates and free labor unions fell into four categories.

The categories of responses to this political object are somewhat similar to those elicited by the political object stated as political parties and/or associations. We find two liberal positions with the more extreme of the two calling for no state intervention in the market mechanism and the existence of real bargaining power on the side of union labor. In this liberal position, the possibility exists of competition among labor unions. The moderate liberal position differs only in that some state intervention in labor organization is possible if desired by workers; state syndicates may be organized. However, in this position as well as in the more extreme liberal position, "real" bargaining power exists and resides in non-government-organized labor.

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on survey research of workers' attitudes toward the state syndicates. However, a study by Juan J. Linz and Amando de Miguel, Los Empresarios ante el poder publico (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Politicos, 1966), states that about half of the businessmen in the study used the syndicates and official interest group system as a satisfactory means of influencing public policy.

Unions are free to enforce their demands with sanctions, e.g., slow-downs, strikes, in order to give more weight to their stance in negotiations with management.

The extreme authoritarian position does not admit the possibility of any syndicates or trade unions other than those organized and directed by the state. This is a very paternalistic viewpoint in which these "ideal" state syndicates are seen as having more decision-making power than is actually possessed by the syndicates in contemporary Spain. In this viewpoint, labor's needs, living standards, and working conditions are determined, procured, and enforced by the state syndical mechanism. There is, of course, no competition among syndicates and organized labor may not engage in slow-downs, strikes, or any of the other traditional bargaining tools. It must be underlined that this category of attitudinal response does not correspond to the actual situation in Spain, but is, in fact, far more authoritarian.

The moderate authoritarian position, however, does closely resemble the present vertical state syndicate system in Spain. These Opus Dei members espousing this viewpoint would not admit active, freely-organized non-government labor unions. But within the framework of the vertical state syndicates, labor would have a bargaining voice, argued by its own elected representatives

and backed up by the possibility of labor strikes. Perfectly compatible with this position are minimum as well as ceiling wage levels set by officials of the syndicates in collaboration with government planning experts.

Let us look at the attitudinal response data to this political object, shown in Table 5.3.

TABLE 5.3

Elites' Attitudinal Responses to State Syndicates and/or Free Labor Unions

	A Liberal	B Moderate Liberal	C Moderate Authoritarian	D Authoritarian
Numeraries	3	1	2	1
Supernumeraries	1	1	6	3
Co-operators	1	1	3	3
Totals	5	3	11	7

A. Only free labor unions in open competition.

B. Either state syndicates or free labor unions, or combination, whichever workers want.

C. State syndical framework, complementary free unions.

D. Only state syndicates

Table 5.3 shows that 18 of the 26 elite Opus Dei members expressed extreme or moderate authoritarian attitudes toward the question of state syndicates and free labor unions, with 11 of 26 favoring a moderate authoritarian position. On the liberal side, five elite members

adopted the extreme, perhaps even laissez-faire, liberal attitude, while the moderate liberal position was adopted by only three members. This shows an obvious authoritarian leaning on the question of state syndicates; to put it another way, there is substantial agreement among elite Opus Dei members on the question of state syndicates.

However, when we look at the breakdown of attitudinal responses into membership categories, we see that it is only among the ranks of Supernumeraries and Co-operators that these attitudes are so thoroughly authoritarian. Nine of the eleven Supernumeraries responded with authoritarian kinds of attitudes and six of the eight Co-operators, likewise. Numeraries were more evenly divided in their attitudinal responses to this political object: four Numeraries indicated liberal attitudes and three showed evidence of authoritarian attitudes. These findings do not lend credence to the notion that Opus Dei teaches either a liberal or an authoritarian ideological way of thinking to its members.

Now, let us look at the final visible, controversial political object. The question was stated as follows: "In your opinion, what kinds of governmental reforms are most immediately necessary in Spain?" In this case, the responses were grouped into two clusters of attitudes representing what we have simply called a

liberal and an authoritarian viewpoint. These two broad categories of responses represent various nuances of attitudes, the further categorization of which would have required too many value judgments on the part of this writer in the coding of responses, unlike the coding operation for responses to the previous political objects where natural intermediate clustering of groups of responses emerged from the data.

Let us examine more closely the kinds of attitudes that make up each viewpoint. The liberal response category is made up of attitudes favorable toward the elaboration of mechanisms to limit executive power; juridical separation of church and state; the elaboration of a genuine electoral mechanism; guarantees for genuine civil and political liberties; and the elaboration of procedures providing for greater decision-making capacity on the local level.

The authoritarian response category is composed of attitudes quite opposite to those found in the liberal category. The authoritarian category comprises attitudes favorable toward the reinforcement of executive and police power; the elaboration of non-competitive, "dialogue" political associations strictly within the framework of the present National Movement organization; the strengthening of controls over the press and the mass media; the necessity to adhere closely to the Spanish constitution.

It should be noted that several of the Opus Dei members expressed attitudes favorable to the present governmental system, i.e., they thought that no governmental reforms were immediately necessary. It was decided to place these members in the authoritarian response category since the present Spanish governmental system is considered to be authoritarian, although it is "moderate" and modernizing.[19]

Table 5.4 shows the distribution of response data in the liberal and authoritarian categories. One can see that there is fairly even overall distribution between the two viewpoints.

This fairly even distribution of attitudes holds true within the three membership categories, although the Numeraries shows somewhat more concentration in liberal attitudes toward necessary governmental reforms and the Co-operators tend to concentrate in authoritarian attitudes. Thus, we again have the situation in which

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[19]Juan J. Linz was probably the first to define and describe, in theoretical terms, the Spanish system as "authoritarian" in his essay, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in E. Allardt and Y. Lithunen, eds., Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology (Helsinki: The Westermarck Society, 1964). The latest confirmation of the classification of Spain as an authoritarian system comes from Charles W. Anderson, in his excellent work, The Political Economy of Modern Spain: Policy-Making in an Authoritarian System (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970).

TABLE 5.4

Elites' Attitudinal Responses to the Question of Necessary Governmental Reforms

	A Liberal Attitudes	B Authoritarian Attitudes
Numeraries	5	2
Supernumeraries	6	5
Co-operators	3	5
Totals	14	12

A. Limitation of executive power; separation of church and state; electoral mechanism; civil and political liberties; decentralization of political decision-making.

B. Reinforcement of executive and police power; elaboration of "dialogue" political associations; stronger controls over press and mass media; close adherence to the Spanish constitution.

there is almost total disagreement among the members of Opus Dei who make up our sample with respect to a highly visible, controversial political object.

It will be instructive at this point to recapitulate the attitudinal responses of elite Opus Dei members to the four visible, controversial political objects. Table 5.5 presents the response data without distinctions among membership categories. The moderate liberal and moderate authoritarian response categories have been combined, where applicable, with each of the respective polar categories.

Table 5.5 shows that there is indeed disagreement among elite Opus Dei members with respect to the four selected political objects, or political questions that concern certain aspects of the Spanish political system in the near future.

TABLE 5.5

Attitudinal Responses of Elite Opus Dei Members to Selected Controversial Political Objects

Political Object	Liberal Attitudinal Responses	Authoritarian Attitudinal Responses	Totals
Political Parties/ Associations	13	13	26
Juan Carlos/Sp. Monarchy	9	17	26
State Syndicates/ Free Labor Unions	8	18	26
Governmental Reforms	14	12	26
Totals	44	60	104

Possible explanations of individual members' attitudinal inconsistencies are discussed later in the introductory remarks to the analysis of deeper, more philosophical attitudes. However, two points may be suggested from the data presented in Table 5.5: (1) the roughly even distribution between liberal responses (44) and authoritarian responses (60) does not suggest that the attitudes

or opinions, in a broader sense, toward the four selected political questions are taught by, or learned within, the Opus Dei instruction setting; (2) the mere presence of attitudinal inconsistencies in some individual Opus Dei members toward the political objects suggests that Opus Dei does not, in fact, teach its members either a liberal or an authoritarian ideological line of thought.

Now, let us turn to our analysis of responses to political objects that tap more perceptional, philosophical levels of attitudes. By this, we mean simply that when asked to identify and discuss current problems faced by contemporary Spanish society, or when asked the best form of government for contemporary Spain, a respondent presumably expresses attitudes informed by his own preferences for some specific philosophical, ideological concepts, or he perceives problems in the society that interfere with his own ideas about the way the society should be. Let us hasten to add that we are not arguing that all respondents are ideologues whose attitudes are consistently arranged according to hierarchical principles and values. We are simply arguing that the question of current problems and the best form of government are responded to in terms of some (perhaps even conflicting) philosophical or ideological concepts, rather than in

terms of affect, disconnected political events, or purely personal interests.[20]

When asked the following question, "Identify and discuss the principal problems facing Spanish society today.", the responses from our sample of elite Opus Dei members again could be grouped into a liberal and an authoritarian category. Let us look at the kinds of perceived problems that make up the liberal and the authoritarian viewpoints. Those attitudinal responses that were placed in the liberal syndrome category included concern over the lack, or recent retrogression, of political and civil liberties; concern over the need to bring Spain's political institutions more in line with those in the European Common Market countries, otherwise stated as concern over the unfulfilled need for genuine representation in, and free access to, the political decision-making process.

These attitudes comprising the authoritarian viewpoint include an insistence on gaining certain levels of economic performance before engaging in (further) political

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[20]This argument is based on findings that politically active elites do engage in ideological thinking and analysis, i.e., taking a stand on a salient political issue with reference to one's beliefs in liberalism or conservatism; see Campbell, et al., American Voter, Chapter Ten.

liberalization; concern over the need to see the Spanish constitution fully in effect and operative before Franco leaves office so as to insure the continuity of Spain's unique form of government; and finally, concern over disorienting social crises ranging from crises in the family institution and among youths to the lack of order and threat of subversion in the society as a whole.

TABLE 5.6

Elites' Attitudinal Responses to Current Problems in Contemporary Spanish Society

	A Liberal Attitudes	B Authoritarian Attitudes
Numeraries	5	2
Supernumeraries	5	6
Co-operators	1	7
Totals	11	15

A. Need for expanded civil and political liberties, for real participation in the political decision-making process.

B. Economic development has precedence over political liberalization, need for constitutional continuity, concern over social crises.

The surprising results shown in Table 5.6 stem from the fact that they represent attitudes which are ostensibly contradictory to some of those shown in Table 5.4. When asked to name necessary governmental reforms

in terms of rather procedural matters, a slight majority of elite Opus Dei members responded with reforms couched in terms of liberal attitudes. Yet, when these same members were asked, in effect, "What is wrong in Spain today?", a larger majority responded with concerns voiced in terms of authoritarian types of attitudes. Table 5.6 shows that Numeraries remained as consistently liberal in their responses to the political object of current societal problems as they were toward governmental reforms. The Supernumeraries shifted slightly in favor of authoritarian attitudes toward current problems. However, the largest shift occurred among Co-operators who, by a ratio of 7 to 1, voiced authoritarian attitudes.

The explanation for these shifts or inconsistencies in attitudinal responses lies, we believe, in the fact that the Supernumerary and the two Co-operators who "changed sides," as it were, are all three governmental officials, connected closely with the economic and social development planning process. In response to the previously studied political object of governmental reforms, these three members voiced concern over the necessity to elaborate procedures which would bring more persons and interests into the planning process on the local level, i.e., a concern for greater decision-making capacity on

the local level.[21] This response was classified as a liberal response. However, when these same Opus Dei members responded to the question of current problems, they made it clear that participation and performance in purely economic development processes should take precedence over any further participation in the political process of choosing government representatives and leaders. Thus, this response was classified as authoritarian.

Several observations are possible concerning the discrepancies between attitudes toward governmental reforms and those evoked by the political object of current problems. One is that the persons holding these attitudes were simply not aware of any inconsistency.[22]

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[21]Participation in the economic and social development planning process on the local level takes place in two ways: in the formulation of proposals for objectives to be included in the four-year development plans and in the formulation of the means to implement over-all objectives contained in the development plans once the objectives have been established. For an up-to-date treatment of the development planning process, see Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain.

[22]See Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1957) for theoretical insights into the matter of consistency among cognitions and the amount of inconsistency that can be tolerated. See Milton J. Rosenberg, "An Analysis of Affective-Cognitive Consistency," in Hovland and Rosenberg, eds., Attitude Organization and Change, pp. 15-64, for reports of experimental work dealing with changes in attitudinal sets in the direction of consistency.

Another observation or possibility is that the purposes which were to be served by specific governmental reforms mentioned were not discussed by the respondents, thus leading to misclassification of the responses. A third possibility is that a moderate category of responses with rather arbitrary boundaries could have been constructed for both political objects, i.e., governmental reforms and current problems, thus allowing for consistency of attitudes from the three Opus Dei members in question. However, it seems more suitable to let the data stand as reported and to insist that the political object of current problems taps a deeper, more ideological type of attitude than the question of governmental reforms. Thus, it is possible to argue that some inconsistencies between the attitudes held toward the two political objects could be tolerated by these Opus Dei members.[23]

Turning to the question of the best form of government for Spain, we find a similar pattern of responses.

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[23]Both of the following articles involving experimental work show that while a person is most likely to change one or a number of his cognitions in the direction of logical consistency, he may resist change and ignore the inconsistencies: William J. McGuire, "A Syllogistic Analysis of Cognitive Relationships," in Hovland and Rosenberg, eds., Attitude Organization and Change, pp. 65-111; Milton J. Rosenberg and Robert P. Abelson, "An Analysis of Cognitive Balancing,", p. 63; Hovland and Rosenberg, eds., Attitude Organization and Change, pp. 112-163.

However, there is an additional advantage in that the responses to this political object fell rather easily into four attitudinal categories, which allows us to better analyze the ranges along a liberal-authoritarian continuum. Before analyzing the data, let us describe each category of responses in terms of the attitudes represented therein.

The liberal category is comprised of attitudes favorable to the immediate establishment of a pluralistic democracy within the framework of a constitutional monarchy or a socialistic democracy. The moderate liberal category differs from the liberal on two points: (1) the moderates prefer a more gradual evolution toward a democratic constitutional monarchy, and (2) during this evolution, they would not allow political participation by those whose goals do not include the establishment of a democratic constitutional monarchy.

The polar authoritarian viewpoint is made up of attitudes favorable to a unique Spanish type of system headed by a politically-active monarchy and constituted at the legislative level by representatives elected through the three "organic" bodies: families, municipal officials, and the National Movement. The moderate authoritarian viewpoint comprises attitudes favorable to the present Spanish form of "organic democracy" within a monarchical framework where the monarch does not take

an active role in legislative affairs once governments have been constituted. The moderate authoritarians also voice attitudes favorable toward some indefinite future evolution of this system to include more participation by the public in political decision-making.

TABLE 5.7

Elites' Attitudinal Responses Toward a Choice of the Best Form of Government for Spain

	A Liberal	B Moderate Liberal	C Moderate Authoritarian	D Authoritarian
Numeraries	3	2	1	1
Super-numeraries	3	1	3	3
Co-operators	1	0	4	3
Totals	8	3	8	7

A. Immediate establishment of democratic constitutional monarchy or socialist political system.

B. Evolution toward democratic constitutional monarchy with political participation limited to those who favor this form of government.

C. Present Spanish form of "organic democracy" with figurehead monarch, possible future evolution toward more public participation in political decision-making.

D. Unique, permanent Spanish form of "organic democracy" headed by a politically-active monarch.

Table 5.7 shows that eleven Opus Dei members expressed liberal or moderate liberal attitudes while

fifteen members' attitudes could be considered authoritarian or moderate authoritarian. This was exactly the same breakdown of attitudes as shown in Table 5.6, where attitudes were measured toward the object of current problems, although in that table, we are not able to distinguish between polar and moderate attitudes toward that political object. It is also noteworthy that the responses according to membership category are the same in Table 5.7 as in Table 5.6. Numeraries displayed liberal attitudes over authoritarian ones in a ratio of 5 to 2; the Supernumeraries were again divided 5 to 6; and the Co-operators again heavily favored authoritarian attitudes, 7 to 1.

The results of eliciting the attitudes of elite Opus Dei members toward various political objects leads to several interesting tentative conclusions.

First of all, the twenty-six Opus Dei members whose opinions and beliefs were scrutinized in this chapter gave us evidence of wide ranges of attitudes, from extreme liberal to extreme authoritarian, toward six political objects. On the face of it, this alone would be strong evidence that the Opus Dei teaching apparatus does not inculcate ideological or more narrow political viewpoints into its members.

However, and as a second point, those who spend the greatest amount of time in the Opus Dei learning process do not espouse more authoritarian attitudes than those who spend less time, nor do those who spend the greatest amount of time in the learning process show evidence of greater cohesion or agreement of their attitudes than those who spend less time. In fact, our data shows the opposite to be true: Numeraries and Supernumeraries tend to be more evenly divided in espousing liberal and authoritarian attitudes, within each membership category, than the Co-operators, who appear to more cohesively express authoritarian types of attitudes.

One possible explanation for the authoritarian leaning of the Co-operators might lie in the fact that they were, on the whole, older than the Numeraries and Supernumeraries. Recalling the contents of the various moderate authoritarian and authoritarian responses, it must be understood that the label "authoritarian" was applied in its moderate sense to those ideals which were, above all, status-quo oriented, and in its extreme form, to those ideas which represented a past system or state of affairs in Spain. Thus, it does not seem too facile an explanation to argue that those who have lived longest, and benefitted most, under a particular system are most likely to be positively oriented toward that system.

Our findings suggest that Opus Dei does not teach any specific ideology nor any ideological manner of interpreting current events or of perceiving social and political problems. Our findings also belie the charge that Opus Dei is a political organization with militantly political goals. This is not to say that individual Opus Dei members or informal groups of Opus Dei members do not have political goals or that they do not engage in political actions, but only that there is no evidence among elite members that the Opus Dei organization as a whole has any such political goals or aims.

We have been focusing in this chapter on a very special, visible group of elite Opus Dei members. Let us now turn our attention to another group of Opus Dei members and test their attitudinal responses to the same political objects.

CHAPTER VI

A SURVEY OF YOUNG OPUS DEI MEMBERS' POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS

In this chapter, we shall be looking at the attitudes of thirty young Opus Dei members from ages 18 through 29. It was decided to call these young people "pre-elites" because of two socio-economic characteristics they shared: all were either university-educated or in the process of undertaking university studies, and all had upper or upper-middle class family backgrounds. These two factors and the advantages that they imply in a system where political recruitment is still greatly affected, if not regulated, by particularistic and ascriptive criteria mean that these young Opus Dei members are quite likely to eventually attain positions of influence in the Spanish society.[1]

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[1]Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., in their work Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, Inc., 1966), p. 48, remind us that even in modern, structurally differentiated political systems, particularistic and ascriptive criteria have weight in the political recruitment process. This author's conversations with knowledgeable persons in Spain have led her to the conclusion that particularistic and ascriptive criteria are extremely important in university examinations as well as in the process of Oposiciones, or examinations, the successful completion of which grant lifetime positions in the Spanish civil service.

As stated in the previous chapter, the difficulties inherent in identifying and procuring appointments with Opus Dei members made it impossible to select in a random manner the members to be interviewed. The thirty pre-elites who were interviewed for this study were contacted on the basis of personal introductions in Madrid, Barcelona, Pamplona, and San Sebastian. Unlike the group of all-male Opus Dei elites discussed in Chapter IV, the group of pre-elites is composed of 22 males and 8 females.

In contrast to the three membership classifications utilized in presenting attitudinal data for the elites, we shall employ only two classifications for the pre-elites, those being Numeraries/Supernumeraries and Cooperators. The logic that dictates this classificatory scheme is that within our sample of thirty pre-elites, one finds eight Numeraries, five Supernumeraries, eight members who are still in their probationary period, and nine Co-operators. The categorization of data from the Numeraries, Supernumeraries, and probationary members showed no significant variations among these three membership groupings, so it was decided that they could be treated as one group with no loss of important information.

As we shall see, these factors will not hinder a comparison of attitudes between the elite and pre-elite

groups. We shall also be interested in comparing the attitudinal responses of our pre-elite Opus Dei group with those of a general cross section of Spanish university students. For this purpose, there exist several excellent studies and documents from which comparative data will be drawn.

Let us turn our attention now to the attitudinal data elicited from the sample of Opus Dei pre-elites. Unlike the elites' responses which were divided into liberal, moderate liberal, moderate authoritarian, and authoritarian categories, the pre-elites' responses were much more homogeneous and were thus divided into only liberal and authoritarian categories of attitudinal responses to all of the political objects with the exception of the question of the future of Juan Carlos and the Spanish monarchy,where four distinct types of attitudes could be discerned.

The first political object toward which attitudes were solicited was the concept of political parties/ associations. The question asked of the respondents was, "In your opinion, what are the possibilities for the development of political parties and/or political associations in Spain?" Attitudinal responses to this political object fell into two categories which we have loosely labeled liberal and authoritarian. Let us look more closely at the content of each category of responses.

The liberal category is comprised of those pre-elites who thought that either political parties or political associations should be organized immediately and officially permitted to function as political parties in the Western sense of the concept, i.e., to aggregate and articulate interests and to operate in electoral competition as channels for political elite recruitment. These young Opus Dei members' attitudes reflected the need for immediacy in the elaboration of political parties/associations in contra-distinction to some of the elite Opus Dei members who agreed with the desirability of political parties/associations, but took a "go slow" attitude toward their elaboration.

The authoritarian category is made up of those who talked about the undesirability of political parties that are ideologically grounded and who failed to mention any aggregation or elite recruitment functions for the political associations that they thought could and should be immediately organized. The pre-elites in this category did, however, mention "discussion" or "dialogue" as suitable activities for political associations.

With these categories in mind, let us look at the distribution of attitudinal responses to this highly visible political object.

TABLE 6.1

Pre-elites' Attitudinal Responses to Political Parties and/or Political Associations in Spain

	A Liberal	B Authoritarian
Numeraries/ Supernumeraries	18	3
Co-operators	6	3
Totals	24	6

A. Either political parties or associations immediately for articulation and aggregation of interests and as channels for elite recruitment.

B. Only political associations, or non-ideological organizations, for discussion and dialogue.

Table 6.1 shows the evidence of disagreement, or widely separated viewpoints, among Numeraries/Supernumeraries as a group and among Co-operators as a group. This finding will reappear in the responses to other political objects and it does not support the hypothesis tested in Chapter IV. It will be remembered that the hypothesis advanced the argument that if Opus Dei teaches a certain ideological line of thought, then there should be substantial agreement among members' attitudes with reference to selected political objects and there should be substantially more agreement among those members' attitudes who have spent the greatest amount of time in the Opus Dei indoctrination

process. While there was a kind of moderation in evidence among the elites' attitudes, the pre-elites seemed to adopt more extreme attitudinal positions. It is true that a large majority of the pre-elites voiced liberal attitudes. However, we shall later compare their responses with data from the survey of a cross-section of middle and upper class Spanish youth. For the moment, it will be sufficient to note that young Opus Dei Numeraries/Supernumeraries responded with proportionately more liberal attitudes that did young Co-operators to the question of political parties and/or political associations.

The second question posed to the Opus Dei pre-elites was stated as follows: "How do you view the future of Juan Carlos and the future of the monarchy in Spain?" The responses to this political object were quite interesting in that they fell into four categories or viewpoints largely similar to those evidenced by the older, elite Opus Dei members.

The liberal category (A), an extreme position, is made up of those who felt that the monarchy is an outdated institution and that it has no place in a modern political system. The Opus Dei pre-elites of this persuasion did not believe that the monarchy would be supported by their own generation in the future. Thus, just as with the older Opus Dei elites who shared this viewpoint, the young Opus Dei members in category A saw little future for Prince Juan Carlos as King of Spain.

The moderate liberal category (B) is comprised of those young Opus Dei members who favor a constitutional monarchy with a monarch who plays an inactive, figurehead role. Many of these pre-elites mentioned England and the Scandinavian countries as similar to the type of monarchy that would be successful in Spain. It is also interesting that most of the pre-elites gave the same reason as the elites who shared this viewpoint for their support of Juan Carlos: he has appeared to be willing not to become actively involved in politics.

Category C, the moderate authoritarian category of attitudinal responses, belongs to those pre-elites who saw both the future of the monarchy and the future of Juan Carlos as together tied to the Prince's political acumen and skill. They believed that as king, Juan Carlos must be active enough in political affairs to protect the interests of the monarchy as an institution and to procure stable governments, but not so active as to alienate the considerable number of anti-monarchists of the younger generation.

The authoritarian position, category D, is occupied by those Opus Dei pre-elites who believed that Spain must have a traditionally-Spanish type of monarchy with a politically-active king. One person in this category even made reference to the need for a "strong leader" in the person of the king. Those Opus Dei members of this

persuasion saw Juan Carlos as the legitimate and logical heir to the throne, but they qualified his chances of success by his yet unproved ability to lead.

Table 6.2 shows the distribution of attitudes toward this visible political object.

TABLE 6.2

Pre-elites' Attitudinal Responses to the Question of the Future of Juan Carlos and the Monarchy

	A	B	C	D
Numeraries/ Supernumeraries	6	12	2	1
Co-operators	1	6	1	1
Totals	7	18	3	2

A. Monarchy not necessary in modern times.

B. Constitutional monarchy, with figurehead monarch.

C. The monarchy and Juan Carlos' future depend on his ability to be active enough to preserve the monarchy, but not too active to alienate non-monarchists.

D. Traditional Spanish monarchy, active monarch.

Here again, we find no support for the hypothesis, nor for the more narrow charge that Opus Dei inculcates an authoritarian philosophy into its members.[2] The fact

[2]This charge has been made by various authors, perhaps most vehemently by Ynfante, Prodigiosa Aventura, Chapter 7. Cf., Artigues, Opus Dei, pp. 4-7, 152-157; J. Vidal Beneyto, "Falange Contra Opus Dei?" Indice, XXI, No. 214-215 (1966), 49.

that four distinctly different types of attitudes were elicited in response to this political object mitigates against the possibility that these attitudes were inculcated by the Opus Dei teaching mechanism. Such variety instead points to the opposite conclusion that no ideological way of dealing with this political object was systematically taught by Opus Dei.

Perhaps the most interesting point in regard to the responses to this political object is that seven young Opus Dei members do not support the monarchy in Spain and eighteen members believe that the monarchy will last only if constitutional limits and restraints are placed on the political activities of the monarch and his governments. Both of these liberal types of attitudes appear to embody an "anti-strong man" theme and are perhaps an indictment of traditional links that existed between military dictators and politically active monarchs in Spain in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

The third visible, controversial political object that was employed in our study to elicit attitudinal responses from the Opus Dei pre-elites concerned the concept of the organization of labor. The question was couched in the following terms: "Do you favor state syndicates or free labor unions, or a system combining both, for Spain?" The attitudinal responses to this

question fell into a liberal category and an authoritarian category, with no one opting for a system of coexisting state syndicates and free labor unions.

The liberal category is made up of those Opus Dei pre-elites who were in favor of free labor unions. They voiced much criticism of the actual state syndicate system in Spain. They argued that free labor unions would give workers greater possibilities for bargaining for benefits. Some mentioned that, in order to be effective, the free labor unions should be able to strike in order to back up their demands from management. This viewpoint is much like the liberal category of attitudes elicited from the older Opus Dei members in response to the same political object.

The authoritarian position is espoused by those Opus Dei pre-elites who favored only state syndicates. Some of these members seemed almost to be "voting" against free labor unions rather than in favor of state syndicates.[3] Others wanted to keep the system of state syndicates in Spain because they believed that only such official syndicates could oblige management and owners to treat

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[3]Some surprising comments were made in response to this political object, e.g., "free labor unions have a lot of highly-paid, useless people working for them;" and "free labor union officials got involved in politics where they don't belong."

workers fairly. However, several pre-elites who were in favor of state syndicates indicated their beliefs that the actual system in Spain should be reformed to make it more responsive to the needs of the labor force.

TABLE 6.3

Pre-elites' Attitudinal Responses to State Syndicates and/or Free Labor Unions.

	A Liberal	B Authoritarian
Numeraries/ Supernumeraries	12	9
Co-operators	5	4
Totals	17	13

A. Only free labor unions
B. Only state syndicates

The distribution of attitudes shown in Table 6.3 is surprising because it shows a much more equal division of Opus Dei pre-elites into liberal and authoritarian camps than we find in reference to any other political object. Seventeen members subscribe to the liberal viewpoint and thirteen adhere to the authoritarian viewpoint. With Numeraries/Supernumeraries only marginally more liberal than authoritarian (12 to 9 respectively) and with Co-operators rather evenly divided (5 to 4), this distribution suggests that Opus Dei does not teach an official position with regard to this political object.

It is interesting to speculate on the reason for this rather peculiar division of attitudes. As we stated above, the proponents of each system criticized the other system. Some of the criticisms of free labor unions suggest that lack of experience with such labor unions may have led to some misconceptions about their "proper" functions. Thus, it could be argued that dissatisfaction with the actual system in Spain, on the one hand, and insufficient experience with free labor unions, on the other hand, are the bases for the particular division of attitudes elicited by this political object.

Let us turn to the final highly visible political object. Attitudes toward this object were solicited in the following question: "What governmental reforms do you consider to be the most necessary in the immediate future?" Responses to this question were classified into a liberal category and an authoritarian category.

Almost all of those Opus Dei pre-elites who were placed in the liberal category mentioned reforms having to do with the organization and the operation of the state university system: giving students a greater voice in curricula, obligating life-time tenured professors to actually meet their classes and deliver updated lectures, and providing better equipped classrooms and laboratories.

Other necessary reforms mentioned by pre-elites in the liberal category include reformation of the civil service and the syndicates so that they become more responsive to the needs of the people they are supposed to serve; free education, including studies undertaken at the university level; de-centralization of government; and reduction of police powers.

The authoritarian category is comprised of the sole Opus Dei pre-elite who did not talk about any governmental reforms necessary in the immediate future, but rather, about his satisfaction with the reforms of the executive department that were undertaken in the 1960's and the efficiency and successes of the Ministry of Development and Planning. It was on the basis of this response and his general satisfaction with the evolution of the Spanish political system that he was placed in the authoritarian response category.[4]

The distribution of attitudinal responses to the question of necessary governmental reforms is shown in the following table.

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[4]It might be added that this person was the oldest (29 years) in the group of Opus Dei pre-elites; that he holds a position in the Ministry of Development and Planning; and that he consistently responded to the political objects with authoritarian types of attitudes.

TABLE 6.4

Pre-elites' Responses to the Question of Necessary Governmental Reforms

	A Liberal	B Authoritarian
Numeraries/ Supernumeraries	20	1
Co-operators	9	0
Totals	29	1

A. university, public administration, and syndicate system reforms; free education; de-centralization of government; reduction of police powers.

B. adequate reforms of executive branch have been underway for several years.

Table 6.4 shows that twenty of the Numeraries/ Supernumeraries and all of the Co-operators enumerated necessary governmental reforms that were related to liberal attitudes. Only one person, a Numerary, responded in terms of attitudes that could be classified as authoritarian. While there is certainly great agreement among the attitudes of pre-elites toward this political object, one should not be hasty in assuming that these attitudes were learned within the Opus Dei organization. Because of the age group with which we are here concerned and because all of these Opus Dei pre-elites are university-educated, it is perhaps reasonable that reforms dealing with the university system would be frequently mentioned. In other

words, direct experience with the university system is probably the most salient encounter that most of the pre-elites have had with any part of the Spanish political system. Recent university experience probably accounts for the fact that 25 of the 29 pre-elites who were placed in the liberal response category mentioned university system reforms; the 4 who did not were the oldest members found in the liberal category, which suggests that concern for the university system diminishes the more one is separated from it in time. This also seems a plausible explanation of the skewed response data elicited by the question of necessary governmental reforms.

Just as in Chapter IV, let us recapitulate at this point the attitudinal responses of the Opus Dei pre-elites to the four visible, controversial political objects. Table 6.5 presents the data without distinctions between the Numeraries/Supernumeraries and the Co-operators. The responses to the question of Juan Carlos and the monarchy have been combined to form a liberal viewpoint and an authoritarian viewpoint.

Table 6.5 shows us that liberal attitudinal responses outnumber authoritarian attitudinal responses by an overall ratio of almost 5 to 1 among Opus Dei pre-elites. While we do not have here the rather even distribution between liberal and authoritarian responses as we found

among the Opus Dei elites' responses,[5] there is some evidence of attitudinal inconsistencies among pre-elites.

TABLE 6.5

Attitudinal Responses of Opus Dei Pre-Elites to Selected Controversial Political Objects

Political Object	Liberal Attitudinal Responses	Authoritarian Attitudinal Responses	Totals
Political parties/ associations	24	6	30
Juan Carlos/Spanish monarchy	25	5	30
State syndicates/ free labor unions	17	13	30
Governmental reforms	29	1	30
Totals	95	25	120

In other words, between five and twelve of the pre-elites responded to some of the political objects with authoritarian attitudes and to other political objects with liberal attitudes. As in our data elicited from the Opus Dei elites, the presence of attitudinal inconsistencies exhibited by some pre-elites indicates that Opus Dei does not systematically teach its members either a liberal or an authoritarian ideological line of thought.

[5]See Table 5.5 in Chapter V.

To complete our analysis of the Opus Dei pre-elites' responses to political objects, let us look at their responses to those objects that tap more deeply perceptional, philosophical levels of attitudes. The reader should be reminded here that it is this writer's assumption that when respondents are asked to identify and discuss current problems in Spain, or when asked the best form of government for Spain, their attitudinal responses will be informed by their own preferences for some ideological concepts. In other words, in these two political objects are tacitly embodied the questions "What is wrong in contemporary Spanish society?," and "What would be the best way to organize the Spanish political system?" It seems to this author that these are inherently ideological questions.

The responses to the political object embodied in identifying problems facing the contemporary Spanish society fell into a liberal category and an authoritarian category. The type of perceived problems that were identified as liberal attitudes included concern over the lack of freedom in the society, inequality in the distribution of goods, the fact that a majority of Spaniards have no voice in the political decision-making process, the system of favoritism and enchufe[6] that exists

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[6]Enchufe literally means an electrical outlet or connection; it is frequently used in the figurative sense to indicate personal acquaintance with persons who occupy influential positions and can, thus, "get things done" for a friend.

throughout the society, and the fact that workers don't really have anyone to effectively represent them or back them up. The authoritarian category is composed of attitudes that show concern over the loss of Spanish customs and traditions and the growing lack of order in the society.

Table 6.6 shows the distribution of attitudinal responses to the identification of principal problems facing the contemporary Spanish society.

TABLE 6.6

Pre-Elites' Attitudinal Responses to Problems in Contemporary Spanish Society

	A Liberal	B Authoritarian
Numeraries/ Supernumeraries	20	1
Co-operators	8	1
Totals	28	2

A. Lack of freedom; inequalities in distribution of goods; lack of participation of political decision-making; system of favoritism; workers lack genuine representation.

B. Loss of Spanish customs and traditions; growing lack of order in the society.

Here we have almost the same distribution of attitudes as occurred in response to the question of necessary governmental reforms, although the latter dealt with procedural matters while the question of societal problems

get at more ideological concerns. The same twenty Numeraries/Supernumeraries and eight of the Co-operators voiced liberal types of concerns. Here, we have a proportionately large share of the Opus Dei pre-elites expressing liberal attitudes in response to a deeply perceptual political object. This data does, indeed, tend to support the hypothesis that if Opus Dei teaches a certain ideological line of thought, then there should be substantial agreement among members' attitudes with reference to selected political objects. However, as stated at the beginning of Chapter V, data that supports the hypothesis will not prove that Opus Dei does, in fact, teach its members a particular ideological way of thinking. In order to do that, our analysis has to show not only that Opus Dei members' attitudes are in ideological agreement, but that they are in some measure different from those of non-Opus Dei members. We shall look for such differences when we compare Opus Dei pre-elites' attitudes with attitudinal data from the surveys of middle and upper class, young, university-educated Spaniards.

The responses to the final political object, the best form of government for Spain, were classified into a liberal category and an authoritarian category. The liberal category is comprised of attitudes favorable toward the immediate establishment of a socialist republic or a pluralistic democracy. Of those who opted for the

democratic scheme, almost half stated that it should be elaborated within the framework of a constitutional monarchy. Although a socialist republic and a pluralistic democracy are normally considered quite different in kind, it seems to this author that they are equally "liberal" in the context of our liberal-authoritarian continuum which is based largely on the ideas of change vs. status quo in the Spanish context.

The authoritarian category is comprised of attitudes favorable to the present form of government in Spain, with mention of a traditional Spanish monarchy.

Table 6.7 shows us the distribution of attitudes toward this political object.

TABLE 6.7

Pre-Elites' Attitudinal Responses Toward Choice of the Best Form of Government for Spain

	A Liberal	B Authoritarian
Numeraries/ Supernumeraries	19	2
Co-operators	8	1
Totals	27	3

A. Socialist republic or pluralistic democracy.

B. Present Spanish form of government.

Again, we see a proportionately large number of liberal attitudes toward the matter of the best form of government for Spain. As a point of explanation, one of the Numeraries and the Co-operator who voiced authoritarian attitudes toward this political object were also the same pre-elites who responded with authoritarian attitudes toward the question of Juan Carlos and the Spanish monarchy.[7] On the whole, the preponderance of liberal attitudes in response to the best form of government for Spain might best be explained as a rejection of the present form of government by the younger generation of Spaniards, those who have known no other system in Spain.

Looking back over all the responses to these political objects, one notices that among the Opus Dei pre-elites, the Co-operators are generally no less liberal than the Numeraries/Supernumeraries who have spent a great deal more time in the Opus Dei indoctrination process. This was not the case with the older elite Co-operators who more cohesively expressed authoritarian types of attitudes.

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[7]See Table 5.2, supra. In response to the best form of government question, there was also a Supernumerary who responded with an authoritarian type attitude; in response to the question on the future of Juan Carlos and the Spanish monarchy, he evidenced a moderate authoritarian type of attitude.

What, then, aids us in explaining the considerable agreement among liberal attitudes voiced by young pre-elite Opus Dei members, especially in response to the perceptional political objects? Does their membership in Opus Dei tell us anything about their political opinions and beliefs? Are their beliefs sufficiently cohesive and distinctive from their non-member peers to suggest that a certain ideology is taught by Opus Dei to its members? In order to indicate possible answers to these questions there are other sources which report a cross section of the Spanish university and youth population's attitudes towards some of the same political objects that were employed in the present study.

The first study to which we shall refer was made by the eminent sociologist and pioneer in the field of survey research in Spain, Professor Amando de Miguel Rodriquez. His study is based on a nationwide survey taken during the period 1960-61 including 1739 interviews with representative, randomly selected Spanish youths, ages 15 through 21 years.[8] De Miguel found that male

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[8]This study was first published as a series of articles in the Revista del Instituto de la Juventud, and it is to that source that we shall refer: Amando de Miguel Rodriguez, "Estructura Social y Juventud Española: Estratificacion Economica, Participacion en la Renta y en el Consumo," Revista del Instituto de la Juventud, No. 0 (August, 1965), 19-45; Amando de Miguel Rodriguez, "Estructura Social y Juventud Española; El Modelo de la cultura politica," Revista del Instituto de la Juventud, No. 3 (February, 1966), 81-106; Amando de Miguel Rodriguez, "Impacto e Interes por la politica," Revista

university students were much less authoritarian than the general category of female students (ages 15 through 21), male rural farm workers, and male urban unskilled and skilled workers. This finding came from responses to the following question:

> "In other countries, it has been asked many times whether it was preferable:
> A) that each of us be interested in our country's politics and consider ourselves responsible for it, or
> B) that an outstanding man have the authority and make decisions for us.
> Toward which one of these alternatives are you inclined?"[9]

While the youths surveyed in the de Miguel study are generally younger than those in the present study, the two groups are not strictly comparable mainly because the younger group has not undergone the socializing influence of the university experience.[10] However, it can be noted that 70% of the male university students in de Miguel's study opted for alternative A, which he calls

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del Instituto de la Juventud, No. 5 (June, 1966), 63-81; Amando de Miguel Rodriguez, "Participacion politica," Revista del Instituto de la Juventud, No. 6 (August, 1966), 15-37.

[9]de Miguel, "Participacion politica," 16.

[10]Ibid., 18; de Miguel makes this same comment in reference to the male university students who are much less authoritarian than the male high school students in his study. The female student category is not divided into high school and university subgroups, but de Miguel assumes that the university experience would have a similar effect on female students.

the "democratic alternative," while only 23% chose B, the "authoritarian alternative."[11]

This data can be compared, in a general way to the Opus Dei pre-elites' responses toward the question of the future of Juan Carlos and the Spanish monarchy. This political object involves in the authoritarian responses certain elements of the "outstanding man" who is active in political decision-making, described in the question from de Miguel's study. We found that five of our Opus Dei pre-elites, or 17% of the sample, opted for the authoritarian viewpoint on the question of Juan Carlos and the monarchy.[12] Thus, the findings of the present study agree in a general way on one point with the findings of a much larger, earlier study, when we control for education, though not for sex. In other words, the fact of membership in Opus Dei makes little difference in the specific political orientation held by young Spanish university students toward the question of Juan Carlos and the Spanish monarchy.

During 1964-65, the youth division of Spanish Catholic Action conducted a survey of 400,000 of its members, ages 18 to 25, in all parts of Spain. A National

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[11]de Miguel, "Participacion politica," 16, 19.

[12]See Table 5.2, supra.

Youth Congress was held in June, 1965, attended by 2000 youth delegates from the entire country. With each delegate came the results of the interviews conducted with members in his geographical area, data which formed the basis of a public declaration drawn up by the delegates. Among those points most cogent to the present study were the following requests, addressed to the Spanish society via the press:

1. The establishment and normal functioning of political associations within an atmosphere of guaranteed freedoms.
2. Open means of communication which would facilitate channels of expression and information.
3. A democratization of political institutions and public organizations and information about various aspects of them.
4. Active presence of youths in those organizations and institutions in which young people are enclosed and directed by the adult world.[13]

These points are quite similar to the liberal attitudes elicited from Opus Dei pre-elites in response to the visible political object of necessary governmental reforms and to the perceptional political objects embodied in the questions of problems in contemporary Spanish society and the best form of government for Spain. Points 1 and 4 above deal with governmental reforms, especially when one assumes that the "institutions and organizations" mentioned in point 4 refer to the school and university

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[13]Congreso Nacional de la Juventud, "Declaracion al Publico Español," Ecclesia (July 10, 1965), 29-30.

system. Each of the four points may be viewed as the result of problems in the contemporary Spanish society as perceived by the Catholic Action youth. And finally, point 3 appears to be related to the liberal attitudes expressed by Opus Dei pre-elites toward the question of the best form of government for Spain.

The Catholic Youth Action declaration was based on those matters that were of concern to a "large majority of the 400,000 members."[14] Since we have seen that there are similarities between some points of the declaration and the liberal attitudes of the Opus Dei pre-elites toward some of the political objects, the findings of the present study can be seen to be quite compatible with the opinions and beliefs of a much larger group of Catholic young people. Tables 6.4, 6.6 and 6.7 show that between 83% and 97% of the Opus Dei pre-elites were expressing the same kinds of liberal attitudes as were embodied in the National Youth Congress declaration.

In this comparison, we have controlled for age since the age groups of the Catholic Action youths and the Opus Dei pre-elites are quite similar (18 through 24 and 18 through 29, respectively). We have also controlled for a somewhat qualitative factor which we shall call

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[14]Congreso Nacional de la Juventud, "Declaracion," 29.

"militant Catholicism." In a country that is officially and overwhelmingly Catholic, there are distinctions that can be made in regard to the degree of importance assigned by individuals to the role of the Church in their lives. At one extreme will be found those nominal Catholics who never, or infrequently, participate in obligatory Church functions. On the other extreme are those who participate regularly and actively in Church functions and in Church-related activities. The latter we have called "militant Catholics" and it is in this group that Catholic Action youths and Opus Dei pre-elites belong.

The study based on data most comparable to that elicited from the Opus Dei pre-elites is contained in the recently-published doctoral dissertation of José R. Torregrosa Peris.[15] The data relevant to our present concerns comes from two surveys conducted by the Institute of Public Opinion, a government-sponsored survey research organization. The first survey is based on 1,931 interviews with a representative sample of the Spanish population between the ages of 18 and 29, taken during the Spring of 1968. The second survey is based on questionnaires given to 1,115 fourth-year university students

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[15]José R. Torregrosa Peris, La Juventud Española: Conciencia generacional y politico (Barcelona: Ediciones Airel, 1972).

in six urban university areas during the academic year 1968-69.[16]

Several of the questions considered in the Torregrosa study relate closely to our political object identified as necessary governmental reforms. In the first survey of 1,931 young people, there were 118 urban university students of middle and upper socio-economic status. Of these, 87% thought that the institutions that functioned worst in the Spanish governmental system were: the schools and universities, public administration, the syndicates, and the Cortes (legislature).[17] This compares roughly with the 97% of the Opus Dei pre-elites who listed similar liberal attitudes toward necessary governmental reforms, although the questions were not exactly alike and the Opus Dei pre-elites appear to be more liberal on this matter.

In relation to the perceptional political object of problems in the contemporary Spanish society, 85% of the university students in the first survey thought that there should be more freedom in the society.[18] Lack of freedom was also a problem perceived by 83% of the Opus Dei pre-elites, although this is not reflected in Table 5.6.

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[16]Ibid., pp. 80-81. [17]Ibid., p. 195.

[18]Ibid., p. 185.

When asked to choose the most important one of six listed future goals for Spain, only 4% of the university students in the first Torregrosa study chose either the goal of keeping Spain the way it has always been or the goal of maintaining order in Spain, the only two authoritarian goals that figured on the list.[19] This compares very similarly to the two variations of authoritarian attitudes elicited from 6% of the Opus Dei pre-elites in response to perceived problems in contemporary Spanish society.

The following question was asked in both surveys reported in Torregrosa's study: "If there were political parties in Spain, as for example in Italy, and these political parties had an ideology similar to those of the Italians, for which one would you vote or with which one would you affiliate?" The respondents were asked to select their answer from the following list: "Neofascist, Monarchist, Liberal, Christian Democrat, Socialist, Communist." Of the 118 university students in the first survey, 84% opted for either the Liberal, Christian Democrat, Socialist, or Monarchist parties.[20] Of the 1,115 university students in the second survey, 85% chose

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[19]Ibid., p. 215.

[20]Ibid., p. 223.

the same parties.[21] In the present study of Opus Dei pre-elites' attitudes toward the question of the best form of government, 86% chose either a pluralistic democracy within or without the framework of a constitutional monarchy or a socialist republic. It is our argument that these forms of government would also be called for by the ideological concerns of the political parties favored by a majority of the university students in each of the two surveys studied by Torregrosa. A similar argument is made by Torregrosa who utilizes the responses to the "political parties" question in order to speculate about the ". . . ideological configuration that would predominate were there in existence a political associative pluralism that could channel the political ideas of contemporary Spanish youths."[22]

Torregrosa reports that on the basis of both surveys, the younger generation in Spain sees the older generation as authoritarian while it sees itself as basically "democratic."[23] The data collected from Opus Dei elites and pre-elites in the present study tends to bear out the younger generation's perceptions, at least to the

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[21]Ibid., p. 222. [22]Ibid., p. 221.

[23]Ibid., p. 182.

extent that it shows the older generation to be more authoritarian than the younger generation in Spain.[24]

Now that we have shown the Opus Dei pre-elites and those we might call the non-Opus Dei pre-elites to be essentially similar in their liberal responses to selected political objects, let us recapitulate the similarities and the differences between the political attitudes of Opus Dei elites and pre-elites.

Disregarding all membership distinctions within the Elites and Pre-elites groups, it is possible to show how different the two groups' responses were by simply totaling the number of liberal responses and authoritarian

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[24]Studies of pre-elites in other countries have also tended to show this same kind of ideological gap between a young university-educated generation and the older generations, with the young group tending to adhere to a more liberal line of thought. For studies of youths' political attitudes and behaviour, see, Daniel Goldrich, Sons of the Establishment: Elite Youth in Panama and Costa Rica (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1966); Seymour M. Lipset, "The Political Behavior of University Students in Developing Nations," Social and Economic Studies, XIV (March, 1965), 35-47; S. N. Eisenstadt, From Generation to Generation: Age Groups and Social Structure (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956); A. Cockburn and R. Blackburn, eds., Student Power (London: Penguin Press, 1969); L. S. Feuer, The Conflict of Generations (London: Heinemanne and Co., Ltd., 1969); Paul Jacobs and Steven Landau, The New Radicals (London: Penguin Press, Ltd., 1967); Richard Haberle, Social Movements (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951); Eric Erikson, La juventud en el mundo moderno (Buenos Aires: Editorial Horme, 1969); and Luis Buceta, La juventud ante los problemas sociales (Madrid: Editorial Doncel, 1966).

responses toward each political object. This data is presented in Table 6.8, which shows that only on the question of necessary governmental reforms does a majority of elites and pre-elites voice liberal attitudes. Toward no political object does a majority of both groups agree in terms of authoritarian attitudes.

TABLE 6.8

Comparison of Elites' and Pre-Elites' Responses to all Political Objects

	Elites			Pre-elites		
	Liberal	Authori-tarian	Totals	Liberal	Authori-tarian	Totals
Political parties/ associations	13	13	26	24	6	30
Juan Carlos/ Sp.monarchy	9	17	26	25	5	30
State syndicates/free labor unions	8	18	26	17	13	30
Necessary governmental reforms	14	12	26	29	1	30
Problems in Sp.society	11	15	26	28	2	30
Best form of government	11	15	26	27	3	30
Totals	66	90	156	150	30	180

Elites show a consistently authoritarian leaning toward the questions of problems facing contemporary Spanish society and the best form of government for Spain. Pre-elites, on the contrary, evidence almost unanimously liberal responses

to these two deeply perceptional, ideological political objects.[25]

Thus, one finds almost no agreement between the elites and pre-elites, as groups, with respect to their attitudes toward certain political objects. Let us bring the argument full circle to the question of the impact of Opus Dei on its members' political opinions and beliefs. The question was, if there is attitudinal agreement among Opus Dei members toward political objects, is that agreement due specifically to membership in Opus Dei, i.e., are political attitudes taught by Opus Dei officials? We found agreement only among the political attitudes of Opus Dei pre-elites, but not within the older, elites group. In order to suggest whether the pre-elites' political attitudes were learned in the Opus Dei probation-indoctrination period, we looked at the political attitudes of young non-Opus Dei member Spaniards of approximately the same educational and socio-economic background as the Opus Dei pre-elites. Since there were significant

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[25]Age has been shown to be a major determinant or predictor of political attitudes of political elites in other countries in the Western world and in the Middle East. See Donald R. Matthews, The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1954); Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963); Suleiman, "Attitudes of the Arab Elite," 482.

similarities among the liberal attitudes of both groups, our data does not justify the conclusion that the pre-elites' political attitudes were inculcated by Opus Dei. Thus, the results of the surveys of Opus Dei members' political attitudes reported in this study tend to reinforce Opus Dei's official policy that members are not taught a political line of thought by Opus Dei.[26]

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[26]Conversaciones, pp. 64-67, 91-93, 144.

CHAPTER VII

OPUS DEI MINISTERIAL ELITES

In this chapter, we want to take a close look at the Opus Dei members who have occupied ministerial posts in General Franco's cabinet. The underlying assumption is that these have been the most visible and probably the most powerful Opus Dei members in Spain. If Opus Dei has a public image in Spain, this image probably derives from these public figures.

Our intention is to show whether the Opus Dei cabinet ministers taken as a group were different from all the other cabinet ministers during the Franco regime. In order to take into account various dimensions of the Opus Dei ministerial group, we will look at such factors as university level studies, age when they entered the cabinet, and length of tenure in the cabinet. We will compare these characteristics of the Opus Dei ministers with those of the non-Opus Dei ministers. The latter group has been divided into two categories: those who entered the cabinet prior to 1957 and those who entered in 1957 or after. The reason for this division lies in

the fact that all of the Opus Dei cabinet ministers except one[1] entered the cabinet in 1957 or after. And finally, we shall look at the political philosophy of these Opus Dei cabinet ministers, as expressed in their published works and interviews.

In Chapter V, we showed that there is considerable diversity among the attitudes and beliefs held by prominent Opus Dei members towards both short-term and long-term political questions. The persons interviewed were prominent in political, business, and/or intellectual circles. In the present chapter, we are interested in the characteristics and the political beliefs of a number of highly "political" elites. Although most of the Opus Dei cabinet ministers would not be considered elites solely in the political sphere, each of them served in middle-or upper-level decision-making positions within the ministries before being named to a cabinet post. We will trace the rise of these Opus Dei ministers through various government positions to their cabinet posts.

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[1]In 1951, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, a Co-operator of Opus Dei, was named Minister of the newly-created Subsecretariat of the Presidency, an administrative and co-ordinating department of the executive branch of government. See Eduardo Alvarez Puga, José Carlos Clemente, and José Manuel Girones, Los 90 Ministros de franco (Barcelona: Dopesa, 1970), pp. 203, 207.

Thus, while most of the Opus Dei members who have held cabinet posts could, at present, be considered elites in business and/or intellectual circles, we will assume that having served in the ministerial posts has made them predominately "political" elites. We expect, also, that in order to be named to a ministerial post, these persons must not have espoused political philosophies that are appreciably different from the "rightest" tenets of the sole political organization, the National Movement, of the Franco regime.[2] Thus, we expect to show that in terms of their political philosophies, the Opus Dei cabinet ministers can be classified as "authoritarian."

Let us begin by identifying the twenty-nine Opus Dei members who have served in cabinet posts. The

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[2]José Antonio Primo de Rivera was the founder of the Falange party which, together with the Carlist soldiers who fought on the Nationalist side during the Civil War, was to become the National Movement during the Franco regime. Much of José Antonio Primo de Rivera's political doctrine was adopted to be the official creed of the National Movement. See further, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, Textos de Doctrina Politica, ed. by La Delegación Nacional de la Sección Femenina del Moviviento (Madrid: Editorial Almena, 1971): Stanley G. Payne, Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961); and Christian Rudel, La Phalange (Paris: Edition Speciale, 1972). Also, see Fundamental Laws of the State, pp. 19-25, for the text of the constitutional law on the principles of the National Movement.

following is a list of these ministers, divided according to their membership category in Opus Dei:

Numeraries	Co-Operators
Alberto Ullastres Calvo	Luis Carrero Blanco
Laureano López Rodó	Jorge Vigon Suerodiaz
	Antonio Oriol y Urquijo
Supernumeraries	Adolfo Diaz-Ambrona Moreno
	Juan José Espinosa San Martin
Mariano Navarro Rubio	Enrique Garcia Ramal
Gregorio Lopez Bravo	Adolfo Baturone Colombo
Faustino García-Moncó	Licinio de la Fuente y de la Fuente
Federico Silva Muñoz	
José Villar Palasí	Juan Castañon de Mena
Tomas Garicano Goñi	Tomás de Allende Garcia-Baxter
Enrique Fontana Codina	
Alberto Monreal Luque	Gonzalo Fernandez de la Mora
Vicento Mortes Alfonso	José Maria Gamazo
Fernando de Liñan y Zofio	Nemesio Fernandez Cuesta e Illana
José Utrera Molina	
Julio Rodriguez Martinez	
Antonio Barrera de Irimo	
Augustin Coturruelo Sendagorta	

We can see that the Co-operators, or those who have chosen the loosest type of affiliation to Opus Dei, are slightly less numerous than the Supernumeraries, those married members who maintain much closer ties to the organization. The Numeraries, those unmarried members who live in strict vinculation to Opus Dei, are very much in the minority. However, these proportions of the various types of membership probably reflect closely the actual proportion of members in each membership category in Spain.[3]

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[3]Suggested by a spokesman in the Opus Dei information office in Madrid in an interview on July 26, 1974.

Now let us look at the cabinet posts occupied by these Opus Dei members. We shall also be interested in the year in which each minister received his appointment. Table 7.1 presents this information.

It is interesting to note that Opus Dei ministers have held, at various times, all of the cabinet posts except one: the Ministry of the Air Force. It is also interesting that the number of Opus Dei ministers appointed at any given time began small, but almost doubled with each new government between 1951 and 1969. Eleven of the ministers appointed in 1969 were Opus Dei members. However, in the next substantial change in government which occurred in 1973, we see a dropoff in the number of Opus Dei members appointed to the cabinet, so that by 1974, only two Opus Dei members were given new ministerial posts. Of course, this data does not indicate how many Opus Dei ministers retained their old positions in subsequent governments. In Table 7.1, we have been interested in identifying the cabinet posts held by Opus Dei members and the year in which each one received his appointment. Yet, we have also seen that there was a tendency to increase the number of Opus Dei members in the cabinet through new appointments up until 1973.

TABLE 7.1

Opus Dei Ministers and Their Cabinet Posts with the Year of Appointment for Each Minister

Subsecretariat of the Presidency	Commerce	Treasury	Public Works	Industry	Justice	Agriculture	Development Planning	Education	
'41 Luis Carrero Blanco	'59 Alberto Ullastres Calvo	'57 Mariano Navarro Rubio	'57 Jorje Vigon Suerodiaz	'62 Gregorio Lopez Bravo	'65 Antonio Oriol y Urquijo	'65 Adolfo Diaz-Ambrona	'65 Laureano López Rodó	'67 José Villar Palasi	
	'65 Faustino Garcia Monco	'65 Juan José Espinosa San Martin	'65 Federico Silva Muñoz			'69 Tomás Allende Garcia Baxter		'73 Julio Rodriguez Martinez	
	'69 Enrique Fontana Codina	'69 Alberto Monreal Luque	'70 Gonzalo Fernandez de la Mora						
	'73 Augustin Coturruelo Sendagorta	'73 Antonio Barrera de Irimo							
	'74 Nemesio Fernandez Cuesta								
International Affairs	Housing	National Syndicates	Army	Navy	Employment	Foreign Affairs	President	Information and Tourism	Sec. General of the Movement
'69 Tomás Garicano Goñi	'69 Vincento Mortes Alphonso	'69 Enrique Garcia Ramal	'69 Juan Castañon de Mena	'69 Adolfo Baturone Colombo	'69 Licinio de la Fuente	'69 Gregorio Lopez Bravo			
	'73 José Utrera Molina					'73 Laureano López Rodó	'73 Luis Carrero Blanco	'73 Fernando de Liñan y Zofio	
									'74 José Utrera Molina

Data Compiled from Eduardo Alvarez Puga, Jose Carlos Clemente, and Jose Manuel Gironés, Los 90 Ministros de Franco (Barcelona: Dopesa, 1970) and from the newspapers, ABC and Ya, June 12, 1973, January 3, 1974, and January 15, 1974.

Now, let us look at the matter of the total presence of Opus Dei members in the cabinet. Here, we are interested in the composition of the governments appointed since 1957 and the numerical strength of Opus Dei ministers in these governments. Table 7.2 shows this data.

As we saw in Table 7.2, there were increasing numbers of appointments of Opus Dei members to the cabinet from 1957 until 1973. The information presented in Table 7.2 confirms the trend of increasing domination of the cabinet by Opus Dei members. In 1957, there were four Opus Dei members in the cabinet, consisting of three new appointments and the carryover of Carrero Blanco from 1951. In 1965, six new Opus Dei members received new ministerial appointments, with two members carried over from earlier cabinets, making a total of eight. The trend reached its apex in the new cabinet of 1969 when five Opus Dei members retained ministerial posts to which they had been appointed earlier, three members received appointments which had previously been held by other Opus Dei members, and seven members were given posts which had never before been held by Opus Dei members. In the government that lasted from 1969 until 1973, fifteen of the total twenty cabinet positions were held by Opus Dei members. This seems to justify the charge of increasing

TABLE 7.2

Cabinet Posts Occupied by Opus Dei Members, Over Time



domination of the government by Opus Dei members. However, the number of Opus Dei members in the cabinet in 1973 dropped to eleven. And in the present government, headed by Carlos Arias Navarro, there are four Opus Dei members. We shall be ready to suggest possible reasons for the drop-off in Opus Dei members in 1973 after we have looked at some other characteristics of the Opus Dei ministers' group.

Since we are interested in the question of the presence of Opus Dei members in Franco's cabinet, let us look at their tenure in this top decision-making body. Table 7.3 shows the exact length of time that each Opus Dei member held his ministerial post. For those members who held more than one post, their total tenure is shown. For those who continue in office at the present time, their tenure has been computed through August 31, 1974.

When we compute the average tenure of all Opus Dei cabinet members, we find that it stands at 5.01 years. This is slightly less than the average tenure of 5.98 years for non-Opus Dei ministers entering the government before 1957. However, in the contemporary period from 1957 to the present, Opus Dei ministers spend an average of about 9 months longer in the cabinet

TABLE 7.3

Opus Dei Ministers' Tenure in the Cabinet

	Years	Months	Days
Numeraries			
Alberto Ullastres Calvo	8	4	10
Laureano López Rodó	9	0	6
Supernumeraries			
Mariano Navarro Rubio	8	4	10
Gregorio Lopez Bravo	11	0	3
Faustino García Moncó	4	9	19
Federico Silva Muñoz	5	3	5
José L. Villar Palasí	5	2	23
T. Garicano Goñi	3	8	14
Enrique Fontana Codina	3	8	14
Alberto Monreal Luque	3	8	14
Vicento Mortes Alfonso	3	8	14
F. de Liñan y Zofio	0	6	23
José Utrera Molino	1	2	19
J. Rodriguez Martinez	0	6	23
A. Barrera de Irimo	1	2	19
A. Cotorruelo Sendagorta	0	6	23
Co-operators			
Luis Carrero Blanco	22	4	26
J. Vigon Suerodiaz	8	4	10
A. Oriol y Urquijo	8	6	3
A. Diaz-Ambrona Moreno	4	9	19
J.J. Espinosa S. Martin	4	9	19
Enrique Garcia Ramal	3	8	14
A. Baturone Colombo	3	8	14
Licinio de la Fuente	4	18	2
J. Castañon de Mena	3	8	14
T. de Allende Garcia-Baxter	4	10	2
G. Fernandez de la Mora	3	8	19
José Maria Gamazo	0	6	23
N. Fernandez Cuesta	0	8	28

Note: Tenures derived from data presented in Alvarez Puga, et al., Los 90 Ministros de Franco, and the newspapers ABC and Ya, June 13, 1973, January 3, 1974, and January 15, 1973.

than non-Opus Dei members, the latter averaging 4.28 years in the government. In tabular form, this is perhaps easier to see.

TABLE 7.4

Average Tenure of all Ministers

Non-Opus Dei ministers entering cabinet before 1957		5.98 years
Non-Opus Dei ministers entering cabinet in 1957 or later		4.28 years
Opus Dei ministers		5.01 years
Numeraries	8.65 years	
Supernumeraries	3.88 years	
Co-operators	5.75 years	

Note: average tenures computed from data found in Alvarez Puga, et al., Los 90 Ministros de Franco, and the newspapers ABC and Ya, June 13, 1973, January 3, 1974, and January 15, 1974.

The only pattern that emerges from this data is that new ministers entering the cabinet in 1957 or later tended to spend less time in their ministerial posts than those entering the cabinet before 1957. However, of those ministers who entered the cabinet in 1957 or later, Opus Dei ministers tended to remain there slightly longer than their non-member colleagues. No pattern is discernible among the different Opus Dei membership categories. It could be suggested that the non-married Numeraries, who go through the longest period in the Opus Dei teaching

mechanism, spent appreciably more time in the cabinet than other Opus Dei members.[4] Perhaps this is because the Numeraries have been most influenced by the Opus Dei doctrine of sanctification of work, i.e., one must become as proficient as one can in one's profession, and are, thus, best prepared and motivated to devote themselves fully to their cabinet posts. However, this supposition cannot be supported by data concerning the cabinet ministers, since there have been only two Numeraries in ministerial posts; hence, their average tenure is not a great deal significant statistically.[5] Neither does this data support the suggestion that close ties with Opus Dei causes professional proficiency which is reflected in longer tenure in the cabinet, since Supernumeraries spent, on the average, less time in the cabinet than Co-operators.

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[4]See footnote 3, supra.

[5]Private conversations with Opus Dei members indicate that this supposition, in fact, has merit. Numeraries become so tied to the doctrine of sanctification of their work that personal success and recognition within their professional field provide the assurance that they have successfully sanctified their work. Thus, Numeraries are probably more psychologically motivated and intellectually prepared to become proficient and to succeed in their professional field than other Opus Dei members. For an example, see M. Castellvi, "Joaquin Villanueva: Empresario ordenado sacerdote," Mundo Cristiano, September, 1974, pp. 10-13, for a report on a Numerary, a typically-successful businessman who went to Australia, raised enough money to build an Opus Dei university residence hall there, returned to Spain where he took a doctorate in Philosophy and Letters, and entered the priesthood through Opus Dei.

There is another descriptive facet of the group of Opus Dei members who have held cabinet positions which will prove to be interesting. This facet centers on the age at which ministers entered the cabinet. Professor Paul H. Lewis has shown that while the average age of Franco's cabinet has increased over the years, this phenomenon cannot be called a trend toward gerontocracy. Instead, the increasing average age is due to Franco's naming of older men and frequent cabinet changes over time.[6] With those facts already established, we are at present interested in the age at which ministers first entered the cabinet. Were Opus Dei ministers younger than their cabinet colleagues when they were given seats in this top decision-making body? Table 7.5 give us the answer to that question.

The findings here clearly mark the Opus Dei ministers as different from their colleagues. As a group, the average age of the Opus Dei ministers, 48.2 years, is lower than the average age of other ministers entering the cabinet either before 1957 or after. The columns indicating the median and the extreme ages for each group show that Opus Dei ministers were not only younger than their colleagues, but they tended to be nearer the same ages as a group, with no members of extremely different ages.

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[6]Paul H. Lewis, "The Spanish Ministerial Elite, 1938-1969," Comparative Politics (October, 1972), 91-92.

TABLE 7.5

Average and Median Ages at Which Ministers Entered the Cabinet

	Average	Median	Extremes
Non-Opus Dei members entering before 1957	49.5	48	28-76
Non-Opus Dei members entering in 1957 or later	58.2	61	39-76
Opus Dei ministers	48.2	46	38-66
Numeraries	43.5	--	43-44
Supernumeraries	45.3	45	38-59
Co-operators	52.2	49	43-66

Note: This data was computed from information found in Alvarez Puga, et al., Los 90 Ministros de Franco, and the newspapers ABC and Ya, June 13, 1973, January 3, 1974 and January 15, 1974.

An additional interesting trend is shown by the data in Table 7.5. Those Opus Dei members with the closest ties to the Opus Dei organization tended to be named to cabinet posts at an earlier age than those with looser ties to the organization. The average age of the Numeraries on entering the cabinet, 43.5 years, was lower than that of the Supernumeraries, 45.3 years. The trend holds true for the Co-operators, whose ties with the Opus Dei organization are the most loosely structured and whose average age on entering the cabinet was 52.2 years. One might, thus, argue that there are elite rewards earlier for those Opus Dei members who receive

greater amounts of spiritual training emphasizing the doctrine of sanctification of work. Or, to put it another way, somewhat more simply, one might argue that those Opus Dei members with the closest and strictest ties to the organization attain elite political positions at an earlier age than those with looser ties to the organization.

Although the data presented thus far has indicated that Opus Dei members were appointed to the cabinet at an earlier age than the other ministers, one may legitimately wonder if the Opus Dei ministers were, indeed, better prepared than their colleagues to direct the affairs of an increasingly complex, developing society. This might be considered one way of measuring the effect of the doctrine of sanctification of work on Opus Dei members. As a further refinement of the test, it would be interesting to know whether those members who spent the greatest amount of time in the Opus Dei teaching process were better prepared than those members who spent lesser amounts of time and had looser ties to the organization.

It is difficult to find operational definitions for the value judgments involved in deciding which ministers were "better prepared" than others. Most elite studies set in autocratic societies have focused on some categorization of cabinet members in terms of early party membership or adhesion to the dictator and,

at a later stage, those elites whose technological or administrative training and studies give them the necessary expertise for decision-making in a developing society.[7]

We will offer a similar device for showing how the preparation of Opus Dei ministers compares with that of the other ministers. We will, first, compare the number of university degrees held by each group of ministers. This will, in effect, be a purely quantitative comparison. Secondly, we will compare the number of each type of degree held by the various groups of ministers. This will be a more sensitive qualitative measure and will show us whether the Spanish cabinet has followed the trend toward more technological expertise evidenced in other developing autocratic states.

Table 7.6 contains the data referring to the number of degrees held by each group of ministers.

By this purely quantitative measure, it can be argued that Opus Dei ministers had more university training than their colleagues. However, a surprising finding is that among the non-Opus Dei ministers, the earlier group received slightly more university training than those who

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[7]See Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR (New York: Viking Press, 1964), pp. 143-144; Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 315-316.

entered in 1957 or later. This does not support the general trend toward more specialized knowledge among political elites, mentioned below. Yet, the finding may be explained by looking at the percentage of military men in each group of political elites. Since career military

TABLE 7.6

Ratio of University Degrees to Cabinet Ministers

	Ratio	Number of Degrees per Minister
Non-Opus Dei ministers entering before 1957	54:47	1.15
Non-Opus Dei ministers entering in 1957 or later	29:27	1.07
Opus Dei ministers	43:29	1.49
Numeraries	5:2	2.50
Supernumeraries	20:14	1.43
Co-operators	18:13	1.38

Note: The information contained in this table was calculated from data found in Alvarez Puga, et al., Los 90 Ministros de Franco, and the newspapers ABC and Ya, June 13, 1973, January 3, 1974, and January 15, 1974.

officers who have held cabinet posts in the Franco regime have tended to be civil war veterans without a civilian career, a large number of military men in any group of cabinet ministers would lower the ratio of university degrees, even though military training has been counted

as the equivalent of university degree. That is exactly what happened in the group of non-Opus Dei ministers who entered the cabinet in 1957 or later. Forty-six percent of them were career military while of the earlier group, 36% were career military, and of the Opus Dei group, only 14% had only military training. These figures should not be interpreted as an indication that military men were predominant in the past 1957 group. The data only means that 46% of the newly-appointed ministers were career military officers. In addition, the data indicates instead of military predominance, a strong degree of instability among the military members of the cabinet, or another example of Franco's frequent cabinet turnovers and the balancing of one internal force against another.[8]

Let us return for a moment to the Opus Dei ministers. The data presented in Table 7.6 also confirms the trend toward a positive relationship between those members with the strictest ties to the organization and greater amounts of university training. Each Numerary minister had an average of 2.5 university degrees. Every Supernumerary held an average of 1.43 university degrees,

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[8]A technique also used by Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. See Howard J. Wiarda, Dictatorship and Development: The Methods of Control in Trujillo's Dominican Republic (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1968).

while the Co-operators came closely behind with an average of 1.38 university degrees. But this measure tells us nothing about the types of university degrees involved.

Table 7.7 represents a more sensitive measure of technological expertise compared with traditional types of knowledge.

In absolute numbers, the Opus Dei ministers had more degrees in economics, statistics, business administration, naval engineering, and political science than either of the two groups of non-Opus Dei ministers. In relative numbers, the Opus Dei ministers held more degrees in mathematics, architecture, science, pharmacy, and law than either of the other ministerial groups. This data supports the notion that Opus Dei ministers were better prepared in terms of the technological knowledge necessary in a rapidly developing society. The fact that the Opus Dei ministers as a group had fewer degrees in the traditional field of philosophy and letters and fewer career military officers than either group of their colleagues qualifies them as "modernists," or "technocrats," as they are often called.[9]

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[9]See, for example, the excellent article by Jordi Sole-Tura, "Los Tecnocratas en la encrucijada," in España Perspectiva 1972 (Madrid: Guadiana de Publicaciones, S.A., 1972), pp. 179-203. The author examines the political beliefs of a number of technocrats, including Opus Dei member López Rodó, and contrasts them with several "liberal" politicians, including Opus Dei member Calvo Serer.

TABLE 7.7

Comparison of Degrees Held by Opus Dei Members and Non-Opus Dei Members

	Economics	Civil Engineering	Math.	Statistics	Bus. Administration	Architecture	Science	Pharmacy	Naval Engineering	Political Sc.	Law	Military	Philosophy and Letters
Non-Opus Dei members entering before 1957 N=47	2	6	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	22	17	5
Non-Opus Dei Ministers entering in or after '57 N=27	0	2	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	11	12	1
Opus Dei Ministers N=29	6	3	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	19	4	2
Numeraries N=2	(1)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(2)	(0)	(0)
Supernumeraries N=14	(4)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(0)	(9)	(0)	(1)
Co-operators N=13	(1)	(2)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(8)	(4)	(1)
TOTALS	8	11	2	1	3	2	2	2	1	1	52	33	8

When we look at the types of degrees held within each membership category of Opus Dei, we are once again hampered by the small number of cases in the Numerary category. However, on the basis of the evidence, we can see that those members with the closest ties to Opus Dei not only have more university degrees than those with looser ties, but also that these degrees were centered largely in the technical fields necessary in an economically-developing society. The Co-operators tended to gravitate more toward the traditional fields of knowledge than the other members. The Co-operators also provided all of the career military officers in the Opus Dei ministerial group. So, we have a fairly strong indication that close alliance with Opus Dei correlates with university studies in the modern, technological fields. The data has also shown that Opus Dei ministers were better prepared in terms of university studies to undertake the tasks of top-level decision-making in a situation of rapid economic development.

Thus far, we have offered data that has suggested that Opus Dei members were appointed to the cabinet in growing numbers between 1957 until 1973 and that they increasingly dominated the cabinet in terms of their numerical strength during those years. We have shown that they remained in the cabinet on an average of 8½ months longer than their contemporary non-Opus Dei

colleagues. Yet, the pre-1957 ministers remained in the cabinet about one year longer than the Opus Dei ministers. We have seen that the Opus Dei ministers entered the cabinet at an earlier age than either of the non-member ministerial groups, and further, that the closer the ties to Opus Dei, the younger the age at which members reached elite political positions. And finally, the data indicated that Opus Dei ministers do tend to be better prepared both quantitatively and qualitatively in terms of university degrees in modern technological fields.

The political philosophies espoused by the Opus Dei ministers represent an additional way of describing these cabinet officials. However, here we shall be looking for rather small nuances instead of appreciable differences. As mentioned earlier, it is safe to assume that no cabinet minister has espoused a political philosophy that is noticeably different from the "rightest" tenets of the National Movement. In fact, there has been only one minister, not an Opus Dei member, who has publicly shifted his allegiance from "Francoism" to what might be called "progressive liberalism" after he was removed from the cabinet. That minister was Joaquin Ruiz-Gimenez Cortes, who served as Minister of Education from 1951 until 1956. He is now considered to belong to an "important sector of the opposition."[10] Thus, while we

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[10]Alvarez Puga, et al., Los 90 Ministros de Franco, p. 213.

do not expect the Opus Dei ministers to be ideologically different from their colleagues, we are interested in describing them in terms of their political philosophies. We shall also offer a biographical sketch of some of the most well-known figures. Table 7.8 presents a classification of the Opus Dei ministers, in so far as it is possible to classify them after accepting the assumption that they are all pro-Franco and in favor of the evolution of the Franco regime thus far.

Table 7.8 shows that both the Numeraries and the Supernumeraries tended to cluster around the Europeanist/Economic Development ideology while Co-operators were more evenly distributed, although with some concentration around the authoritarian National Movement line of thought. This would seem to suggest, at first glance, that there might be some correlation between close vinculation to Opus Dei and adherence to the Europeanist/Economic Development line of thought. However, the results of our survey of Opus Dei elites in intellectual, business, and government circles show that there was much more equal distribution between liberal and authoritarian attitudes,[11] a finding which indicated that political attitudes were not learned in Opus Dei itself.

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[11]See Table 5.5, in Chapter V, supra.

TABLE 7.8

Political Philosophies Espoused by Opus Dei Ministers*

Monarchists			Europeanists	
Juan Carlos López Rodó	Carlists	National Movement López Rodó-Falangist	Economic Developmentalists Ullastres López Rodó	Various
			Navarro Rubio	Navarra Rubio - pro big business
	Garcia Moncó	Gárcia-Moncó - Requetes		López Bravo - open Spain to the Communist countries; Spanish flexibility and neutrality in diplomacy
			Silva Muñoz Villar Palasí	
	Garicano Goñi			
		Mortes Alfonso - Falangist	Fontana Codina Monreal Luque Liñan y Zofio Utrera Molina Rodriguez Martinez Barrera de Irimo Coturruelo Sendagorta	Silva Muñoz-maintain traditional Spanish Catholic principles Villar Palasí-modernize education Garicano Goñi-Decentralization
Carrero Blanco Vigón Suerodiaz Fernandez de la Mora	Oriol y Urquijo	Oriol y Urquijo - Requetes Diaz Ambrona - Falangist Espinosa S.Martin - Falangist Garcia Ramal - Falangist de la Fuente - Falangist Allende Garcia Baxter - Syndicates	Allende Garcia-Baxter Gamazo Fernández Cuesta	Vigón Suerodiaz - member of wartime Accion Espanola, a Spanish fascist movement. Oriol y Urquijo - make Justice Dept. more independent of politics Castañon de Mena - Apolitical military Baturone Colombo -Apolitical military

*Data used to make classifications taken from Alvarez Puga, et al., Los 90 Ministros de Franco; Gregoria Pecia-Barba, "La Realidad que nos rodea," Sabado Grafico, June 3, 1972, p. 17; "Un Lago entre la politica," Actualidad Española, April 15, 1972, p. 33; Navas, La Generacion del Principe, pp. 91-100; Cuarenta Politicos ante el Futuro (Madrid: Dipasa, 1974), pp. 100-105; and Mariano Navarro Rubio, El Vacio Politico; ¿Hacia un Estado Arbitral? (Barcelona: Dopesa, 1973).

Thus, it seems not unjustified to revert to the explanation that because Numeraries and Supernumeraries have spent more time learning the Opus Dei doctrine of sanctification of work, they place more emphasis on proficiency and efficiency. Hence, it can be argued that Numeraries and Supernumeraries tend to place more emphasis on economic development, which by its nature concerns efficiency, while Co-operators are slightly more likely to stress purely political concerns.

An additional argument is that none of the ideological categories contained in Table 7.8 are mutually antagonistic except the Juan Carlos and Carlist monarchists. However, since the naming of Juan Carlos as heir to the throne in 1969, the Carlist ministers have not withdrawn their support of the regime. Thus, we have a case of minimal ideological differences among these Opus Dei ministers.

One might ask, at this point, how like-minded political elites are gathered together in the government? How do they become "ministrable"? The answers to these questions are familiar in autocratic government: through co-optation from above. The charge becomes double-barreled when Opus Dei ministers name Opus Dei members to middle-and upper-level decision-making posts. Table 7.9 shows the paths upward through bureaucracy traveled by some Opus Dei political elites.

TABLE 7.9

Opus Dei Members Rising Through Bureaucracy, Co-opting Other Opus Dei Members*

Treasury	Commerce	Foreign Affairs	Public Works
1957 M.Navarro Rubio ↓ **J.J.Espinosa S.Martín Director General of the Treasury *A. Barrera de Irimo '57-Vice-sec'ty gen. '60-Dir.of the Institute of Fiscal Studies '62-Technical Sec'ty. General	1957-A.Ullastres Calvo ↓ **G.López Bravo Dir.Gen.of Foreign Commerce '60 Director of the Institute of Currency Exchange **F.García Moncó Sub-sec'ty of Commerce **J.Villar Palasí Sub-sec'ty of Commerce	1969-G.Lopez Bravo ↓ **G.Fernández de la Mora	1957-J.Vigon Sucrodiaz ↓ **V.Mortes Alfonso Sub-sec'ty of Public Works
1969 A.Monreal Luque ↓ F.Fernandez Ordónez Sect'y Gen. V.Mendoza Olivan Dir.Gen.of the National Patrimony J.Monedero Carrillo Dir.Gen.of Direct Taxes J.J.Sainz de Vicuña Tech.Sub-sect'y.	1965 F.García Moncó ↓ **E.Fontana Codina Sub-sec'ty of Commerce 1969-E.Fontana Codina ↓ **N.Fernández Cuesta Sub-sec'ty of Commerce		1965 F.Silva Muñoz ↓ Pedro Arieto Fernando Yturriaga Santiago de Cruyllas Virgilio Onate Director Generals **Alberto Monreal Luque Tech. Secretary Gen. Alfonso Osorio Sub-sec'ty. of Public Works

Agriculture	Education	Subsecretariat of the Presidency	Employment	Development Plan Commission
1965-A.Diaz Ambrona ↓ **L.de la Fuente Dir. General F.Hernández Gil Subsec'ty. of Agriculture R. Esteruelas Rolando Director General	1967 J.Villar Palasi ↓ **A.Monreal Luque Subsecretary R. Diez Hochleitner Subsecretary J.Echevarria Gangoiti Director of Higher Education	1957-L.Carrero Blanco ↓ **F.de Liñan y Zofio Head of the Organization and Methods Section **L. López Rodó Sub-sec'ty.	1969 L.de La Fuente ↓ **J.Utrera Molina Sub-sec'ty.	1962-J.López Rodó ↓ **A.Diaz Ambrona **F.Silva Muñoz **T.Allende Garcia Baxter **A.Monreal Luque **V.Mortes Alfonso **A.Cotturruelo Sendagorta **F.deLiñan y Zofio

*Information used to compile this table found in Alvarez Puga, Los 90 Ministros de Franco.
**Later named to a ministerial post.

One might also wonder, at this point, what some of these elite Opus Dei members are like. Let us take a brief look at two of the most well-known members: López Rodó and López Bravo.

Laureano López Rodó was born in Barcelona on November 18, 1920. He studied Law and Business Administration at the University of Barcelona, receiving his degrees in 1942, and a doctorate in Law in 1943. In 1945, he obtained the tenured Chair of Administrative Law at the University of Santiago de Compostela. Admiral Carrero Blanco heard López Rodó in a speech on administrative reorganization and named him Technical Secretary General of the Subsecretariat of the Presidency. In 1962, the Economic Development Plan Commission was created and López Rodó was named to head the new office. In 1965, he was named Minister without Portfolio, while he continued to direct the planning activities. As shown in Table VII.9, it was through the Commission that López Rodó was responsible for bringing seven future ministers, all Opus Dei members, into the government. In 1969, he was named Minister of Development Planning, a newly-created cabinet-level department, and in 1973, he was moved to head the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He served in that capacity for a short time, being removed at the

request of the new President, Arias Navarro, in January, 1974. He is at present Ambassador of Spain to Austria.[12]

Gregorio López Bravo was born in Madrid on December 19, 1923. He studied Naval Engineering at the University of Madrid and later, Business Administration in the United States. He began his career by working in the ship-building firm, Sociedad Española de Construccion Naval, S.A., in Sestao and Cadiz. He was brought into government by his personal friend and fellow Opus Dei member, Alberto Ullastres, the Minister of Commerce in 1957. López Bravo was named Director General of Foreign Commerce. In 1960, he was named Director of the Institute of Foreign Currency Exchange. During this time, he worked closely with Ullastres and Navarro Rubio in the Stabilization Plan. This activity earned him the headship of the Ministry of Industry in 1962. López Bravo enjoyed a high level of popularity and approval from the press. When the Matesa scandal became publicly known, even though it involved the Ministry of Industry, López Bravo was not removed from the cabinet, as so many of his colleagues in the major cabinet changeover in 1969. He was instead, shifted to the more important post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, where he

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[12]López Rodó, Politica y Desarrollo, pp. 54-77, passim; Alvarez Puga, et al., Los 90 Ministros de Franco, pp. 393-401.

opened Spain diplomatically to the Communist countries and established trade with them. López Bravo was extremely successful in his rise to the heights of political power in Spain, enjoying the friendship and protection of Franco himself. The reasons for his removal from the cabinet in 1973 are not known officially. However, it has been speculated that by 1973, López Bravo was becoming too powerful and well-known internationally to suit Generalisimo Franco. It has also been speculated that López Bravo was removed because he voiced his opinion abroad that Franco was growing old and would soon give up the reins of government.[13]

We have seen that the Opus Dei ministers, particularly the Numeraries and Supernumeraries, place a great deal of emphasis on economic development. We have also seen that as ministers, they brought like-minded Opus Dei members into responsible decision-making positions. In the following chapter, we will be looking at the ways in which they put their economic development ideology into action, and the ways in which this ultimately affected the Spanish political system.

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[13]Alvarez Puga, Los 90 Ministros de Franco, pp. 331-338. Information on the supposed reasons for López Bravo's removal from the cabinet was supplied by a high-ranking official in the Ministry of Information and Tourism.

CHAPTER VIII

OPUS DEI GOVERNMENTAL ELITES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY OF CHANGES IN ECONOMIC POLICY-MAKING

In the present chapter, our concern is to analyze the economic policy-making process during two periods of the Franco regime: the initial period from 1939 to 1957 which we shall call the Autarchy Period because of the policies aiming at economic self-sufficiency that were put into effect; and the contemporary period from 1957 to 1971, which we shall call the Neo-Liberal Period after the Keynesian policies aiming at industrialization and integration into the world market, elaborated by a number of cabinet ministers and high government officials who were both Opus Dei members and technical experts in the field of economic development.

The emphasis in this chapter will be on the changes that occurred in the policy-making process in the Neo-Liberal Period, as compared with the process in the Autarchy Period. We shall expect to show that the Spanish experience follows the general Western model of the political correlates of economic development in terms of greater public participation in the economic policy-

making process and that this fact has been due particularly to the efforts of Opus Dei political elites.

The analytical method employed to study the economic policy-making process during these two time-periods has already been described and explained in Chapter I. However, it may be useful to reiterate the main concepts utilized.

In this study, the concept of economic policy-making implies a process in which authoritative choices are made for the entire economy. These choices are based on proposals for possible economic objectives and on information about the various means of securing, as well as the probable consequences of, the objectives. The authoritative choices also relate to the allocation of scarce resources.[1]

In analyzing the Spanish economic policy-making process, we consider the process as a matter of adapting and/or expanding the choice-making, or problem-solving, capabilities of the state in order to achieve public purposes. Within this perspective, we shall focus on a fundamental choice-making task which must be performed by authoritative decision-makers in the economic policy-making process. This choice is that of procedural

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[1]This concept of the economic policy-making process follows the general policy-making process described by Lindblom, Policy-Making Process, pp. 4-42, passim.

instrumentation, i.e., the structuring of an environment of choice by bringing together mechanisms and utilizing techniques that generate information on possible objectives, their consequences, and the means to achieve objectives.[2] Thus, if a problem-solving capability serves as a guide to decision-making by providing information about potential policies or objectives, or about consequences of present or potential policies, it will be treated as a procedural instrument, e.g., committee hearings, survey research, some types of statistical analysis, and, in some cases, elections.

To reiterate, we are interested in looking at the way in which the Opus Dei political elites directed procedural instrumentation in the economic policy-making process, and in showing that the result was increased public participation in political decision-making, i.e., that Spain evidenced some of the political correlates of economic development that occurred in the general Western model of economic and political development.

Before we begin our analysis of the economic policy-making process during the Autarchy Period, let us look briefly at the economic situation with which the

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[2]As was stated in Chapter I, this method is based on a similar set of analytical concepts utilized by Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain, see pp. 9-21, 206.

initial authoritative policy-makers were faced in 1939.

Continuing to follow protectionist high tariff policies that had been adopted at the end of the nineteenth century, Spain was in effect prevented from a successful economic recovery from the worldwide depression by the chaotic political circumstances which existed during the Second Republic (1931-1936).[3] Moreover, while other nations began to recover from the severe economic depression, Spain was engaged in a civil war (1936-1939) that completely disrupted production, greatly damaged the transportation and communications systems, and depleted the national treasury's gold and foreign exchange reserves.[4]

After the cessation of internal hostilities in 1939, the Second World War soon erupted and General Franco, as Head of State, held to a position of wait-and-see neutrality. Aid received by Franco during the civil war from both Hitler and Mussolini brought about a post-war boycott and isolation of Spain by the Western allies,[5]

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[3]For a discussion of public economic policy and the Spanish economy during the twentieth century up to the civil war, see Ramos Oliveira, Politics, Economics, pp. 187-261.

[4]Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain, p. 27. Cf. Jean Chardonnet, Les Grandes Puissances: Etude Economique, Tome I: L'Europe, 3rd edition (Paris: Librarie Dalloz, 1960), pp. 416-417.

[5]Payne, Falange, pp. 225-246, passim.

all of which reduced the number of possible economic development strategies that were feasible and available to Spanish policy-makers during the early years of the Autarchy Period.

Now that we have looked at some of the most important political and economic factors that set the stage for policy-makers during the initial period of the Franco regime, let us turn to our analysis of the procedural instrumentation of the Autarchy Period.

The most fundamental procedural instruments created or adapted for economic policy-making during the Autarchy Period were the syndicate organization and the ministerial cabinet of the Head of State, with the latter being the more crucial.[6] In his work on economic policy-making during the Franco regime, Charles Anderson considers the syndicates to be the "key innovation" in the Spanish political-economic system during the Autarchy Period, although there had been a precedent for the corporate syndicate organization during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923-1928).[7]

The hierarchical syndicate system was established in 1939 in a conjunctive status to the FET (the official

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[6]Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain, pp. 66, 73.

[7]Ibid., pp. 58, 66.

political organization, later termed the National Movement), as the only authorized representatives of labor and management. The syndicate system is based on units at the local, provincial, and national levels. Delegates were "elected" at local levels, but they were appointed at intermediate levels, up to the apex where the President of the Syndicates also served as the National Delegate. However, until 1956, only those persons authorized by the National Movement could present themselves as candidates in the triennial elections of syndicate delegates.[8]

The syndicate organization at each level was divided into "economic" sections, composed of employers, and "social" sections, made up of employees. In addition to this overall hierarchy, there were different "vertical" syndicates for separate economic activities, e.g., textiles, banking, and mining. The vertical syndicates were also divided into economic and social sections and, in many cases, had provincial and local offices. Despite the vastness of the syndicate organization with its obligatory membership, its functions in the economic policy-making process were somewhat meager during the Autarchy Period. The syndicates were expected only to perform the functions of providing information and

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[8]Welles, Gentle Anarchy, pp. 130-131; Souchère, Explanation of Spain, pp. 260-261.

lobbying on behalf of their respective management of labor constituents. Wages and working conditions could not be negotiated. Rather, they were prescribed in detail by the Ministry of Labor. In the vertical syndicates, there was rarely any coordination between the management and labor sections to formulate policy proposals or "bargaining" positions. Formulations of pricing, taxation, and industrial policy were initiated almost exclusively by the management sectors of the vertical syndicates.[9]

Anderson concludes that although the syndicates "did not provide an autonomous or decentralized mechanism for reconciling or aggregating the interests of labor and management at that time," the conventional unrepresentativeness and ineffectiveness of the syndicates should not be overemphasized since, in the final analysis, "the government and the syndicates did not speak with one voice on public policy."[10]

The cabinet, as has been indicated, was the most crucial component of the decision-making process in the Autarchy Period. Anderson sums up the functions performed by the cabinet in that period as follows:

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[9]Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain, pp. 66-67.

[10]Ibid., pp. 68-69. Welles, Gentle Anarchy, pp. 124-125, points out that syndicate leaders did win for labor substantial wage increases in 1954 and 1956.

> The cabinet served as the principal mechanism of innovation, since it contained the most active forces of the regime. . . . It was the focus of coalitional politics, the place where the disparate forces supporting the regime came together to seek common ground before the Caudillo. It was the key forum of policy consultation in the system, the critical place for analyzing proposals against a broad, national spectrum of interests and concerns. It was the only basic tool of basic administrative coordination and the one place where an effort could be made to overcome the historic, monolithic self-sufficiency of the Spanish ministries. In short, the cabinet was the focus of most of the critical functions of policy procedure.[11]

Anderson identifies some optional components which were available to decision-makers and were actually used by them in structuring an "environment of choice." Among these components was the great private banking system with its interlocking directorates linking it with many, if not most, of Spain's largest private industrial enterprises. In the mid-50's, seven of these private banks (Banco de Bilbao, Banco Central, Banco Español de Credito, Banco de Santander, Banco Urquijo, Banco Viscaya, and the Banco Hispano Americano) controlled well over half of the capital in the country, and it would seem that the private sector of the economy was significantly guided by the banks in investment. There is also evidence that

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[11]Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain, p. 73.

bank officials had sufficient access to top level decision-makers to allow them to bypass altogether the banking syndicate organization.[12]

A group of economists, related to the banking system, also performed an information-generating function beginning in the early 1950's. These economists, using techniques of modern economic analysis, began to develop a macroeconomic perspective and to produce basic economic trend and foreign trade analyses. These functions were not supplementary to those performed by the governmental bureau of statistics which produced only indirect calculations of the national income and other indices. In many cases, the modern economists pioneered in statistical analysis of the Spanish economy.[13]

There were other components of the economic policy-making process that should be mentioned briefly. Even though military men occupied relatively few ministerial posts during the Autarchy Period,[14] the impact of high military officers on economic policy in the early years was evident in the regime's emphasis on defense industries. In addition, high-ranking generals accepted

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[12]Ibid., pp. 76-77.

[13]Ibid., pp. 77-78.

[14]See Lewis, "Spanish Ministerial Elite," Comparative Politics, 97-98.

lucrative posts on the boards of private firms in order to supplement their relatively low salaries. These influential generals were sought after as board members by business enterprises because their presence tended to expedite the firms' negotiations with top government economic policy-makers.[15] Also, one tends to assume that since a military officer, General Suances, was named Minister of Commerce and Industry in Franco's first cabinet, in effect this gave a representative of the military a minimum "veto power" over economic policy relating to commerce and industry. Suances was also the creator and first director (1941) of the Instituto Nacional de Indústria (INI), the state's development corporation that directly invested in and encouraged new industry.[16] Yet, the role of the military in economic policy-making did gradually decline in the latter years of the Autarchy Period.[17]

Local government institutions, the final component of economic policy-making, should be mentioned.

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[15]Payne, Politics and the Military in Modern Spain, pp. 435-436.

[16]Welles, Gentle Anarchy, pp. 316-317.

[17]Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain, p. 80.

Even though local mayors and provincial officials were initially appointed at the cabinet level, they often lobbied actively for their particular interests and they did add an aspect of (potential) decentralization to the decision-making system during the Autarchy Period. Yet they appear not to have been particularly effective in their lobbying activity, nor were they utilized by central decision-makers as real generators of information about the consequences of policies already in effect.[18]

Now that we have set forth the procedural instruments that were created or adapted throughout the Autarchy Period, we can focus our attention on the contemporary period, which we have called the Neo-liberal Period, for it is here that the presence of Opus Dei members in high-ranking government positions begins to make an impact on the economic policy-making process.

In late 1956, General Franco appointed Professor Laureano López Rodó to the position of Technical Secretary General (second-ranking official) under Admiral Carrero Blanco, Minister of the Government Presidency (a cabinet post heading the executive or administrative branch of government). López Rodó, a numerary member of Opus Dei, had come to Franco's attention through the

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[18]Ibid., pp. 81-82.

publication of his articles on organizational reform along classic public administration lines. Thus, López Rodó became the first Opus Dei member to gain a top decision-making position, and he used his position to begin a long-overdue reform of Spain's archaic bureaucracy. He was named to head the Economic Development Planning Commission in 1962, and in 1965, he was named Minister without Portfolio while he remained in charge of Development Planning. In 1969, he was named Minister of Development Planning, a cabinet post that was created for him. Soon after López Rodó's first governmental appointment, Franco announced various new cabinet appointments. Thus, in 1957, Opus Dei members were found in the Council of Ministers: Alberto Ullastres as Minister of Commerce and Mariano Navarro Rubio as Minister of the Treasury (Finance). In cabinet changes that have taken place since 1957, as we saw in Chapter VII, Opus Dei members have continued to be included in high positions associated with economic policy-making, although not always at the ministerial level. However, these Opus Dei political elites have not been immune to the political necessity of maintaining the public's faith in the regime's capacity to solve public problems. For example, in 1965, Ullastres was blamed for failure to deal decisively with the recurrent problem of inflation, and he was replaced. Nor have Opus Dei political elites refused to consider demands originating

within the "structuralist" school of thought identified with the socialist left wing of the National Movement in the 1960's. In fact, a comparison between the first Development Plan (1964-1967) and the second Development Plan (1968-1971) shows that a feedback mechanism worked and that many structuralist ideas were incorporated into the second plan.[19]

The Opus Dei economic ministers in 1957[20] came into the cabinet with a perspective that was quite different from those earlier ministers who had formulated, implemented, and adapted the policy of autarchy. The Opus Dei

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[19]Artigues, Opus Dei, pp. 163-165; Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain, pp. 101-102, 107-108, 236-239. Although the structuralists made an impact on economic policy in the second Development Plan, Opus Dei economic ministers preferred "monetarist" or neo-Keynesian solutions to problems of inflation and balance-of-payments difficulties. For discussion of these two schools of economic thought, see: Roberto de Oliveira Campos, "Two Views on Inflation in Latin America," in Latin American Issues: Essays and Comments, ed. by Albert O. Hirschman (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, Inc., 1961); David Felix, "An Alternative View of the 'Monetarist'--'Structuralist' Controversy," in Latin American Issues: Essays and Comments, ed. by Albert O. Hirschman (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, Inc., 1961); David Felix, Monetarists, Structuralists, and Import-Substituting Industrialization: A Critical Approach, Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. I (St. Louis: Washington University Social Science Institute, 1965).

[20]Artigues, Opus Dei, p. 165, states that, in addition to Ullastres and Navarro Rubio who were actually members of Opus Dei, Cirilo Canovas, Minister of Agriculture, was an Opus Dei sympathizer; Planell, Minister of Industry, had family connections with Opus Dei; and General Vigón, Minister of Public Works, was a friend of Calvo Serer and a student of the works of Perez Embid (both are Opus Dei members and intellectuals of some renown).

ministers shared the macroeconomic analytical viewpoint held by economists and statisticians in the banking community which we described as consultation procedural instruments in the Autarchy Period. Indeed, Ullastres and Navarro Rubio and others of the Neo-Liberal perspective had professional affiliations with, or interest in, the international economic community of banking, modern enterprise, and the new corps of technical economists.

A basic criticism of the autarchy policy advanced by those of the Neo-Liberal persuasion was that Spain was outside the mainstream of the new processes of growth taking place in Western Europe. They argued that unless Spain opened her markets to international trade, unless the domestic economy was freed from excessive government controls, and unless the currency was freed from unrealistic restraints on its convertibility, the gap between Spain and an increasingly integrated, prosperous international industrial economy would certainly grow wider.[21] This macroeconomic perspective of the Opus Dei economic ministers led to the initial adoption of monetarist-type austerity measures to combat inflation and balance-of-payments problems. However, since our emphasis is on procedural instrumentation rather than policy instrumentation, let us turn our attention to

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[21]Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain, pp. 103-105.

elements that were constructed or were available and selected to create an environment of choice for economic policy-makers.

During their first two years in top decision-making positions, the Opus Dei economic ministers set about the task of procedural instrumentation, that is, of building a decision system of information-generating mechanisms which would culminate in the Stabilization Program of 1959 and the Social and Economic Development Plans of the 1960's. As we shall see, two quite different decision systems were utilized during this period.

The first of the procedural instruments created by the economic ministers was a new cabinet level committee (comisión delegada) to promote coordination of economic policy-making among the economic ministers, a function that had largely been absent during the Autarchy Period. The committee was composed of the Ministers of Finance, Industry, Commerce, Public Works, and Agriculture. Below the cabinet level, the economic ministers created the Office of Economic Coordination and Programming under the direction of the Secretary of the Presidency (the executive office in the cabinet) which was to provide administrative coordination. At the same time, a committee composed of technical secretaries of the economic ministries and the Presidency was created to begin long range planning based on modern economic techniques and principles.

This committee was headed by López Rodó. Professor Anderson believes that in creating the economic comisión delegada as a coordination and decision-making instrument, the economic ministers sought to replace the cabinet as the prime forum of economic policy-making with a smaller, more technically-expert, and more ideologically homogeneous decision-making body. He also states that the economic ministers sought to restructure procedure so that the cabinet would play mainly a formalizing or legitimating role in the decision-making process and the Cortes would play an ever more peripheral and optional legitimating role. In fact, in the matter of the Stabilization Program, the cabinet did play solely a formalizing role and the Cortes was totally ignored since the law establishing the Stabilization Program was enacted by decree of General Franco, as Head of State. However, as we shall see, the Cortes did not keep to the passive role envisioned for it by the economic ministers when they presented their development plans to it for approval.[22]

In 1958, Spain became an associate member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (which soon after became the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development); Spain also joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank

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[22]Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain, pp. 112-113, 124-125.

for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) that year.[23] At the same time, France embarked on a stabilization program drawn up by a council of technical experts headed by Jacques Rueff. These events were to furnish new inputs into the Spanish economic policy-making process in the form of consultations between the foreign technical experts and Spanish economic policy-makers. The recommendations given to Spanish policy-makers by the various international organizations were quite similar in nature, primarily because they were committed to the neo-Liberal principles of development through trade liberalization and the removal of restraints on currency convertibility.[24]

Perhaps the most innovative procedural instrument utilized by economic policy-makers in the first years of the Neo-Liberal Period was a questionnaire sent to various economic organizations to solicit their opinions about the probable consequences of stabilization measures, such as liberalization of trade and exchange, and economic integration with Europe. The questionnaire was sent to the following organizations: the National Economic (management) Council of the Syndical Organization, Superior Council of the Chambers of Commerce, Bank

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[23]Ramon Tamames, Estructura Económica de España, Third edition (Madrid: Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1958), pp. 739-740.

[24]Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain, pp. 118-119.

of Spain, Spanish Confederation of Savings and Loan Associations, Superior Banking Council, INI, Institute of Agricultural-Social Studies, Institute of Political Studies (University of Madrid), School of Economics (University of Madrid), and the National Economic Council (an appointed body of technical experts and high-level public officials). The results of the questionnaire showed a somewhat remarkable consensus on the desirability and probable benefits of stabilization measures and Spanish participation in European economic integration.[25]

Anderson suggests that instead of genuine consultation, the questionnaire achieved an aggregative effect, ". . . a largely uncautious, uncritical, overwhelmingly enthusiastic endorsement of the course. . . ," that the economic policy-makers intended to follow. He further suggests that this overwhelming approval of proposed stabilization policies was due to the fact that the labor sectors of the syndical organization were not consulted and that the younger, more aggressive and innovative business firms, which favored liberalization and economic integration to a greater degree than traditional firms, were overrepresented in the participation procedure, i.e., the questionnaire.[26]

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[25]Tamames, Estructura Económica, p. 740.

[26]Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain, pp. 121-122.

During the period prior to and following the initiation of the Stabilization Program, two additional procedural instruments developed quite apart from those initiated by the economic policy-makers. One of these was the reactivation of the annual meeting of the National Syndical Economic Council in late 1957 by the newly-designated Minister Secretary of the National Movement, José Solís, who was also the National Delegate of the Syndical Organization. This was, Anderson states, the first genuine entry of the syndicates into the field of macroeconomic analysis. The activation of an annual policy-debating mechanism which had been inactive since 1952 showed ". . . a vivid political awareness to the implications of economic policy debate in Spain in 1957." Even though the National Syndical Economic Council meeting involved only commercial and industrial management personnel and owners, and even though they made policy recommendations that were largely in line with the proposed stabilization program, Anderson suggests that neither the National Syndical Economic Council deliberations nor its published report played a role in designing the stabilization policy instruments which were mainly formulated by López Rodó and his committee of technical secretaries (including many Opus Dei members) and the Economic comisión delegada.[27]

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[27]Anderson, Political Economy of Spain, pp. 123-124.

The other procedural instrument available to policy-makers at that time also developed as a result of actions taken by José Solís. Minister Solís instituted a limited collective bargaining process between management and labor in 1957 which resulted in negotiated rather than prescribed wage agreement for different sectors of labor.[28] Elections for local enlaces (labor syndical representatives) became less controlled in the sense that candidates were no longer preselected by National Movement committees, although there was some evidence of government interference with ballot-counting in 1960. The election of local labor representatives and the institution of a collective bargaining process have had the effect of broadening the scope of participation in the labor policy decision-making process. In the 1957 local syndical elections, approximately 70 percent of the 350,000 worker delegates, or enlaces, were elected for the first time and of these, about one-half were older workers who had been active in either the Anarcho-Syndicalist trade union (CNT) or the

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[28]The former Minister of Labor, José Antonio Girón, was replaced in 1957 by Fermin Sanz Orrio, a syndical chief whom Stanley Payne characterizes as ". . . entirely lacking in political initiative or personality." This may help to explain why Solís was successful in taking away the function of arbitrarily setting wage policy from the Minister of Labor and substituting this function with the collective bargaining process; Payne, Falange, p. 2261.

Socialist labor movement (UGT) during the Second Republic. In the 1960 elections, at least 2000 "known Communist" enlaces were included among the total 400,000 worker representatives elected. Between 1958 and 1963, some 2,465 new wage agreements were negotiated, affecting 4,344,166 (approximately half) of Spain's workers and some 840,559. Thus, even though the procedural instrument of the more "representative" labor syndical organization was available to economic policy-makers from 1957 on, it made little or no impact on overall economic policy-making until the formulation of the first development plan began.[29]

The next major procedural instrument utilized by economic policy-makers was that of long-range development planning. By 1961 when Franco addressed the First Syndical Congress with the statement, "We have come out of stabilization, we are about to enter the plan of development. . . ," it had become clear that economic policy-makers had selected planning as the central instrument of economic development, modeled after the planning procedure used in France.[30]

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[29]Souchère, Explanation of Spain, pp. 260-265; Welles, Gentle Anarchy, pp. 130-132, 211.

[30]Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain, pp. 163-164; Michel Drain, L'Economie de l'Espagne (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), p. 114.

French planning was basically indicative rather than prescriptive in character. That is to say, it represented a moderate course between the two extremes of laissez-faire non-planning, or simple economic projection for informational purposes, and centralized prescriptive planning and control of the economy. Indicative planning as a procedural instrument in France involved the establishment of overall economic goals and targets. This took place at the technical Planning Commission level. Then, in a series of "horizontal" and "vertical" committee meetings which included public officials, business leaders, technical experts, and labor union representatives, the details of the plan were worked out in terms of programs for specific economic sectors. The projected targets were assumed to be merely indicative for the private sector while they were prescriptive for the public sector of the economy. Thus, the primary functions of indicative planning in France were to coordinate public and private sector growth and to provide private business with full information on future public policy.[31]

The French planning procedure had a built-in macroeconomic perspective, one of the main reasons for

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[31]Tamames, Estructura Económica, pp. 765-769.

its adoption by the Spanish economic policy-makers. Anderson suggests that another reason was that the French planning procedure allowed the Opus Dei economic ministers to create new institutions which performed the functions of gathering information from the private sector for economic planning, instead of relying on the syndical organization which was the established and legitimate instrument for contact between economic policy-makers and the private sector and which could have been adapted to the purposes of long-range planning. Anderson explains that this was done because, according to a private study in 1960,[32] the largest business firms had particularly low levels of confidence and participation in the syndical organization, and since those were the firms most committed to neo-Liberal principles (according to the questionnaire), the economic ministers had to circumvent the syndicates and fashion instruments of participation which would be utilized by large businesses.[33]

The process of setting up the procedural instruments for planning was initiated in February, 1962, when López Rodó was appointed Commissioner of the Development Plan. The committee of technical secretaries which had begun long-range planning in 1957 now became the Planning

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[32]Amando de Miguel and Juan Linz, Los Empresarios Ante el Poder Publico (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Politicos, 1966).

[33]Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain, pp. 70-72, 167-169.

Commission operating as an agency within the Ministry of the Presidency. The Office of Economic Coordination and Planning (OCYPE), also created in 1957, became a staff agency of the plan, serving primarily as an organ of interministerial coordination. The Planning Commission, which ultimately reported to the economic comisión delegada, also had at its disposal the services of a consulting commission composed of eight well-known economics professors, the newly-created Foreign Trade Institute, an office of public relations and the Institute of National Statistics, although the latter remained an autonomous agency. Within the Planning Commission, there were four subsecretaries (including López Rodó) who were in charge of overseeing the work of the participant committees: eight ponencias which corresponded to the French "horizontal" committees, and twenty comisiones or "vertical" committees. Each committee was furnished with economic and statistical advisers from the Planning Commission.[34]

The instruments which comprised the total planning procedure were created in the first months of 1962, although finishing the task of appointing members to the

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[34]Tamames, Estructura Económica, pp. 767-769. The ponencias considered general factors which would shape the plan: finance, commerce, labor, productivity, geographic location, economic flexibility, agriculture, and irrigation. The comisiones each represented a specific economic sector and corresponded roughly to the syndical organizations, e.g., maritime fishing industry, transport, steel and metal industries, communications, etc.

participant committees took longer. Eventually about 400 committee members were appointed by the relevant ministries, the Planning Commission, and, where directly relevant, the syndical organization. Of these 400 participant committee members, approximately 250 were private businessmen. Finally, a president was appointed for each participant committee by the relevant ministers. Most of the presidents were technical secretaries-general or subsecretaries of the ministries.[35]

It was also at this time in late 1962 that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development published the report of its study undertaken in 1960-61. The IBRD study contained a detailed analysis of the Spanish economy and it outlined development policy proposals, emphasizing the need for overall planning, sound fiscal and monetary management, and the removal of constraints on the free operation of the Spanish market.[36] The report showed a basic commitment to neo-Liberal principles and it became the focal point, and often the target, of a public debate which began developing in the early 1960's. We shall return later to the matter of a legitimate public forum for debate.

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[35]Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain, p. 172; cf. Welles, Gentle Anarchy, p. 321.

[36]IBRD, The Economic Development of Spain (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963).

After the Planning Commission had established the development targets and public sector strategy, the participant committees carried out studies and designed programs for their relevant sector. The manner in which the work of the committees was carried out suggests that the committees performed primarily coordination and aggregation functions, as had been intended by the economic ministers, although the consultation function was not absent in the overall work of the committees.[37] It is worth quoting Anderson at some length on this point:

> . . . there was considerable diversity in the experience of different committees. In some cases, the economic advisers and public officials who were officers of the committees prepared the sectoral plans with only rudimentary participation by committee members. In other cases, the committees of the plan represented a continuation of established patterns of negotiations between industrial leaders and their public sector counterparts, a transference to a new arena of a type of interchange that had long existed in policy-making. This was particularly apparent in the large, more important industrial sectors. In a minority of cases, a healthy and persistent dialogue was joined between groups with differing interests and points of view. This interchange, sometimes quite heated, was normally resisted by the leaders of the committees, who saw it as disruptive of the purpose of formulating a sectoral plan in a limited period of time.....
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> In some committees a tension was evident between the leadership, which sought to get on with the work expected by the Planning Commission, and those members who preferred to raise major

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[37]Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain, pp. 171, 173-174. Cf. Tamames, Estructura Económica, pp. 770-771.

> issues of policy debate or to question the premises of the planning effort itself.....
> Though there were conflicts in most committees, the specific objectives and deadlines specified by the Planning Commission dominated the work in the long run.[38]

Yet policy debate, both within the participant committees and, more importantly, in the public forum that developed so rapidly during the early 1960's, had an impact on the formulation of the plan in at least two areas: regional development and social development. The growing public debate added a new, legitimate dimension to the planning procedure as well as to the political system. While the debate focused on the philosophy, procedures, and programs of neo-Liberalism as an "economic ideology," the subjects treated in the general press and scholarly publications often spilled over into the previously-forbidden areas of criticism of the form of government in Spain.[39]

Within the Syndicates, the National Movement, the intellectual communities, and among increasingly

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[38]Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain, pp. 175-176.

[39]An example of this type of criticism is found in the following quote from Tamames, Estructura Económica, p. 785: "Cuando el sistema político in genere no es democrático es dificil que pueda serlo la elaboración del Plan. Sin verdaderos Sindicatos obreros es imposible hablar de verdaderos representantes de los trabajadores."

reformist clergy, vigorous protests were published against the preoccupation of the policy-makers with industrial sector growth at the expense of social objectives. The Syndicates, especially those representing agricultural workers, and the National Movement openly criticized the plan as it was being formulated, and they argued for a regional development strategy which would lure industry into the more underdeveloped regions of the country. They were joined in this demand by a group of "structuralist" economists who saw regional development as a way of incorporating a mechanism to redistribute wealth more equitably into the neo-Liberal development strategy. In fact, they succeeded and by early 1963, regional development had become a central focus of the plan, even though no high priority had been placed on regional development in the earlier decisions taken by the Planning Commission concerning policy strategy.[40]

Opponents of the neo-Liberal orientation also were somewhat successful in having their demands met for more emphasis on "social" development policy, as opposed to merely "economic" development policy. Anderson takes the position that the response of the policy-makers to this demand was largely on the symbolic level in that

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[40]Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain, pp. 176-177, 184-185.

they merely changed the name of the plan (it became the Economic and Social Development Plan) and made explicit the social byproducts which were assumed to accompany economic development.[41]

It appears, however, that Anderson is overly critical of the economic policy-makers and that their response to public criticism was more than symbolic. The Dutch planning expert, Jan Tinbergen, explains a development planning method, termed the "method of complementarity" which allows for the "implicit" planning of the social sectors and "explicit" planning in the industrial or economic sectors. This method is based on the empirically-verified proposition that increases in the activities of a number of social sectors rise in relation to increases in national income or the income of certain regions. The social sectors involved include personal services, government services, and education services (in the widest sense of the word "education") at the national and regional level.[42] Apparently, the Spanish planners were utilizing the method of complementarity for planning in the social sectors. However, under

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[41]Ibid., pp. 197, 199.

[42]Jan Tinbergen, Development Planning, trans. by N. D. Smith (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1967), pp. 117-125.

pressure from the syndicates and the "structuralists," the planners did make explicit their plans in the social sectors, and it became evident that investment in education facilities had received some measure of priority.[43]

It is possible to suggest that the "spirit" of the public debate carried over into the forum of the Cortes. After the cabinet approved the development plan on November 8, 1963, it was sent to the Cortes for consideration in the December session. Anderson suggests that this step in the procedural process was expected to be no more than a ratifying or enacting function. However, objections to the plan were raised in the Cortes on both procedural and substantive grounds. The procedural question involved the right of prior approval by the Planning Commissioner for proposed budget changes. The major substantive debate culminated in the proposal by the Committee on Fundamental (constitutional) Laws and the Presidency to recommit the entire plan to the government for total reconsideration. Although the policy-leaders prevailed and the Economic and Social Development Plan was approved in the full session of the Cortes on December 27 (with sixteen dissenting votes), it is significant that some "opposition" members attempted to use the Cortes as a vehicle for substantially changing

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[43]Consejo Economico Sindical Nacional, España: Desarrollo Económico-Social (Madrid: Organizacion Sindical Española, 1964).

public policy and for expressing criticism publicly--an action which did not occur during the Autarchy Period.[44]

The public debate continued, along with criticism of the actual performance of the economy, especially in 1965, which was marked by new inflationary pressures and poor agricultural performance. By early 1966 when preparations for the formulation of the second plan began, public examination and criticism of the direction of economic policy became even more probing. In general, the arguments for emphasizing social objectives in the new plan were revived by opponents and critics of the first plan.[45]

The procedural instrumentation for the second plan was basically the same as that utilized to formulate the first plan with the important exception that, before establishing macroeconomic targets and strategy, the policy-makers consulted major groups through the vehicle

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[44]Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain, pp. 178-180.

[45]Ibid., pp. 225-227. In order not to overdraw the scope of the public debate, it should be noted that a public opinion study was carried out by the Public Opinion Institute in late 1965. The study showed that 57 percent of the population knew of the existence of the development plan, and most of these persons were middle- and upper-income, educated (at least to the level of high school studies), urban inhabitants, as might be expected in any modern country. For further comments on the study, see Ramon Tamames, España Ante un Segundo Plan de Desarrollo (Barcelona: Editorial Nova Terra, 1968), pp. 205-207.

of a questionnaire that requested their comments on an outline proposed by the Planning Commission for the direction of the second four-year plan. Spokesmen for the banking and business communities stressed in their reports the need for economic stability with limited attention to social and agrarian reform.[46] Various other agencies, groups, and individual economists stressed the need for emphasis on the social and agrarian aspects of the new plan.[47] Among these, the provincial bureaus of the Syndical Organization produced a thorough analysis of the economic and social problems of each region of Spain. This published study also presented the Syndical Organization's demands in terms of social goals as well as concrete policy strategy proposals for achieving the social goals.[48]

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[46]In addition to the demand for economic stability, the business and banking community pointed out economic problems that required attention by planners. In a typical article, José Antonio Valverde cites five major defects in the business and industrial sectors: (1) industrial incapacity, (2) excessive profit (not reinvested), (3) total lack of marketing studies aimed at the future, (4) lack of modern management, and (5) raquitismo empresarial, or "mini-firms" with less than five employees which, according to a Banco de Vizcaya study, accounted for 84% of all Spanish industrial and manufacturing firms, in "Las Quince Empresas Mas Poderosas de España," La Actualidad Española, December 5, 1968, pp. 20-24.

[47]Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain, p. 227; Tamames, España Ante un Segundo Plan, pp. 207-208, 218-221.

[48]Consejo Económico Sindical Nacional, Las Provincias Ante el Segundo Plan de Desarrollo, Vols. I, II, and III (Madrid: Consejo Económico Sindical Nacional, 1967).

Before the final version of the second plan had been formulated, the Organic Law of the State was adopted by a general referendum in December, 1966. This portion of Spain's open, or segmented, constitution provided, among other things, that in order for a bill to become law, it must have the approval of the Cortes. This meant that according to legal procedural requirements, the second development plan had to be approved by the Cortes. The plan was, in fact, approved, although there was again some open opposition and debate. Also, it should again be mentioned that López Rodó had been named Minister without Portfolio in the cabinet changes made in 1965, an action which amounted to a promotion for López Rodó which was to facilitate the process of obtaining cabinet approval of the second plan.[49]

In evaluating the planning procedure utilized for formulating the second plan, Anderson suggests that policy-makers were responsive to the criticisms and pressures generated in their political environment and that there was an increase in the number of inputs from

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[49]Fundamental Laws of the State: The Spanish Constitution (Madrid: Spanish Information Service, 1967), pp. 13-16, 104-106. For biographical information on all cabinet members through April 17, 1968, see, Joaquin Bardavio, "Los 76 Ministros," La Actualidad Espanola, 14 November 1968, 32-44. For biographical information on the cabinet named in 1969, see the Madrid newspaper, Arriba, October 30, 1969, 1-2, 15-18.

various sources to the planning process. This responsiveness resulted in a strikingly different kind of development plan from the first one which had been in effect from 1964 through 1967. The second plan was most responsive to criticisms of the lack of social content in the first plan as well as to problems that had developed during the implementation of the first plan. Thus, the advocates for social reform did make a substantial impact on the formulation of public policy. Moreover, the public forum for debate remained lively and there were not a few articulate opponents of the second plan in 1968 when international money problems, including devaluation of the pound and the peseta, caused a one-year delay in the implementation of the second development plan.[50]

Now that we have delineated the elements of procedural instrumentation utilized by economic policy-makers in the Autarchy Period and the Neo-Liberal Period, let us briefly compare the two periods in terms of the public participation in economic policy-making that existed.

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[50]Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain, pp. 228-229; Drain, L'Economie, p. 115. For a scholarly criticism of the second plan and of the planning procedure, see Ramon Tamames' work, Los Centros de Gravedad de la Económia Española (Madrid: Guadiana de Publicaciones, S. A., 1968).

During the Autarchy Period, public participation in economic policy-making was extremely limited. It consisted of information furnished through the syndical organization whose local labor delegates were not freely elected and whose provincial delegates were appointed. There was almost no coordination between labor and management sections of the syndical organization and wages were prescribed by the Ministry of Labor, rather than negotiated between labor and management.

Economic policy-making during this period was centered in the ministerial cabinet of the Head of State. During the early years, apparently only high-ranking military officers and government officials had access to this body. However, by the early 1950's, Spanish economists pioneering in macroeconomic analysis furnished statistical information on the economy to the cabinet-level policy-makers, and by the mid-50's, the private banking community also provided information related to the performance of the economy to policy-makers.

Local government officials, appointed at the cabinet level, lobbied for local interests. However, they made little impact on economic policy during the Autarchy Period.

During the Neo-Liberal Period, public participation in economic policy-making began to expand considerably. While the Stabilization Program of 1959 was in the planning stage, Opus Dei members who were economic ministers and

technical experts consulted various government and educational organizations and private industries about the desirability and probable benefits of stabilization measures as well as Spanish participation in European economic integration. Considerable inputs from foreign technical experts were received and registered by the Opus Dei economic policy-makers during the first years of the Neo-Liberal Period, i.e., from French planning experts, the Organization for Economic Coordination and Development, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Although the annual meeting of the National Syndical Economic Council in 1957 published policy recommendations in line with the proposed Stabilization Program, it is believed that these recommendations had little effect on the final program of stabilization measures. The limited collective bargaining process between labor and management and the liberalization of the electoral system for choosing local syndical labor representatives, both begun in 1957, failed to provide immediately-expanded avenues of public participation in the formulation of the Stabilization Program.

However, public participation did increase significantly in the early 1960's during the elaboration of the first four-year economic and social development plan (1963-1967). The Opus Dei economic ministers and technical

experts adapted the French long-range economic development planning procedure, based on the participation of some 400 members (public officials, business leaders, technical experts, and labor syndical representatives) of specialized economic sectoral committees that worked out specific policy programs to meet sectoral goals. A new Planning Commission, headed by López Rodó, handled the coordination of the participant committees.

Public participation expanded considerably when dissatisfaction with some aspects of the development plan led to the spontaneous evolution of a public forum, mainly through the printed media, for debate about the plan and other subjects, formerly not permitted by the regime's censors.[51] This public participation had substantial impact on the plan in terms of emphasis on regional development, and some impact in the plan's emphasis on the social aspects of economic development.

During the elaboration of the second economic and social development plan (1968-1971), the same procedural instruments functioned that were utilized during the first planning period. In addition, public

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[51]It would be interesting to argue that dissatisfaction with the development plan and the generation of a public forum for debate leading to wider-ranging economic policy and more emphasis on social policy, was closely akin to the behavior anticipated in Schmitter's concept of "spillover" in the realm of regional integration among nation-states; see Philippe C. Schmitter, "Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses about International Integration," International Organization, XXIII, No. 1 (Spring, 1969), 162.

participation was increased through the utilization of a questionnaire drawn up by the Ministry of Development Planning to solicit ideas about goals and targets which would form the basis for the second plan. This questionnaire was sent to persons in approximately the same groups that participated in the 1957 questionnaire, with the exception that the syndical organization was now more genuinely representative of its rank-and-file members.

Participation was also increased through the elaboration of a major study of the economic and social problems of the various regions of Spain. This study, including demands in terms of social goals and policy proposals for achieving the goals, was carried out by the syndical organization. The syndical study made a substantial impact on the content of the second development plan.

This brief comparison of procedural instrumentation utilized in economic policy-making during the Autarchy Period and the Neo-Liberal Period shows that while public participation was extremely limited during the early period of the Franco regime, policy-makers of the latter period brought an increasingly large volume of inputs into the economic policy-making process, both through procedural instruments that were designed by the policy-makers and through those procedural instruments that developed independently of the policy-makers' efforts.

This increasingly large volume of inputs during the Neo-Liberal Period represents increases both in quantity and in quality of participation.

The economic planning process was largely put into effect by Opus Dei economic ministers and technical experts. They showed themselves to be firmly committed to the overall goal of the economic development of Spain, while at the same time, flexible enough to heed critics of the development plans and policies. This resulted in an increase of public participation in the economic policy-making process. The era of the Neo-Liberal Period also saw the liberalization of Spanish electoral procedures and the requirement of approval by the Cortes in order for a bill to have the status of law. Thus, the Spanish experience with economic development and its political correlates parallels the general Western experience in terms of increasing public participation in political decision-making.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS

The research for this study began with the half-formed assumption that where a somewhat secretive organization was being loudly accused of trying to take over commanding positions in the Spanish society, there was probably some truth in the accusations. The research reported in this study has not upheld that assumption. On the contrary, the research has suggested that Opus Dei as an organization is concerned solely with spiritual ends. However, it is perhaps the practical or secular way to achieve those spiritual ends emphasized by Opus Dei that has produced such noteworthy and suspicion-raising results. To put it another way, when success in a person's professional work becomes the measuring stick by which he can objectively know whether he will achieve eternal life and happiness in the supernatural realm, then that person becomes so motivated to succeed that elite status is likely to be the result. Seen in this way, becoming an elite is a very secondary goal. The achievement of eternal life is the primary goal. It is not a new idea that religious doctrine, fervently believed, can vastly affect the

shape and form of the secular world. However, the case should not be overstated. A process of self-selection may also be at work to the extent that people who are success-oriented may be attracted to affiliate themselves with Opus Dei.

Let us retrace, however, the general lines of argument presented in the present study before we suggest further consequences of the phenomenon of Opus Dei in contemporary Spain.

It has been argued that the founding of Opus Dei was causally related to two important trends in the 19th and early 20th centuries. One trend involved the steady growth of popular anti-clericalism and political radicalism which eroded the Catholic Church's mass base in Spain. The other trend had to do with a tacit alliance between the Bourbon Crown and the Catholic Church, an alliance which guaranteed that the Church would retain its special, official relationship to the state and that the Crown would retain the support of the Church hierarchy and the Church's faithful, i.e., the middle and upper classes. The second trend begins to disintegrate in 1923 with the coup d'etat of General Primo de Rivera. His inability to control civil disturbances and his willingness to give Socialist labor groups a voice in government cost him the support of the Church and eventually, the entire populace.

However, in the elections of 1931, a majority of the citizens were unwilling to return to a monarchy or to give the Catholic Church its historically unique official position. It has thus been suggested that Opus Dei was founded as part of the middle and upper classes' attempt to retain the Spanish Catholic state and to regain the Spanish Catholic populace.[1]

It has also been argued that although Opus Dei was founded at a difficult time in Spain's history and although it was hampered in its activities during the Spanish Civil War, the organization has grown rapidly during the Franco regime. This rapid growth has not been limited to Spain. In fact, the papal recognition of Opus Dei in 1950 as the first Secular Institute indicates an almost meteoric rise to acceptance within the Church. Again, the rapid growth and official church acceptance of Opus Dei is felt by this author to be due to the doctrine taught by the organization. Catholic Religious Orders promise eternal life to those people who are willing to separate themselves from the secular world and its pleasures. Opus Dei was the first Catholic organization that promised eternal life to those people who would remain in the secular world and become

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[1]See Chapter II, supra.

successful and proficient in their professional work.[2] Thus, the appeal of Opus Dei in a Catholic society seems understandable when viewed in this light.

The study of the organizational structure of Opus Dei contained in Chapter IV of this work suggests several somewhat perplexing notions. As has been mentioned, Opus Dei officials on the local group level maintain close relationships with members, and a great deal of spiritual guidance and counseling is an expected part of the relationship. Although we found diversity in attitudes toward political matters held by elite Opus Dei members and agreement among attitudes toward the same political matters held by younger Opus Dei members and non-members, the line is very thin and flexible between spiritual guidance and advice about a member's secular conduct. We were able to suggest, on the basis of the findings about political attitudes and beliefs discussed in Chapters V and VI, that no specific political ideology is taught to Opus Dei members in their period of membership probation. It was further suggested, on the basis of this evidence that Opus Dei is probably not a political group in the sense of an underground political party or a pressure group acting in behalf of self-interest. No evidence was found to suggest that those

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[2]See Chapter III, supra.

who maintained the closest relationships to Opus Dei, the Numerary members and the Supernumerary members, adhered more closely to one line of political thought than those whose ties to the organization are more loosely structured, the Co-operators.

In reference to another possibly perplexing aspect of the organizational structure, it can be noted that Opus Dei resembles the Communist party in structure. This resemblance is based on the cell-like bodies of Opus Dei on the local group level, the regular, hierarchical flows of instructions from top to bottom, and the extra-hierarchical information channels in the office of the Visitors. This resemblance is further strengthened by the fact that, on the local level, Opus Dei members often know only the other members in their own group, but few or no members outside the group.[3] It appears that political associations or parties of some type will be allowed in Spain the near future, even though Opus Dei political elites have generally opposed them, especially in terms of political parties.[4] When and if

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[3]See Maurice Duverger's discussion of the cell in his classic work, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, transl. by Barbara and Robert North, 3rd edition (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1959), pp. 27-36.

[4]See the late President Luis Carrero Blanco's remarks in the newspaper Ya, July 21, 1973, p. 1, where he is quoted as having said: "If there are associations, sectors, or groups, I am with all and not with any of them."

this happens, Opus Dei will already have the structure of a political party. But in all fairness, one could assert the same of the Jesuits and the Freemasons. Whether Opus Dei decides to turn its organized structure toward political purposes of the type engaged in by political parties is considered by this author to be unlikely.

The present study has attempted to indicate the effects of Opus Dei doctrine in the lives of some of its politically elite members: those who have held cabinet posts. We have shown that the Opus Dei cabinet ministers who entered the top decision-making body in 1957 or after were younger than their contemporaries, held their posts longer, and were better prepared in terms of the university-level studies most likely to be needed in order to initiate and sustain rapid economic development. It was shown that these characteristics were more often attributed, or attributed in greater degree to those members with the closest ties to Opus Dei, the Numeraries and then, the Supernumeraries. This reinforces this author's argument that the Opus Dei doctrine of sanctification of work produces visible results, generally in the form of proficient, efficient professionals.

It was also shown in Chapter VII that Opus Dei ministers increased in numbers until 1973, and that the original Opus Dei ministers co-opted into upper-level

bureaucracy other Opus Dei members who would also become cabinet ministers. No really satisfactory explanation has been given for the decline in the number of Opus Dei ministers in 1973 and 1974. It is the feeling of this author that the Matesa financial scandal and its involvement of several Opus Dei cabinet ministers were quite damaging to the Opus Dei image. But to the Matesa affair must be added the fact that while Opus Dei ministers were responsible for the rapid growth of Spain's economy, they were also seen as responsible for the persistent problem of inflation. Alberto Ullastres Calvo was unable to control inflation and was terminated by Franco as Minister of Commerce in 1965.[5] The inflation problem of the 70's in Spain has been far worse than that brought on by the First Economic and Social Development Plan in the early 60's. It is, thus, not unlikely that Franco has removed some of the Opus Dei ministers for their failure to deal decisively with the problem of inflation.[6]

And finally, it was suggested that even though the Opus Dei ministers espoused an authoritarian, pro-Franco political ideology, they devised and put into effect a vast planning and policy-making apparatus which

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[5]Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain, pp. 107-108.

[6]See the article in the Times-Picayune newspaper, October 15, 1974, p. 2, where the annual rate of inflation is cited at 20%.

eventually meant greater public participation in economic policy decision-making. Thus, economic development in Spain has followed the Western model generally agreed to mean greater public participation in authoritative decision-making. This model also assumes, from past Western experience, that the amount of public participation in and control over authoritative decision-making is likely to increase, leading toward the development of democracy. The analysis of decision-making contained in Chapter VIII does not extend beyond the area of economic policy-making, although the model of economic development leads us to expect that greater public participation in authoritative decision-making will occur. It is interesting that the Opus Dei ministers did not publicly support the "greater public participation" political correlate of economic development in Spain.

There remain some final speculations and comments about Opus Dei in the Spanish political system. There is still the fact that a sizeable number of Spaniards believe Opus Dei to be engaged in a plot to take over the society. J. M. Roberts has looked at the same kind of "plot" accusations aimed at the Freemasons between 1750 and 1830. He concludes that such "mythologies" must be understood as attempts by individuals to find a satisfactory explanation

for large bewildering processes of social change and that these mythologies, or accusation of plots, are likely to arise in the Christian cultural tradition which locates moral responsibility in the individual.[7] Roberts' argument does not seem to hold in the case of Opus Dei in contemporary Spain since, in fact, Opus Dei members, themselves, increasingly gained top decision-making positions after 1957. It can be argued, however, that as known Opus Dei elites in all sectors take public stands on the political left, the charge of right-wing authoritarian Opus Dei ideology is likely to lose ground.[8]

It should be pointed out that even though Opus Dei as an organization has no provable political aims, it is seen as a political group by other political groups or nuclei in Spain.[9] Thus, it is treated as a political

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[7]J. M. Roberts, The Mythology of the Secret Societies (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972), pp. 349-357.

[8]Rafael Calvo Serer, an Opus Dei member living in Paris, has announced that he and a Spanish Communist leader were together forming the new Democratic Leftist Coalition; see ABC, August 12, 1974, p. 40.

[9]The old-line Falangists bitterly oppose Opus Dei and see it as a political group, according to an unpublished letter from Cortes-member, and early Falange member, Agatangelo Soler Llorca to Laureano López Rodó, dated March 16, 1971.

group and should, in that sense, be considered one. In a much larger sense, Opus Dei as an organization engages in political activity when it teaches occupational trades to underprivileged children and when its schools of "domestic science" lobby for inclusion of domestic laborers within the benefits of the government's social security program. And in terms of long range effects, the Opus Dei doctrine that encourages efficiency and proficiency in one's professional work points the way toward much-needed expertise in a country that has traditionally lagged behind its European neighbors.

However, as a last comment, albeit a comment full of irony, one cannot help remembering that modernization scholars have often noted that as economic development progresses, the accompanying demographic and social changes are likely to result in the increasing secularization of the society. If this be true in the Spanish case, it is indeed ironic that Opus Dei ministers and technocrats have started the wheels of economic development rolling. In their quest for eternal life through professional proficiency, they may have created the vehicle that will carry Spaniards farther away from the Church, rather than closer to it.

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